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Thesis Abstract 
According to Mary Ann Glendon, scholars and statespersons have often grappled with 
a tension of pursuing their political ideals within practical realities. In The Forum and The 
Tower, Glendon examines how the political judgments of prominent public figures illuminates 
how conceptions of political ends inform, or do not inform, those decisions. This thesis draws 
from contemporary debates on Aristotle’s phronesis to explore how political actors deliberate 
between acting with integrity and compromising their political ideals. It develops a theoretical 
framework to examine the sources of political judgment in the leadership of Pope John Paul II 
towards Communist authority in Poland. The research proposes that John Paul II’s moral 
diplomacy draws from his political aim to expand the peoples’ participation in Poland’s 
political culture and economic structure. His decisions served as a “catalyst” for the Solidarity 
movement, which ultimately helped secure his political aims. However, external pressures on 
the Communist Government make it difficult to determine the extent to which John Paul II is 
“practically wise” in this context. 
 
Introduction  
 
“What can be more glorious,” [Cicero] asked, “than the conjunction of practical experience 
in great affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and 
learning?”1 
 
This thesis examines how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his decisions to 
influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It argues that the 
Pontiff’s philosophical formation under totalitarian regimes helped shape his view that 
participation in political, economic and social activities constitute basic human rights. As the 
first Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, John Paul II combined the conventional 
diplomatic and moral authority of the papacy with knowledge and reflection gained through 
his own experiences of totalitarian regimes, to influence events leading to the collapse of the 
Polish Communist government in 1989. The project argues that his political philosophy and 
                                                          
1 Cicero, ‘On the Commonwealth and on the Laws’, trans. James Zetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Unviersity Press, 1999), 61 in The Forum and the Tower, ed. Mary Ann Glendon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 222. 
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the Polish context of that period directly informed his political strategy to encourage the Polish 
government to increase its citizens’ political, social and economic freedoms, while advocating 
nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it studies how John Paul II, as a philosopher, makes 
political decisions as a statesperson.  
 The thesis examines and then adopts Mary Ann Glendon’s main question in her work, 
The Forum and The Tower2 about whether it is possible to be politically effective without 
compromising too much on principles.  In order to do so  it develops Glendon’s method into a 
theoretical framework, so as to understand the ways that Pope John Paul II brought together 
his work in the tower (his thought about the aims of politics) with his activity in the forum (his 
political strategy towards Poland in that period). Glendon observes that the kinds of persons 
who ponder her question, among them students in the disciplines of philosophy and law,3 are 
concerned that politics often requires compromise on personal principles in order to gain, or 
retain, some degree of political influence. Glendon recognises that pursuing political goals as 
a political actor is difficult and imprecise. It requires skills to deliberate when, how, and to 
what extent one should advance a particular goal without damaging one’s effectiveness in the 
long-term. Glendon offers Weber’s view that if a political actor focusses “too narrowly” on the 
“ultimate good, the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because 
responsibility for consequences is lacking.”4 At the same time, if a political actor focusses too 
narrowly on immediate success at the expense of political principles, the person’s political aims 
become undermined.  
The thesis proposes to make two contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it provides an 
original analysis of Glendon’s methodology in The Forum and The Tower and develops a 
                                                          
2 Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and the Tower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
3 Ibid., ix. 
4 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in The Forum and The Tower, ed. Mary Ann Glendon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), x. 
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framework applicable to new contexts. Second, it applies the developed framework to a figure 
appropriate to Glendon’s question, namely John Paul II, to understand his method of political 
judgment. It consists of four chapters. Chapter One and Chapter Two adapt and develop 
Glendon’s method to focus on the relationship between political theory and political judgment. 
Thus established, Chapter Three and Chapter Four apply the method to John Paul II so as to 
examine the extent to which John Paul II retains his political thought in his methods and 
strategies to influence Polish politics. It highlights the process of deliberation where John Paul 
II considers the short-term advantages of compromising on his political views, versus the 
merits of, as Weigel puts it, “thinking long-term” by not sacrificing “core principles to what 
seems immediate advantage.”5 The framework also considers the extent to which John Paul 
II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989.  
To construct the methodology, the research project makes the dimensions of Glendon’s 
framework more explicit, which in turn makes possible an application to future case studies 
beyond the present subject. Pursuing this point, Chapter One outlines Glendon’s project in The 
Forum and The Tower. It proposes that Aristotelian virtue ethics help understand concepts 
central to The Forum and The Tower. Glendon employs classical concepts in Aristotle’s Ethics 
and Politics to frame her analysis. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia 
(happiness)6 and phronesis (or practical wisdom),7 aid a conceptual understanding of what 
                                                          
5 George Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft’, First Things 1, no. 247 (2015): 29. 
6 Definitions and arguments on eudaimonia will be drawn from: David Keyt, ‘Intellectualism in 
Aristotle’, In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1983) 364–87; Richard Kraut, ‘The Peculiar Function of Human 
Beings’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979): 467–78; John McDowell, ‘The Role of 
Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 359–76; Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for Happiness in 
Nicomachean Ethics 17 and X 6-8’, The Classical Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1990): 421–432; later 
additions to the debate include: Gary M. Gurtler, ‘The Activity of Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics’, 
The Review of Metaphysics 56, no. 4 (June, 2003): 801–834; Stephen S. Bush, ‘Divine and Human 
Happiness in “Nichomachean Ethics”’, The Philosophical Review 1, no. 117 (January, 2008): 49–75. 
7 Definitions and arguments on phronesis will be drawn from: Eugene Garver, ‘After “Virtu”: 
Rhetoric, Prudence and Moral Pluralism in Machiavelli’, History of Political Thought 17, no. 2 
(1996); Eugene Garver, Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); 
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constitutes a life of philosophy (the tower), and what constitutes a life of politics (the forum). 
Glendon highlights the importance of the classical passions thymos (spiritedness) and eros 
(love) as non-rational forces that explain the desire to hold theory and practice with integrity.  
These debates reveal a lack of consensus over whether Aristotle believed the best kind 
of life was one of theoria (contemplation) as the best and most self-fulfilling activity, or a 
combination of the moral virtues, best fulfilled in the life of the statesman.8 The lack of 
consensus among scholars provides contextual grounding for Glendon’s claim that scholars 
can deliberate “endlessly” about the “advantages and disadvantages” of a particular course of 
action, but it is statespersons who must “make decisions, and take responsibility for them.”9 
Therefore, Glendon’s framework studies how political thought (in the tower) informs, or is 
compromised, in political action (in the forum).  
Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue as a “double position” of mean and 
excellence, shows that sound political judgment requires a synthesis of political ends with a 
sound understanding and judgment of what means are most likely to contribute towards their 
success.10 The virtuous statesperson aims towards the right “ends” through deliberating about 
what “means” will succeed. Political judgments that fail to adapt the means to the practical 
                                                          
Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Maurice Charland, ‘Lyotard’s Postmodern Prudence’, in Prudence, 
Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, ed. Robert Hariman (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003); Shaun Gallagher, ‘The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics’, 
Philosophy Today 37, no. 1 (1993); Richard S. Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political 
Judgment’, The American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997); Peter J. Steinberger, The 
Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993); David E. Tabachnick, 
‘”Phronesis”, Democracy and Technology’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne 
de Science Politique 37, no. 4 (2004); Ronald Beiner, ‘Review of Peter Steinberger’s the Concept of 
Political Judgment’, Political Theory 22, no. 4 (1994); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming, 
trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). 
8 Glendon does not reference which scholars have deliberated this topic, and as such necessitates that 
the thesis examine contemporary discussions within Aristotelian virtue ethics to test the soundness of 
this claim. 
9 Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, x 
10 SJ Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books, 
1963), 337. 
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realities of the political context are excessive, and constitute a vice in relation to practical 
wisdom. At the other extreme, decisions that focus only on the present conditions and ignore 
the pursuit of political ends, is another form of excess, and is also a vice in relation to practical 
wisdom. In Glendon’s view, Edmund Burke and Cicero are examples of the wise statesperson. 
They combine a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in “managing great affairs”.11 This 
explanation demonstrates that Glendon’s view of sound political judgment, what can be aligned 
with phronesis – or practical wisdom – is Aristotelian. Thus, it is presently argued that scholarly 
perspectives on Aristotelian virtue ethics, particularly practical wisdom, enable an original 
analysis of Glendon’s understanding of political judgment in The Forum and The Tower.  
Chapter Two develops Glendon’s analysis into a theoretical framework that is 
applicable to new contexts. Drawing from the explanation of virtue in Chapter One, it shows 
that the statesperson able to retain moral integrity and be successful in those aims is “practically 
wise”. The practically wise person must deliberate what means best serve the political aims. 
Following Copleston, sometimes the right action involves an “excess” rather than a “defect”, 
while in other cases the reverse may be preferable.12 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use 
actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of 
the right ends.  
Additional to Glendon’s terminology, concepts from Maritain’s essay “The End of 
Machiavellianism” help identify excessive forms of political judgment, which, Maritain 
argues, constitute vices.13 Practical wisdom is understood as both a mean point between what 
Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other.14 
These terms are employed in the present thesis to highlight how political actors in The Forum 
                                                          
11 Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 24. 
12 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 337–8. 
13 Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? 
Perspectives from the Review of Politics, ed. Daniel Philpott and Ryan T Anderson (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 37–67 
14 Ibid., 62–64 
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and The Tower engage in a moral process of deliberating between moderate and excessive 
degrees of political judgment. Such decisions involve deliberation on a course of action when 
“apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”15 
Building on Glendon and Maritain, Hartmann’s graph of virtue16 is adapted to establish 
a new graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the practically 
wise person aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of 
phronesis call “political judgment”.17 It is the visual result of the conceptual integration of The 
Forum and The Tower and “The End of Machiavellianism”. Accordingly, the graph is 
employed heuristically as a visual aid throughout the discussion, providing the reader with a 
reference point that captures the distinctive elements of political judgment being examined.  
The current analysis is limited to how perspectives of political ends inform, or do not 
inform, political decision-making. Other insights are not considered, such as how one’s 
political legacy can change over time. Political thought, in the form of published works, can 
also shape future political events. For example, Glendon credits Locke’s political philosophy 
with fundamentally shaping the modern American legal and political system, and so in that 
sense they can be considered as works from the tower that have practical impact in the forum.18 
Aspects of Glendon’s framework in addition to the above are thus excluded from the current 
research project.  
Applying an adapted Glendon framework as described above fills a gap existing in 
research about the thought and political legacy of Pope John Paul II. Specifically, the 
framework synthesises studies of John Paul II’s ethical and political thought with analyses of 
his political decisions and contributions to the collapse of communism in Poland. Chapter 
                                                          
15 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38  
16 Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1932), 256. 
17 Richard Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment’, American Political Science 
Review, 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 409–10. 
18 Glendon, The Formum and the Tower, 105–6. 
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Three primarily engages Gregg,19 Buttiglione20 and Barrett,21 who offer comprehensive studies 
of Karol Wojtyla’s / John Paul II’s ethical and political thought. These studies argue that John 
Paul II has an intense interest in the fundamental dignity of the human person. His 
philosophical thought is built around his analysis of the person as an irreducible subject. These 
thinkers argue that his philosophical thought guides his views of political ends. In particular, 
John Paul II advocates that all persons have a fundamental right to have their dignity recognised 
through participation in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community. 
These rights include the right to work and have a sense of ownership of work, to participate in 
the determination of the political and economic system in which they live, to exercise freedom 
of worship and association of groups without government oversight, and to act in accordance 
with their conscience.22 Buttiglione also suggests that John Paul II’s experience of totalitarian 
governments in Poland shaped the intensity of his interest in individual rights as the 
manifestation of fundamental human dignity.23  
Within the understanding of John Paul II’s political convictions, Chapter Four analyses 
his political decisions to influence the circumstances of his home country of Poland. The 
chapter follows Troy,24 Marshall25 and Hall’s characterisation of papal political influence as 
                                                          
19 Samuel Gregg, Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II and the Development 
of Catholic Social Teaching (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999). 
20 Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II 
(Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997). 
21 Edward Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol 
Wojtyla/John Paul II (USA: Lexington Books, 2010). 
22 Ibid., 50, 60–62. 
23 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 27. 
24 Jodok Troy, ‘”The Pope’s Own Hand Outstretched”: Holy See Diplomacy as a Hybrid Mode of 
Diplomatic Agency’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 3 
(2018):521–39; Alan Chong and Jodok Troy, ‘A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal Secular 
Organization: The Holy See and the United Nations’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 12, no. 3 
(2011):335–54; Jodok Troy, ‘The Catholic Church: An Underestimated and Necessary Actor in 
International Affairs’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2008): 65–73. 
25 Katherine Marshall, Global Institutions of Religion: Ancient Movers, Modern Shakers (London: 
Routledge, 2013). 
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“hybrid”, where the Pope is both the Holy See’s “chief diplomat and moral authority”.26 This 
agency enables John Paul II to make more direct public pronouncements than would have been 
possible as a priest under Communist oversight. Weigel,27 Luxmoore and Babiuch,28 and 
Gaddis,29 argue John Paul II’s engagement with Poland contributed to the Communist 
government’s decision to allow free elections in June, 1989. This event marks the start of its 
transition from a communist political and economic system, to a liberal democratic political 
system, and an open market economy. John Paul II can be credited as the “catalyst” that 
inspired the Solidarity movement, which formed one year after his papal pilgrimage to Poland 
in 1979.30 He presented the freedom to worship, to form independent unions, to participate in 
the economic and political system through democratic elections, among other freedoms, as 
basic human rights. The Solidarity movement drew from his public message to secure these 
rights in the form of the first independent trade union under the communist government in 
Poland.31 Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church provided the organisational support that 
sustained and developed growing national opposition to the communist political and economic 
system. By 1989, the Polish government recognised Solidarity had become “a decisive factor 
on the political scene” and that it required Solidarity’s support for any legal act to be effective.32 
                                                          
26 Rodney Bruce Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, International Organisation, 51,4 
(1997): 591–622.  
27 George Weigel, The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of 
Pope John Paul II (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999); George Weigel, The End and the 
Beginning: Pope John Paul II—The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy (New York: 
Image Books, 2010).  
28 Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul 
of Eastern Europe (New York: G. Chapman, 1999). 
29 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
30 Gracjan Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution Pope John Paul II’s 1979 Pilgrimage to Poland and 
Its Effects on Solidarity and the Fall of Communism,’ The Polish Review 57, no. 4 (2012): 27. 
31 Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul 
of Eastern Europe (New York: G. Chapman, 1999), 212-13. 
32 James E Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, Journal of Law and 
Religion, 2, no.1 (1984): 154 
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Synthesizing analyses of John Paul II’s political thought and political action 
demonstrates how his political decisions draw from his political philosophy. This suggests that 
John Paul II makes political judgments in a way that is consistent with his view of political 
ends. Further, it shows how Karol Wojtyla’s formation under totalitarian systems shaped his 
cautious and moderated approach to critiquing the communist system. This view follows 
Weigel’s insight in his essay, “Lessons in Statecraft”, which argues that John Paul II prioritised 
his long-term aim of political autonomy for the Polish people over short-term success.33 The 
current research project draws from secondary literature to show how this strategy took form 
in the Pope’s public demand that the state uphold basic human rights. John Paul II encouraged 
nonviolent political resistance, and shifted Vatican foreign policy – called the ostpolitik 
(Eastern politics) – from accommodating government policies he disagreed with, to arguing 
for new policies that upheld basic human rights.34 Glendon’s framework emphasises that the 
decisions of scholars and statespersons show how ideas about the ends of politics (the tower) 
can shape individual efforts at political influence (in the forum). Applied to John Paul II, it 
therefore demonstrates he is a political actor who gives preference to long-term aims and 
political integrity over compromise for immediate political advantages.  
Glendon’s audience – the aspirant statesperson – is also interested in political success 
whilst retaining moral integrity. The thesis therefore also considers the extent to which John 
Paul II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of the communist government. At the time of his 
election to the papacy in 1978, over 90% of Poland’s population adhered to the Roman Catholic 
faith, and the Catholic Church wielded considerable political authority in Poland.35 At the same 
                                                          
33 Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft,’ 29. 
34 The Pope’s strategy under the ostpolitik is explored in John M. Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s 
“Ostpolitik”,’ The Review of Politics 42, no. 3 (1980): 283–308; J. B. Hehir, ‘Papal Foreign Policy’, 
Foreign Policy, no. 78 (1990): 26–48; Francis Rooney, The Global Vatican: An Inside Look at the 
Catholic Church, World Politics, and the Extraordinary Relationship between the United States and 
the Holy See (Maryland, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013) 
35 James E. Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, Journal of Law and 
Religion 2, no. 1 (1984): 154–6. 
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time, low wage growth and rising food prices, coupled with increasing government debt to 
finance expenditure, stagnated the Polish economy.36 The Soviet Union’s abandonment of its 
direct military intervention policy, under Gorbachev, also increased the Polish people’s 
confidence to organise mass political opposition.37 These factors contributed to what Glendon 
describes as the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and luck”, which facilitated 
the effectiveness of John Paul II’s political strategy.38 
The scope of analysis is also limited to the Polish context under communism. It 
excludes arguments that link the collapse of communism in Poland with the collapse of the 
entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between 1989-
1991,39 extrapolating a kind of domino effect where Poland caused the collapse of the entire 
Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is an overly 
simplistic analysis.40 Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish 
context during John Paul II’s papacy – between 1978-1989 – and does not engage the contested 
literature on the links between the revolution of 1989 in Poland and the rest of the Soviet Union. 
  
                                                          
36 Weigel, The Final Revolution, 26–7. 
37 Mary Buckley, ‘The Multifaceted External Soviet Role in Processes Towards Unanticipated 
Revolutions’, in The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to 
Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 55-72. 
38 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii. 
39 See Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution’; Matthew McDermott and Kevin Stibbe, ‘The Collapse 
of Communism in Eastern Europe: Origins, Processes, Outcomes’, in The 1989 Revolutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2013), 3.  
40 Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, ‘The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the 
Communist Collapse’, World Politics 59, no. 1 (2006): 84. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
Mary Ann Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower examines the lives and decisions of 
prominent scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and 
practical realities.”41 This chapter aims to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics 
help understand Mary Ann Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory 
and political practice, outlined in The Forum and The Tower. The aim of the chapter is to 
contextualise Glendon’s project within contemporary discussions of Aristotle’s Ethics and 
Politics.42   
This chapter considers Aristotle’s account of virtue, in particular as to how virtue 
applies to Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for 
those ambitious with a view to virtue” are “philosophy” and “politics”.43  The thesis draws 
mainly from Copletson’s A History of Philosophy to explain how virtue is both a mean point 
between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the individual.44 The 
chapter aims to show The Forum and The Tower draws from Aristotelian concepts to define 
the life of philosophy and the life of politics, and the intersection between them. The chapter 
will show that within Aristotelian virtue ethics, philosophy and politics intersect in the moral 
process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals. Ends will also be defined within 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics as goods, things toward which persons aim for the sake of the goal, 
                                                          
41 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii.  
42 All page numbers and paragraph in-text references of Aristotle’s works are, unless specified in a 
footnote, cited in the following translation: Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).  
43 Cited in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, ix. 
44 Frederick Copleston, SJ, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (New York: Image Books, 
1963). 
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and not any other object or aim.45   Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue,46 it is possible 
to discern that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians 
deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms 
of political judgment. An excessive commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of 
political judgment; on the other extreme is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of 
immediate advantages. The present thesis will show how Glendon’s concept of the ideal 
statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of 
practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).  
 
Section One: An Overview of The Forum and The Tower 
 
In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon presents a vocational dilemma that several of 
her students come to her with: is politics such a dirty business, that if I entered I would lose my 
moral compass? Glendon lists the kinds of questions men and women interested in public 
service grapple with in the face of this tension, 
How should one comport himself or herself as a member of a regime that may be far 
from being even second best? How much should one compromise for the sake of getting 
and keeping a position from which one might be able to influence the course of events? 
How much should one compromise for the sake of achieving a higher political goal? 
Are private morality and public morality distinct, and if so, what principles should 
govern political action?47  
                                                          
45 Jessica Moss, ‘”Virtue Makes the Goal Right”: Virtue and “Phronesis” in Aristotle’s Ethics’, 
Phronesis 56, no. 3 (2011): 211. 
46 Aristotle’s account of virtue comes from the Greek arête, which is often also translated as 
excellence. For Aristotle, virtue is defined as lying in a mean position between prodigality and 
meanness (NE II.6 1107a1-2). Sorabji explains that the mean position is determined by the person 
who has “practical wisdom”, as this person knows, through experience and through the orthos logos 
(the right rule NE II.2 1103b31-34), what action is required in particular instances. Sorabji, “Aristotle 
on the role of Intellect in Virtue”, 206. 
47 Glendon, The Forum and Tower, 79.  
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Glendon’s project is to answer these kinds of questions, primarily for those interested 
in holding “theory and practice together with integrity”.48 Glendon proposes that scholars and 
statespersons have deliberated the same kinds of choices throughout history, making them 
perennially meaningful and worthy of further analysis. In her words, 
For as long as there have been governments and people to study them, statespersons 
and scholars have pondered the relative merits of life in the public forum and life in the 
ivory tower – the different skills required, the temperaments suited for one or the other 
way of life, and the relationship of the study of politics to its practice.49 
Glendon frames the deliberations of scholars and statespersons in The Forum and The 
Tower within the study of governments. Scholars and statespersons, Glendon writes, consider 
the relationship between the study of politics and the practice of politics. Glendon terms the 
life dedicated to the study of politics as “life in the ivory tower” and the life dedicated to the 
practice of politics as “life in the public forum”. The “merits” of each kind of life, the skills 
and temperaments needed to be successful in each are implicitly not the same. Glendon cites 
the experiences of the “modern day scholar-statesman”, Henry Kissinger, to illustrate why 
integrating the life of the mind with the world of action is challenging, 
As a professor, I was responsible primarily for coming up with the best answer I could 
divine. As a policymaker, I was also responsible for the worst that could happen. As a 
professor, the risk was that the important would drive out the urgent. As a policymaker, 
the risk was that the urgent would drive out the important.50  
                                                          
48 Ibid., ix 
49 Ibid. 
50 Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Current International Trends and World Peace’, in Charity and Justice in the 
Relations Among Persons and Nations, Proceedings of the XIIIth Plenary Session of The Pontifical 
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Kissinger continues that the political actor “lives in the world of the contingent”, 
dealing with “partial answers” that “hopefully are on the road to truth.”51 Glendon suggests 
that observing the “wise statesman” is a means to learn how to work within situations such as 
those Kissinger describes. Glendon describes the ideal statesperson as one who “combines 
experience” in making sound judgments on “great affairs” with the “mastery of philosophy”. 
In her view, Cicero personified this ideal, and offers his belief that philosophers should “not 
stand aloof from the fate of their cities”, but learn how to, as the wise statesman does, “operate 
within the limits of the possible”.52  Thus, The Forum and The Tower is a study of how scholars 
of political theory attempt to influence the politics of their State.  
How does Glendon propose to understand the distinction between and intersection of 
theory and practice to guide the intended audience of The Forum and the Tower?53 Glendon 
writes a collection of “biographical essays”54 to explore the lives and decisions of twelve 
prominent political actors and scholars who face a similar tension to pursue their aspirations to 
“make a difference”.55 Within these lives, Glendon’s method focuses on how the aspiration to 
“make a difference” manifests itself in the decision-making process. In particular, Glendon 
identifies instances where the life of the mind – the “tower” – and the life of political action – 
the “forum” – intersect. Her method aims at identifying these moments of political judgment 
in varying political circumstances to determine how conclusions from the study of politics 
inform political decisions. Each person deliberates whether the circumstances in the present 
                                                          
Academy of Social Science, (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), 233, in Glendon, The Forum and the 
Tower, x. 
51 Kissinger, ‘Current International Trends and World Peace’, in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 
x. 
52 Cicero, ‘The Republic’, in The Republic and The Laws, in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xi. 
53 See Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, ix. Glendon’s primary audience is the student: “It was 
primarily for my students – young men and women seeking to hold theory and practice together with 
integrity – that I initially assembled these accounts of how remarkable individuals in the past have 
struggled with choices similar to those we face today.” 
 
55 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii 
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moment are favourable to the pursuit of conceived political aims, or are so unfavourable, that, 
as Glendon quotes Plato, the only reasonable course of action is to “keep silent and offer up 
prayers for one’s own welfare and for that of one’s country”.56  
 
Thymos and Eros 
On what basis does Glendon believe that the political theorist desires to influence the 
course of political events?  Glendon suggests that political theorists can possess a desire to 
“make a difference”.57 For example, Glendon states that Cicero thought the life of public 
service was “the course that has always been followed by the best men”, and that “brave and 
high-minded” persons have no stronger reason for entering politics than a “determination not 
to give in to the wicked, and not allow the state to be torn apart by such people.”58 Sometimes, 
Glendon states, scholars can possess a desire to influence governments with greater emphasis 
on their own political thought as advisers to rulers. Plato is such an example, in Glendon’s 
view. Plato, though a distinguished scholar by age forty, believed that he had to be involved in 
the decisions of governments lest he “might someday appear to be a mere man of words, one 
who would never of his own will lay his hand to any act”.59 Glendon suggests that the 
experiences of prominent scholars and statespersons show that desires for a certain kind of life 
do influence the process of deliberation.  
Abizadeh explains there are rational and non-rational forces, or “passions”, that drive 
the wise statesperson, which are fundamental to making choices (prohairesis).60 Glendon’s 
framework uses rational and non-rational concepts to suggest that the content of a scholar’s 
                                                          
56 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 14. 
57 Ibid., 7. 
58 Ibid., 6. 
59 Plato, ‘Seventh Letter’, in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 4. On the other hand, John Locke, 
observes Glendon, was “quite content” to live his life as a scholar at Oxford. However, by his mid-
thirties, chance encounters with prominent politicians had brought him to a kind of influence as an 
adviser to governments to which “Plato had aspired in vain”. 
60 Arash Abizadeh, ‘The Passions of the Wise: “Phronêsis”, Rhetoric, and Aristotle's Passionate 
Practical Deliberation’, The Review of Metaphysics 56, no. 2 (2002): 268. 
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political aims are shaped by both “reason and passion”;61 she explicitly uses thymos and eros, 
which she simply defines as a “spiritedness” and the “love of fame” that are the “ruling passion 
of the noblest minds.”62 Such passions, Glendon argues, drove some of the figures she profiles 
“to pursue a life in the public forum”; while others placed the quest for knowledge at the centre 
of their energies.63  
Glendon offers little to explain what role thymos and eros play in her method. However, 
scholarly considerations of these concepts shows that integrating political thought with 
political action is desirable; and this does seem to be the sense in which Glendon offers these 
concepts. That is, Glendon employs eros and thymos as manifestations of the desire for a 
holistic approach to ethics and the realisation of conclusions of ethics in the political life. 
To understand how this is the case, Cooper explains both thymos and eros are major 
psychic forces within the soul. They are also complex and ambiguous, and he treats them 
separately in his essay, “Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the 
Republic”.64 Cooper situates these concepts within Plato’s account of the soul,65 which consists 
of three parts – the rational, the spirited, and the desiring. Each part of the soul can be 
considered a “faction”, which creates a contest between factions for dominance. This contest 
is analogous to life in the polity. Like the city, the soul is subject to faction, each part clashing, 
causing harm and ill harmony when it is not resolved. The proper way to understand the soul 
is not of different parts pulling in different directions, but rather a contest for the same end: 
                                                          
61 Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 72. 
62 Ibid., 3 
63 Ibid. 
64 Laurence D. Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the Republic’, The 
Review of Politics 63, no. 2 (Spring, 2001): 341–372 
65 The concept of “soul” (psyche) is developed by Plato’s psychology in Book IV of the Republic; 
Socrates breaks the soul into three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the desiring parts. This structure 
enables a treatment of the soul as having respective parts that perform clearly assigned functions. See 
Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 341–342.  
 21 | P a g e  
 
rule.66 Thus, a different part of the soul can be dominant in directing the will towards a certain 
kind of action.  
Cooper’s distinction between two kinds of eros is helpful to understand Glendon’s use 
of it in The Forum and the Tower. Cooper suggests there is a “higher, nobler” form and lower, 
“base” form of eros - the eros of the philosopher and the eros of the tyrant. These two types 
are the most opposite, in terms of the ruling parts. The philosopher is ruled by a well-developed 
intellectual part, and the tyrant of the lowest kind of desires.67 They are each united, however, 
by a shared desire: eros. The tyrant’s eros is a love of base desires and raw appetites. This eros 
directs the tyrant towards pursuing the passions that reside within the desiring part of the soul.68 
Conversely, the philosopher’s eros is a love of wisdom. The philosopher is driven towards 
wisdom, loving whole classes of things and “desiring wisdom.” Santas describes the feeling of 
eros as the “sense of… radical incompleteness and… longing for wholeness.”69 Howland adds 
that“Eros is definitive of the human condition: it is not a specific, discrete desire of a part of 
the soul or body, like thirst, but a mysterious longing of body and soul as a whole for whatever 
it is that will provide us with a comprehensive satisfaction.”70  
That the satisfaction aimed for be “comprehensive” is an important aspect of eros. 
Howland defines the aim of eros as “a kind of wholeness or unity.” The person with eros thus 
“senses” that the object of their desire will provide “comprehensive satisfaction.”71 Such a love 
is most proper to the life of the philosopher. Cooper explains that, “The culmination of eros is 
in the love of the Good… which manifests itself in the practice of philosophy.72”  
                                                          
66 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 345  
67 Ibid., 348 
68 Ibid. 
69 Gerasimos Santas, Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love (New York: Basil Blackwood, 1988), 
72–3 
70 Jacob Howland, The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy (New Jersey: Paul Dry Books, Inc., 
1993), 38. 
71 Howland, The Republic, 38–9 
72 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 367 
 22 | P a g e  
 
With the fullest form of eros, the philosopher desires what is total and comprehensive, 
which can only be through the practice of philosophy. The present thesis suggests that Glendon 
employs the noble, or holistic understanding of eros. Glendon suggests this force is that which 
drives the person towards pursuing the life of the philosopher, which has as its aim the pursuit 
of the “highest ideals”.73 The present thesis will explain in the following section how eros is 
paired with Aristotle’s statements in NE X6-8 that theoria – the activity of contemplation found 
in the life of the philosopher – is the “best and most complete” act.74 This pairing is significant 
for Glendon’s project because the theorist aims to work out what the best kind of life is, and 
thereby work out the human good for their State. Glendon’s use of thymos shows that the 
scholar will desire these conclusions about the human good to have political effect. 
Strauss identifies thymos as the political passion.75 Zuckert explains that this 
spiritedness can be aroused by a range of slights or insults.76 It has many manifestations, the 
most common of which is anger. 77 What causes thymos? Cooper states that thymos is aroused 
when eros is thwarted. That is, when the soul is prevented from attaining what it desires, a 
raging anger arises that drives the person to rectify the wrong. This raging is thymos.78 Thus, 
“thymos is born of and for the sake of eros”, and thymos can be understood as born of a kind 
of war, and aims at victory (success).79  
                                                          
73 Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 72–3, 160. Glendon explains that, in the life of Alexis De 
Tocqueville, his passion for the highest ideals is evident in his work Democracy in America, where he 
draws stark contrast between what he perceived as the American passion for commerce and the more 
noble, European aim of enlightened thinking. 
74Thomas Nagel ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A O Rorty (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 7 
75 Thomas Pangle, The Rebirth of Classical Political Realism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo 
Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 165–66 
76 ‘On the Role of Spiritedness in Politics’, in Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical 
Investigations from Plato to Nietzsche, ed. Catherine Zuckert (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988), 109 
77 The range of thymos’ manifestations include “anger, courage, shame, reverence, the desire for 
recognition, pride, vanity, contempt, envy, idealism and fanaticism.” Thomas Pangle, ‘The Political 
Psychology of Religion in Plato’s Laws’, The American Political Science Review, 70 (1976): 1062–
64. 
78 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 366. 
79 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 367. 
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Relevant to Glendon’s project is Cooper’s claim that thymos manifests itself in the 
political life when the noble form of eros is denied. Thymos becomes a desire to act in the 
affairs of the State when the lover of wisdom, i.e. the philosopher, sees their conceptions of the 
good “thwarted” in the management of the State.80 Cooper argues that all persons know 
“something” of what victory and honour are in ordinary achievements, but suggests that the 
strongest manifestation of thymos is connected to when the best kind of eros, which must entail 
the Good, or philosophy, is lacking in the State.81 It is the passion which aims to achieve every 
political good, including order, justice, honour, victory, and like things. Thymos can become 
the “natural ally of reason” in its effort to direct desire towards the right ends.82 Thus, the soul 
that possesses both the thymotic and erotic passions will not be content to “stand aloof from 
the fate of their cities” (the State), and aim at the highest political ideals.83  
Glendon recognises that either thymos or eros can dominate as a motivating force in the 
soul, which affects the political decisions of the scholar.84 In Glendon’s view, De Tocqueville’s 
experience illustrates how thymos directs decision-making. Tocqueville was an esteemed 
scholar, producing Democracy in America in 1835, which became an instant bestseller.85 
Despite his eminence as a theorist, Tocquville confided that he desired political success above 
all things. She quotes him, saying: “Do not believe that I have a blind enthusiasm, or indeed 
                                                          
80 Thomas Pangle, The Rebirth of Classical Political Realism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo 
Strauss, 165-66. Anger itself has many manifestations, however Strauss explains that its most noble 
expression stems from the “most noble indignation about injustice, turpitude and meanness…” 
81 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 368 
82 Pangle, The Rebirth of Classical Political Realism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, 
165–66 
83 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xi 
84 Seth Bernadete advises thymos, like eros, has a base manifestation. Like eros, thymos can be 
corrupted by bad rearing. Thymos can direct desire to achieve the greatest good, if the person has been 
educated well. If not, it can “run rampant” in subservience to lawless desire. See Seth Bernadete, 
Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 55. 
85 Glendon, The Form and the Tower, 152 
 24 | P a g e  
 
any kind of enthusiasm for the intellectual life. I have always placed the life of action above 
everything else.”86 
Glendon cites a passage from Tocqueville’s biographer, Andre Jardin, who states that 
Tocqueville “could not conceive of fulfilling his personal destiny in any other way than by 
active participation in political life.”87 At the same time, observes Glendon, though he was 
convinced that “politics was his destiny”, he was, in Glendon’s view, “poorly suited by talent 
and temperament for a political vocation.” De Tocqueville possessed a “fiercely independent 
streak” that caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which 
ultimately left him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French 
Chamber of Deputies.88 In light of these experiences, Glendon offers Weber’s perspective, that: 
“The qualities that make an excellent scholar and academic are not the qualities that make him 
a leader to give directions in practical life, or, more specifically, in politics.”89   
On the other hand, Glendon also argues that skilful political judgment absent of eros 
causes a mode of decision-making that disregards the aims of philosophy. Machiavelli 
exemplifies, in Glendon’s framework, the political actor who prioritises immediate advantages 
over the pursuit of “higher ideals”. Machiavelli devised a method of political action that 
focused on outcomes, particularly securing power and influence, rather than consistently acting 
upon, and aiming towards, “higher ideals”.90 His method, writes Glendon, all but abandoned a 
concept of political judgment oriented towards retaining moral integrity. This evidences a lack 
of eros, in that integrated, holistic sense that Glendon seems to have in mind, in Machiavelli.91 
As such, the example of Machiavelli’s decision-making suggests an approach opposite to Plato 
and De Tocqueville: a rejection of the insights of scholarship, in favour of political expediency. 
                                                          
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 153 
88 Ibid., 160. 
89 Ibid., 5 
90 Ibid., 77 
91 Ibid., 79 
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   Glendon observes that it is only rarely that the right combination of thymos and eros 
enable the ideal statesperson to emerge. However, she believes Cicero and Edmund Burke are 
two such examples where the skills of the politician and the wisdom of the philosopher are 
found in the same person.92 
It is only rarely that thymos and eros of the mind are as felicitously combined as they 
were in Cicero and Burke. Some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for 
philosophy or statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many 
directions.93  
Cicero’s belief expresses that thymos and eros are manifested in the ideal statesman, 
who combines excellence in practical decision-making with a deep understanding of 
philosophy.  
What can be more glorious, than the conjunction of practical experience in the great 
affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and learning?... 
the person who has had the will and the capacity to acquire both – that is, ancestral 
institutions and philosophical learning – is the one who I think has done everything 
deserving of praise.94 
Cicero and Burke’s legacies, notes Glendon, are among the few in history where each 
are noted for contributions to political theory as well as for distinguished public service. Indeed, 
she draws a sports analogy between them and an athlete who has represented at the highest 
level in “both major leagues”.95 Therefore, it is Glendon’s view that, across the examples in 
The Forum and The Tower, scholars aim at working out the human good through philosophy, 
and can be drawn into the political life. The ideal statesperson, the kind of person Glendon’s 
                                                          
92 Ibid., xi. 
93 Ibid., 7 
94 Ibid., 222 
95 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Lecture on Politics as Vocation in Cicero and Burke, 1 November 2011’,  
accessed November 01, 2017, http://www.lumenchristi.org/november-1-mary-ann-glendon-on-cicero-
and-burke-on-politics-as-vocation/  
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student desires to emulate, will be one who, like Cicero, combines political experience with a 
mastery of philosophy.   
Part of the skill of operating within the “limits of the possible,” is the political 
environment of the State. Unfavourable political conditions provide tension between the 
scholar’s “political ideals” and “practical realities”. Indeed, Glendon believes that the “optimal 
confluence of gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck” are repeatedly “elusive”. For this 
reason, this optimal confluence requires more than just a proper balance of thymos and eros, 
but also the skills of deliberation, and knowledge of the right ends of politics. Scholars must 
learn how to deliberate when the time is right to “speak [the] truth (of one’s convictions) to 
power” and when it is better to “speak the truth with measure” as part of a “prudent 
accommodation” to gain or retain, a position of influence.96 
To understand how Glendon uses the relationship between political thought and 
political action, the present thesis asks, how does Aristotle’s concept of virtue manifest itself 
in the deliberations of the examples in The Forum and The Tower? The following section aims 
to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics can help understand the concepts Glendon employs in 
The Forum and The Tower. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s view of the best kind of life 
helps contextualise Glendon’s thought about the pursuit of philosophy and politics.  
 
Section Two: Understanding Glendon’s Project through Aristotle 
 
The present thesis employs Aristotelian virtue ethics to understand The Forum and The 
Tower because Glendon states her method follows Aristotle’s Ethics.97 Aristotelian influence 
can be found in multiple instances in The Forum and The Tower, particularly  when considering 
                                                          
96 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii. 
97 Author’s correspondence with Mary Ann Glendon, February 10, 2017. 
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his view that effective statesmanship requires virtue.98 Glendon employs Aristotle’s 
observation that a tension exists between political decision-making and a desired political aim 
because leaders have to act, and often with only partial information. Decisions must be made 
sometimes without the benefit of a symmetry between one’s principles and actions likely to 
succeed, when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”99 Such circumstances, 
Aristotle observes, drive virtuous men and women away from politics and government because 
of the fear of corrupting their moral character.100 However, these persons remain intensely 
interested in perennial political arguments – arguments about “human nature, reason and 
passion, tradition and innovation, liberty and law.”101 Glendon suggests Aristotle’s Ethics as a 
conceptual lens through which to understand the desire to hold theory and practice together 
with integrity. Glendon quotes from Aristotle’s Politics as the opening to The Forum and The 
Tower, 
There is a dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy life is that 
accompanied by virtue as to whether the political and active way of life is choiceworthy, 
or rather that which is divorced from all external things – that involving some sort of 
study, for example – which some assert is the only philosophic way of life. For it is 
evident that these two ways of life are the ones intentionally chosen by those human 
beings who are most ambitious with a view to virtue, both in former times and at the 
present; the two I mean are the political and the philosophic.102  
   
The two ways of life chosen by “human beings who are most ambitious with a view to 
virtue” are the path of either study (called the philosophic way of life) or the political, active 
                                                          
98 See Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38, 72–3, 79, 93. 
99 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38. 
100 Ibid., 79. 
101 Ibid., xiii. 
102 Ibid., vi. 
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way of life. As the previous section has shown, Glendon’s framework highlights interior 
passions of eros and thymos. Glendon uses a holistic view of eros as a passion that directs the 
person towards the life of the philosopher, and thymos as the passion that directs the 
philosopher towards political action.103 Thus, the passions Glendon uses in The Forum and The 
Tower are consistent with Aristotle’s perspective that the best kind of life is either philosophy, 
or the political life. Therefore, Aristotle is employed as a starting point to understand how 
different scholars and statespersons deliberate the merits of each kind of life – philosophy and 
politics – to their goal of making a difference. The present thesis turns to Aristotle’s view of 
“virtue” as a concept that can merge the aims of philosophy and politics in the process of 
deliberation in Glendon’s framework. 
 
Understanding Aristotle’s Virtue: Mean and Excellence 
Aristotle defines virtue as a “disposition to choose, consisting essentially in a mean 
relatively to us determined by a rule, i.e. the rule by which a practically wise person would 
determine it” (EN1106b 36-1107a2). The person who has “practical wisdom” knows, through 
experience and through the orthos logos (the right rule NE II.2 1103b31-34), what action is 
required in particular instances.104 In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two 
kinds of virtue – intellectual virtue, and character (or moral) virtue (ethike arête).105 Intellectual 
virtues are of the “rational part of the soul”, while character virtues are of the non-rational part 
of the soul (though this does not mean “irrational”, as this part is still responsive to reason).106 
Intellectual virtues aim at truth as its object, for its own sake, while character virtue aims at 
                                                          
103 Ibid., 3, 7, 79. 
104 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the role of Intellect in Virtue’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie O. 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 206. 
105 J O Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 157–170. 
106 Ursula Coope, ‘Why Does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?’, 
Phronesis 57, no. 2 (2012): 142-163. 
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truth, not for its own sake, but for practical purposes.107 The practical nature of the moral virtues 
are most relevant to Glendon’s project. Glendon wants to know how to influence the public 
sphere in light of reflections on the human good. Copleston explains that Aristotle’s Ethics and 
Politics are each concerned with the human good. In the Ethics, Aristotle considers what human 
activities are constitutive of a “good life”, and indeed whether there is such a thing as the good 
kind of life. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts that the task of political science is to work out the 
human good, and that the individual and the State have the same good.108 Copleston states, 
Ethics, then, are regarded by Aristotle as a branch of political or social science: we 
might say that he treats first of individual ethical science and secondly of political 
ethical science, in the Politics.109 
Copleston continues that one learns about how to be virtuous through observing the moral 
judgments of the person “who was generally looked upon as good and virtuous”.  Moss 
explains that Aristotle defines virtue as “prohairetic”, which is itself a state of “issuing 
decisions.” Virtue is that which makes decisions right.110  Thus, virtue is learned through 
observing the decisions of the one generally looked upon as virtuous.111 This kind of moral 
learning is evident in Glendon’s project. The aim of The Forum and The Tower is to observe 
the decisions, particularly the moral judgments, of those considered able to make judgments 
well. Understanding how to identify what the right judgments are of the virtuous person is thus 
fundamental to Glendon’s approach. 
Copleston argues that Aristotle’s account of virtue has a “double position”. In the 
“ontological dimension” virtue is a mean; in the “axiological dimension” virtue is an 
                                                          
107 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 328–9. 
108 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Jessica Moss, ‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right’: Virtue and “Phronesis” in Aristotle’s Ethics’, 
Phronesis 56, no. 3 (2011): 210. 
111 Ibid., 211-12. Moss points out that children learn to be virtuous from their parents as their first 
examples of moral virtue.  
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excellence. In the ontological dimension, good actions have an order or proportion, according 
to Copleston. This proportion is a mean between two extremes, where each extreme is a vice. 
One extreme is a vice through excess, the other is a vice through deficiency. The mean is the 
virtue.112 The excess and defect can be in regards to a feeling or an action. For example, with 
the feeling of anger, it is proportionate to experience a great amount of anger at the sight of the 
innocent being tortured, while the defect would be apathy towards seeing the torture. In the 
same vein, it would be an excess to show the same great amount of anger when witnessing 
torture, as at dropping one’s ice-cream. The mean is thus a proportionate response. Urmson 
explains, 
…if a man has excellence of character he likes acting in a proper way, feeling emotions 
which he can manifest with pleasure, since there is no internal struggle… To have one's 
emotions and actions in a mean, says Aristotle, is to feel and manifest each emotion 
when, on what matters, toward such people, for what reasons and in such a manner as 
is proper.113 
With action, the mean point is determined by the goal. For instance, with the action of giving 
money, the excess is “prodigality”, which is a vice, and the defect is “illiberality” or 
“stinginess”, another vice. The mean point is liberality, or generosity – which does not give 
away too much, to the wrong cause, at the wrong time, nor too little to the right cause. The 
virtue of generosity is choosing the mean point between excess and deficiency, giving a 
proportionate amount of money to the right cause.114 Sorabji offers a comparable view of the 
virtue of generosity to Copleston, noting that phronesis enables a person “in the light of his 
conception of the good life in general,” to discern what act constitutes generosity in a particular 
                                                          
112 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336. 
113 James O. Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 159. 
114 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336. 
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instance. That is, “A picture of the good life will save him from giving away too much, or too 
little, or to the wrong causes, in particular instances.”115 
Copleston uses a map, or graph, developed by Hartmann,116 that can be used to illustrate 
the relationship between ends and means, or excellence and the mean, in Aristotelian virtue. 
This relationship will be used to explain how the life of philosophy and the life of political 
action intersect in Glendon’s framework. This graph is shown in figure 1 below. The 
“ontological dimension” is represented along the horizontal ‘x’ axis, which forms the base of 
the semicircular graph. This shows that the extremes of actions are called “excess” and 
“deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme right and extreme left of the horizontal axis, 
respectively. The middle point is at the centre of the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the 
graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could not be assigned to either the category of “mean” 
or the category of “excellence”, but to their “synthesis.”117  
 
Figure 1: Hartmann’s Graph of Virtue 
 
 
As Hartmann’s graph illustrates, the centre of the horizontal axis is labelled “badness”, 
and not “virtue”. Why is it bad that one chooses the middle point between excess and defect – 
                                                          
115 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 206 
116 Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1932), 256. 
117 Hartmann, Ethics, 424. 
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is this not virtue? Copleston explains that virtue is not just a mean, it is also an excellence. For 
Aristotle, excellence is actions aimed towards the good.118 For an act to be virtuous, it is not 
simply a matter of choosing a “middle road” between two vices. The act itself must aim at 
something desirable in itself – the good, which makes the action “right”.119 That the act aims 
towards the good elevates the act from a simple “opposition to both vices” as a middle point 
between them, to a synthesis of making the right choice for the right ends.120 At the same time, 
the mean point is a practical guide that helps set limits on the right proportionate action or 
feeling in a specific context. As Copleston explains,  
It is not as though virtue were a composition of vices from a valuational point of view, 
since, from this point of view, it stands in opposition to both vices; but it is nevertheless 
a mean from the ontological viewpoint, since it combines in itself both the good points, 
which, run to excess, constitute vices.121 
Copleston argues the Aristotelian “doctrine of the mean” is not simply “an exaltation 
of mediocrity” in the moral life.122 Urmson concurs, stating the doctrine of the mean is not a 
fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances.123  Simple calculated compromise between vices 
is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when 
the right ends are sought.124 On the graph, this is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent 
to which one’s actions aims towards the right ends determines the height one reaches on the 
vertical axis, towards goodness.  
The map shows that virtue is a “double position”, as Copleston puts it. In one sense, 
virtue is a mean point between vices, but it is also an excellence because it aims towards the 
                                                          
118 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332. 
119 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 208. 
120 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336. 
121 Ibid., 337. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 164–5 
124 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 345. Copleston states that a person can only be 
considered good if the action proceeds from moral choice and is done because (the aim) is good. 
 33 | P a g e  
 
good. Goodness can only be attained when one applies both the mean and excellence rules of 
Aristotelian virtue. “Goodness” is both the highest point of the vertical axis and the middle 
point of the horizontal axis. This illustrates that virtue is a “synthesis”, in Hartmann’s words, 
of the right ends and proportionate means.125  
The semicircular boundary around each axis completes the graph. The boundary places 
a limit on the extent that extreme actions or feelings can move towards the right ends. The 
closer one acts to an extreme on the horizontal axis, the lesser height that action can gain along 
the vertical axis. Thus, within the virtuous life the person seeks out not only what ends to 
pursue, but also deliberates what means are right in the circumstances to pursue those ends.  
Urmson cautions it is a common misconception to consider practical wisdom as limited 
to deliberation only in scope. This is not the case, he argues. There are two further skills 
required for practical wisdom – which he calls “understanding” and “judgment”. 
Understanding is the “capacity to sum up a situation.”126 This skill is exhibited in observation 
– the person sees what unfolds before him or her, and assesses it accurately. This activity of 
understanding is, on its own, more a “touchline” skill – it is not phronimos to simply sum up a 
situation in theory. Practical wisdom is exhibited on the “field of play”; judging what is best to 
do brings understanding from the “sidelines” into the “action”.127 In sum, practical wisdom is 
a virtue that deals with action. It is a deliberative process that constitutes knowledge of the ends 
that are good for the person, a sound understanding of the means available in the present 
moment towards that end, and the choice to pursue the right means, towards that end.  
The thymos and eros of the mind, as Glendon employs them, can be linked to Aristotle’s 
description of “choice” as “reasonable desire” or “the deliberate desire of things in our power”. 
This description shows, in Copleston’s view, Aristotle does not identify preferential choice 
                                                          
125 EN, 1106b 36-1107a2, in Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336. 
126 Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 165. 
127 Ibid., 165-66. 
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with reason by itself, or desire by itself.128 Rather, Aristotle proposes that actions are a 
manifestation, and in a certain sense embodiment, of some emotion (NE 1105b 21).129 Between 
one’s own formation and understanding of their own desires, the person must work out what 
kind of life to pursue. This task requires phronesis, which is a moral virtue that is constituted 
by a “disposition towards action, by the aid of a rule, with regard to things good or bad for 
man” (EN VI.5 1140a 30). As Copleston explains, practical wisdom is a “moral process” 
concerned with a “practical syllogism”, of deliberation on means to achieve ends. For example, 
A is the end; B is the means to A here and now; therefore, B should be done here and now.130  
Sorabji observes that, to Aristotle, practical wisdom is the chief virtue of the statesman. 
Practical wisdom can be applied in a range of settings, from the individual good, to the good 
of the family or household, and the good of the State. But it is pertinent to the present thesis 
that Sorabji observes that practical wisdom is the virtue responsible for working out the 
individual good (called ethics) and the good of the State (called political science).131 The task 
of politics is to work out the human good – both for the individual and for the community (the 
common good). Therefore, the task of working out the human good falls to the politician – or 
statesperson. (NE 6.13 1144b17-1145a6; 10.8 1178a16-19; Eudemian Ethics 3.7 1234a29). 
Therefore, in Glendon’s consideration of the “merits” of the life of the philosopher and the life 
of the statesperson, phronesis is an essential practical virtue to help the person deliberate, and 
choose, the best kind of life.132  
                                                          
128 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 339. 
129 Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 164–5. Urmson states these include emotions like 
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130 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 339, 344. In its expanded form, Aristotle’s moral 
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131 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 209–11. 
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Eudaimonia as “Happiness”? Contemplation and Moral Virtue  
Is there a definitive answer as to which of the two options Aristotle puts forth – 
philosophy and politics – is the highest kind of life? Indeed, how does Aristotle determine that 
these two kinds of life are the most choiceworthy, and not the life of a doctor, a lawyer, or a 
builder?133 The answers to these questions on Aristotle and his account of the highest life 
remain contested.134 It is precisely this contested space that Glendon’s arguments address, 
making her work particularly appropriate to analysing the case study of John Paul II as both 
philosopher and statesman. 
To determine the best kind of life, Curzer states one must ask what activity, or activities, 
constitute the best way to live?135 Rorty writes Aristotle has often been “charged with 
indecision” and with holding incompatible views about the “relative merits of a comprehensive 
practical life and one devoted primarily to contemplation”.136 On one interpretation of the 
Nichomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics, the highest life is realised in the activity of the 
most divine part of man, in accord with its “proper excellence”.137 This is the activity of 
theoretical contemplation (theoria).138 On the other dominant account (called “secondary’ at 
NE1178a9), contemplation is one activity within a wide range of activities that constitute the 
                                                          
133 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119. 
134 For debates, see: David Keyt ‘Intellectualism in Aristotle’, in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 
ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 364-87; Kraut, 
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Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 359–76; Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for 
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49–75. 
135 Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics’, 421. 
136 Amelie O Rorty, ‘The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 377. 
137 Amelie O Rorty, ‘The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics’, 377. 
138 Thomas Nagel, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A O Rorty 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 7. 
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best kind of life. Contemplation is one good within a life of intellectual and moral virtue.139 Is 
Aristotle contradicting himself by stating in one instance the happy life consists in one activity, 
and then saying it involves a combination of activities? This seeming contradiction has the 
added difficulty of Aristotle requiring other conditions for eudaimonia, including good fortune, 
wealth, good looks, slaves and other features scholars find puzzling.140 
Scholars have bracketed these competing accounts into the inclusivist interpretation 
(moral virtue as the best life) and intellectualist interpretation (contemplation as the best 
activity).141 This section will give a brief account of Aristotle’s highest life, and portray some 
of the more recent scholarly debates around what his account actually constitutes. Specifically, 
it will address the rational basis for the highest life as philosophy and politics. The aim of this 
section is to illustrate how the virtue of phronesis enables a “synthesis” of the two kinds of life 
in the ideal statesperson. 
Aristotle asks what is generally viewed as the end, or ultimate aim, of life. He is 
interested in working out if there is some sole end for the sake of which every action is done.142 
Aristotle says if there is indeed such an end, then it would be worthwhile to work out what it 
is, for it must be the highest good of all (NE I.2 1094a 23). Aristotle tells his audience in the 
Nichomachean Ethics that the best or highest end aimed at is eudaimonia.  
Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people 
of superior refinement say that it is happiness (eudaimonia), and identify living well 
and faring well with being happy (NE I.4 1095a 14-19). 
                                                          
139 Thomas Nagel, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, 7. 
140 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 118. 
141 For a breakdown of the intellectualist and inclusivist positions, see: Howard J. Curzer, ‘Criteria for 
Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics’, 421–432; Gary M. Gurtler, ‘The Activity of Happiness in 
Aristotle’s Ethics’, 801–834. 
142 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332–3.  
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However, as Urmson states, Eudaimonia is a highly complex concept that defies modern norms 
of definitions.143 The word eudaimonia does not translate easily to English or other languages 
in its complete form. “Happiness” is a common translation; however, with its modern 
connotations of feelings or as a disposition of contentment, most scholars agree this is a limited 
translation of eudaimonia.144  
Is eudaimonia a single end that all actions ultimately aim at, or is eudaimonia a 
combination all the goods desired for their own sake?  In NE I.7, Aristotle describes what 
intellectualists, such as Richardson Lear145, and Bush,146 argue are the criteria for what 
constitutes the highest life. These are that eudaimonia is: self-sufficient (autarkes), complete 
without qualification (teleion haplos), particular to human beings, involves excellent activity, 
and is the best and most complete end.147 And in a later passage at NE X 6-8 Aristotle declares 
the life of contemplation to be the sole, highest, most eudaimon life. Tessitore148, Curzer149 and 
Ackrill are among the scholars who argue Aristotle’s account of the best life is ambiguous. In 
particular, Ackrill argues that it is unclear how a person can live a eudaimon life without moral 
virtue.150 The present thesis suggests that within this debate, it is possible to identify philosophy 
as that which entails the criteria for the highest activity. 
 
                                                          
143 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 135. 
144 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 11; Gabriel Richardson Lear, ‘Happiness and the Structure of Ends’, in 
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Levels of Ends for Happiness 
On balance, the present thesis suggests the more convincing stance toward Aristotle 
concerning this issue is expressed by Richardson Lear and others who hold comparable 
intellectualist arguments that Aristotle believes contemplation (theoria) is the best and most 
complete activity. However, although contemplation is the highest activity, inclusivists 
including Ackrill and Garver point out convincingly that the answer to “what is the best 
activity?” does not extend to practical questions of how to best live. The activity of deliberation 
requires phronesis, or practical virtue, to deliberate about how to pursue virtue in the present 
moment. The virtue of practical deliberation is proper to the moral life, not the contemplative. 
The present thesis suggests that this debate reveals that Glendon’s ideal statesperson is drawn 
from Aristotle’s “practically wise man”, who combines both the excellences proper to 
philosophy and the moral virtues. 
In Book I.7 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle proposes happiness, or eudaimonia, 
is an end sought in itself, self-sufficient and most complete.151  Richardson Lear proposes that 
the highest good must conform to the most complete human activity, which, she argues, is 
contemplation. To understand how this might be, Richardson Lear suggests there are degrees 
of completeness within goods in the Ethics.152 Completeness means the degree to which a thing 
– that is, a good (a thing desirable) – is sought for its own sake.153. Thus the most complete 
good will be associated with eudaimonia. Lear discusses Aristotle’s explanation of 
completeness, which is: 
If there is only one complete end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more 
than one, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that 
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit 
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for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of 
something else more complete than the things that are both desirable in themselves and 
for the sake of that other thing, and we call complete without qualification that which 
is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else (NE I.7 1097b28-
34).154 
Richardson Lear argues Aristotle is working out a way to narrow down a single, highest good 
from the multitude of practicable goods human beings are able to pursue. This is what the 
finality criterion does, in her view. If there are many complete, or final, ends, that which is 
most complete will be what is sought as the highest end.155 Goods must therefore be 
distinguished between higher and lower, by their level of completeness. Richardson Lear 
distinguishes three levels of ends – lower, middle and highest level ends. The first is goods that 
are chosen for the sake of other goods – for example, buying runners to get fit for one’s health. 
These are instrumental goods. Their purpose is subordinate to the further end they serve. One 
cannot properly explain an account of them without reference to the end. The runners do not 
explain themselves – they serve a purpose, to run, which might in turn be chosen for the 
enjoyment of running, or for the further end of health. Regardless of where the chain ends, its 
instrumental nature subordinates it to goods that do not need to explain themselves in this 
way.156 
Middle-level ends are those chosen for their own sake. These are goods that we choose 
and deem desirable even if nothing further comes from them; they are desirable in themselves. 
In achieving them, we have completed our aim fully. For example, medicine aims at health, 
and health is desirable for its own sake; the end of health is not more perfectly achieved by the 
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addition of another good.157 Such ends are more final than instrumental goods. Intelligence, 
honour and pleasure, are also among those that Aristotle considers sought for their own sake.158  
However, these ends are not happiness itself, as one does not declare he or she is 
eudaimon because he or she has health, or wealth, or intelligence.159 Richardson Lear argues 
that Aristotle places all the virtues in this middle-level end category. The virtues are chosen for 
the sake of themselves, but they are also chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, supposing that 
through them we will live happily.160 However, eudaimonia is not chosen for the sake of these 
things (NE I.7 1097a34-b6). The moral virtues then, and their highest expression in the political 
life, do not constitute happiness, but rather are middle level ends, which means they cannot be 
the highest end in the hierarchy.  
At NE X 6-8 Aristotle declares the activity of contemplation to be the sole, highest, and 
most complete end.161 The eudaimon life is that which consists of the end which is the “best 
and most complete” and is therefore the “super end” on which all other ends converge.162 
Walker defines contemplation as an activity that consists in “the exercise of the theoretical 
intellect according to its proper virtue of theoretical wisdom, and in actively comprehending 
the ultimate explanations of things.”163 Rorty describes contemplation as the “self-contained 
activity par excellence”.164 Contemplation is the most “end-like” activity because it is the most 
enduring kind of activity, most self-sufficient, and is performed for its own sake.165 
Contemplation is “fully and perfectly achieved in the very act” (NE 1177b1-5).166 Walker’s 
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view concurs with that of Rorty, as he suggests for Aristotle, “the contemplative life is 
happiest” because it is “organised around the properly highest end within a human life.”167 This 
account renders contemplation the most complete activity, and the highest good. The task of 
ethics is to work out the individual good, which Glendon’s students want to work out in their 
discernment about how to best live. The intellectualist account suggests that the best activity a 
person can engage in is contemplation. The present thesis has shown that phronesis is needed 
to make deliberations in the present based on knowledge of ends. Thus, phronesis must help 
Glendon’s student answer: how is the contemplative life to be lived practically? This is the 
focus of the following section. 
 
Section Three: Life in the “Forum” & Life in the “Tower” 
 
Political Influence through Life in the “Tower” 
Glendon suggests that the person who concludes the contemplative life is best can still 
influence the State, and that it is important to remain interested in its affairs. In The Forum and 
The Tower, Glendon observes that some of the figures she analyses “opted early for philosophy 
or statesmanship and seldom looked back.”168 As the present thesis has argued, Glendon’s 
holistic approach to the eros of the mind renders it a force that drives the person towards a kind 
of unity or wholeness, found in the life of the mind. In addition to eros, Glendon’s use of 
thymos as a spirited force drives the scholar towards involvement in the political life. As a 
practical consideration, what is the best life for one who concludes that the life of the mind is 
more choiceworthy than the political life? Bostock and Miller are among intellectualist 
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scholars who suggest that Aristotle has in mind a certain kind of “lifestyle” or “occupation” 
most proper to the contemplative ideal. This kind of life is the life of the philosopher.169  
The contemplative life is often characterised as one devoted to studying or teaching, in 
whatever mode best leads to wisdom (sophia). Walker notes life in the Aristotelian Lyceum 
(where Aristotle taught) cannot be equated with the modern academic’s career. This frees 
Aristotle from the claim that the life of the modern professor is happiest. Nonetheless, Walker 
claims Aristotle idealises the academic, even “quasi-monastic” lifestyle.170 Urmson echoes this 
view, suggesting Aristotle shows “too much enthusiasm for his own profession” in his claim 
for the highest life as purely contemplative.171172 That said, Copleston acknowledges that 
Aristotle’s “common-sense” approach recognises contemplation is not possible for any person 
without certain pre-existing conditions, such as political stability, a reasonable degree of 
comfort, friendship, and like things.173 Accepting these conditions as necessarily first 
established, the best kind of life is one that organises itself around theoria; this life aims at 
wisdom.174 In Glendon’s view, the philosophic and the political intersect in the life of the 
philosopher through his or her conception of the ends of politics.175 The person who possesses 
thymos and eros considers the individual good (ethics), and the good of the State (political 
science). The philosopher in The Forum and The Tower has to use phronesis to work out how 
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best to influence the course of political events. Glendon writes that, “scholars have often 
exerted considerable influence on politics as advisers to rulers, or, indirectly through their 
writings.”176 Further, a scholar’s philosophical legacy can “nourish” and contribute to future 
political events.  
However, Glendon considers that this mode of political engagement is far from the ideal 
of the statesperson. Indeed, Glendon urges caution against efforts to have political influence as 
a theorist without practical political experience. She states that, sometimes theories taken out 
of a scholar’s context and reapplied in future contexts can have effects they never imagined, or 
intended. 177 
 The ideas taken out of their original contexts can morph into surprising forms…the 
ideas that migrate from political theory into political practice are often mere fragments, 
yanked out of the context that gave them nuance and balance.178 
Glendon’s advice is clear that satisfying thymos by remaining in the “tower” and trying 
to indirectly influence the organisation and governance of one’s city or nation is an 
unpredictable path. Glendon suggests that scholars emulate Cicero’s advice to philosophers: 
Philosophers, Cicero said, should not stand aloof from the fate of their cities. But he 
cautioned them that if they want to put their talents at the service of the polity, they 
                                                          
176 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii, 3–4. Glendon writes that Plato felt the desire to influence 
the course of political events “so strongly” that he “imagined he could enlighten [Syracuse’s] 
intellectually curious, but tyrannical rulers.” 
177 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 117–19. How ideas migrate into practical politics is not 
treated explicitly in this thesis. Glendon offers no precise method to measure what impact an idea has 
in a political setting, though she does give some examples. For example, Rousseau’s works The 
Discourses on Livy and Emile had a profound influence on the political upheavals in revolutionary 
France. Some of Rousseau’s most eloquent passages became slogans for the revolution of 1789 and 
the reign of terror that followed. The resulting bloodshed and upheaval was a consequence, Glendon 
argues, that Rousseau never intended. For a work of how ideas migrate into political events, see 
Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
178 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii. 
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must learn what the wise statesman knows: how to operate within the limits of the 
possible.179 
Not to stand “aloof” from the city requires a more direct involvement in operating within the 
“limits of the possible”. A philosopher ought to remain interested in the affairs of the state even 
only to ensure that conditions remain amiable to philosophy. Glendon has expressed this mode 
of thinking in other works.180 She also believes philosophical concepts can have a lasting 
impact on the shape of moral and legal norms in a political community.181 
The present thesis suggests that Lear’s and comparable intellectualist arguments shows 
that a unity of principles, desired through eros, is consistent with aiming for contemplation as 
the highest end in the life of the philosopher. This is Glendon’s “life in the ivory tower”. 
However, Glendon’s view remains consistent with the likes of Urmson, who argues wisdom 
through theoria does not guarantee virtue in moral action. Indeed, a life of contemplation 
requires dedication for a long time, as would be the demands of reaching excellence in any 
profession.182 It is on this point that inclusivists make a practical observation: can excellent 
contemplation provide clear choices to practical questions?183   
 
The Inclusivist Solution to theoria in the “Forum”  
Inclusivists suggest there is an intellectual problem with formulating Aristotle’s highest 
life as the life of the philosopher. Ackrill observes: how can one good be chosen for its own 
sake, and have intrinsic value, and yet be subordinate to another, higher, good? It would seem 
                                                          
179 Ibid., xi. 
180 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Western Political Discourse (New 
York: Free Press, 1991); Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Rights Babel: The Universal Rights Idea at the Dawn 
of the t=Third Millennium’. Gregorianum 79, no. 4 (1998): 611–624; Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Looking 
for Persons in the Law’, First Things, accessed February 4, 2017, 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2006/12/looking-forpersonsin-the-law 
181 See Glendon, ‘Looking for Persons in the Law’, First Things. 
182 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119.  
183 Eugene Garver, Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 190. 
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that a good that has intrinsic value in itself, but is also subordinate to a higher good, has no 
intrinsic value at all, but only instrumental value. If a good is chosen for the sake of some other 
good only, does it not render it an instrumental good?184 Thus, are not the moral virtues, 
pleasure, or honour chosen only instrumentally – that is, for the sake of happiness?185 
Ackrill proposes the inclusivist solution to the middle to higher-level ends problem. 
Ackrill suggests that if eudaimonia is an inclusive end, that is, the composition of all intrinsic 
goods (not instrumental goods), then these middle-level ends are all choiceworthy for the sake 
of eudaimonia. Each good is a constituent of the whole that is eudaimonia. Ackrill here argues 
that this does not render such goods as moral virtue, honour and pleasure to be of mere 
instrumental value – that they are for the sake of happiness. Rather, these goods are 
instrumental only insofar as they are intrinsically valuable.  Happiness is a constitutive good, 
inclusive of all noble and good ends.  
One can answer such a question as, ‘‘why do you seek pleasure?” by saying that you 
see it and seek it as an element in the most desirable sort of life… the answer to the 
question about pleasure does not imply that pleasure is not intrinsically worthwhile but 
only a means to an end. It implies rather that pleasure is intrinsically worthwhile, being 
an element of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the most desirable sort of life, the life that 
contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities.186 
Ackrill’s view of eudaimonia is inclusive. Happiness is a composite good, achieved by the 
performance of all intrinsic goods, including contemplation, but also the life of political 
involvement. Roberts summarises, “excellence or virtue is expressed in functioning well as the 
                                                          
184 Ackrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, 252–254. 
185 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 41. Richardson Lear replies this is a 
problematic view. Consider someone that dances for enjoyment – are they dancing because the dance 
brings them pleasure, or because the dance aims at happiness? It could be coincidental that the dance 
brings both pleasure and at the same time aims at happiness. However, she suggests it is more likely 
that happiness must be more complete than the dance is.  
186 Ackrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, Phronesis, 17 (1972): 252–259. 
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kind of creature one is; humans are, by nature, rational and political beings.” For a human 
person, excellence would be to be a good rational and a good political being.187 Moral virtue is 
properly expressed in the political life.188 Thus, Walker suggests that Aristotle presents the 
political life as the main alternative to the contemplative life. The political life itself is most 
properly exemplified by the statesperson (EE I.5 1216a23-27).189 Aristotle’s virtue 
countenances a proportionate response to a given situation. In the political life, the person with 
excellent character continues to choose “toward the goal” (the end)190, but is able to adapt to 
shifting political climates using deliberative judgment to choose according to the orthos logos 
(right rule).191  
There is no resolution among scholars on Aristotle’s account of the highest life.  
Richardson Lear contends that the inclusivist account of the moral life as mot eudaimon cannot 
be reconciled with Aristotle’s statement in NE X 6-8, in which he states that contemplation is 
true eudaimonia.192 Further criticism made by Richardson Lear and others, including Stephen 
Bush and Aristide Tessitore, is that the Greek word for most complete, or final refers to the 
highest member of a set, but not the set itself. Thus, in their view, eudaimonia cannot be an 
end that is the sum total of all other worthwhile ends.193 This would align more closely to NE 
X 6-8, where contemplation is the highest good of all.194  
                                                          
187 Jean Roberts, ‘Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual’, in A Companion to Aristotle ed. 
Georgios Anagnostopoulos (UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 555. 
188 Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 567.  
189 Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’ 561, 567. Walker states that the 
political life is commonly construed to mean the life of the statesman. However, he argues that 
Aristotle allows for the life of moral virtue to be expressed by citizens and not just statesmen, 
particularly at (EN X.8 1179a-3), where Aristotle states virtue can be exercised “even from moderate 
resources”. 
190 Jessica Moss, ‘”Virtue Makes the Goal Right”, 214–15. 
191 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 208. 
192 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 42. 
193 Aristide Tessitore, ‘Aristotle’s Ambiguous Account of the Best Life’, 201. 
194 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 42–3. 
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The present thesis does not offer a final judgment on this debate. Rather, its purpose in 
employing this discussion has been to illustrate that The Forum and The Tower draws from 
Aristotle’s ambiguity on whether the best life is that of the philosopher or the statesperson. 
This lack of consensus is the starting point from which Glendon examines the deliberations of 
scholars and statespersons about the merits of “a life dedicated to philosophy, of politics, or of 
both.”195 The virtue of phronesis helps explain how the person with thymos and eros needs to 
deliberate about what “means” are available in the present moment to pursue their views on 
the good life, both for their individual good, and for the good of the State.  
 
Political Influence through Life in the “Forum” 
Glendon proposes that whatever one concludes about Aristotle’s view that the 
philosophic and the political are the two most choiceworthy paths of life to follow, what is 
certain is that scholars can debate about great ideas or the “advantages and disadvantages of a 
course of action, but statespersons must make decisions and take responsibility for them.”196 
Hence, all of the scholars and statesmen profiled in the book “shared the belief that 
statespersons should keep in touch with the world of ideas and that political theorists should 
attend to what is going on in the life of the polity.”197  
The challenge for the scholar is to become involved in the affairs of the state, as advisers 
to rulers or, indirectly through their writings. The danger, Glendon suggests, is through an 
excess of eros and the corresponding action of a zealous commitment to pursuing one’s 
conception of the political good. A failure to operate within the power structures of one’s own 
                                                          
195 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 223. 
196 Ibid., x. 
197 Ibid., 221. This indicates Glendon is emphasisng the two paths of life qua careers for the modern 
student. Though career choice is not the primary aim of the ethics, its practical nature forms the 
foundation for Glendon’s approach. The studies of the lives and decisions of scholars and statesmen 
are not two distinct discussions on separate, noble vocations, but show that scholars can try to extend 
the influence of theory into political practice. 
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State can render one politically ineffective. De Tocqueville’s “fiercely independent streak” 
caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which ultimately left 
him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French Chamber of 
Deputies. Glendon writes, 
[De Tocqueville] confronted the problem facing any politician who refuses to accept 
party discipline or follow the party line: how could he maintain his independence 
without rendering himself isolated and ineffective? Sadly, Tocqueville was never able 
to solve that problem, and thus never achieved the political influence he so desperately 
desired.198 
Within Glendon’s framework, Copleston’s explanation of Aristotle’s virtue as both a 
“mean” and an “excellence”, indicates that Tocqueville’s deliberations erred on the excessive 
side of integrity of his own views of “ends”. Tocqueville was unable, in Glendon’s view, to 
work out the necessary “means” in the time he served in the Chamber of Deputies to be 
politically effective.  
On the other hand, the challenge for the political actor is to keep their view of the good 
for man – the very reason for their political involvement – in sight while deliberating how to 
remain influential. Machiavelli exemplifies the person who chooses the life of statesmanship 
over scholarship as their “central preoccupation.” Glendon relays that Machiavelli sought 
diplomatic missions as a Florentine public servant during the early 16th century. His method of 
deliberation emphasised the means to secure power, over the retention of any private morality, 
or notions of the “good life”.199  
                                                          
198 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 160. 
199 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 66–7. More detail on Machiavelli’s method of political 
judgment will be explored in the following chapter, as Machaivelli illustrates one part of the present 
thesis’ aim to construct a “Glendon method” from this analysis. 
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Glendon’s view on Machiavelli offers a process of deliberation at the opposite extreme 
of virtue to that of Tocqueville. This shows that, among Glendon’s examples, it is possible to 
identify different degrees of practical wisdom between the extremes of excessive commitment 
to ideals on one extreme, and an excess of expediency over integrity of ends, on the other.  
Machiavelli lacked the eros that could have spurred him towards more noble ends. In the 
application of Aristotle’s virtue to Glendon’s framework, the present thesis can ask: is this 
phronesis? Copleston explains that “prudence”, or “practical wisdom” is not the same as 
“cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle, Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of 
deliberation that enables the person to find the right means to any particular end, even if that 
end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not phronesis because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the 
good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever means can be used to attain whatever end is 
desired, however morally perilous.200 On this reading, Machiavelli’s lack of the right ends in 
the process of deliberation is more akin to “cleverness” than phronesis. Glendon’s view that 
the ideal statesperson is one who combines the mastery of philosophy (knowledge of the good 
for the individual and the state) with the experience of political judgment (sound deliberation 
and judgment of means) is therefore the phronimos, or “practically wise man”, in Aristotle’s 
Ethics (EN1106b 36-1107a2).  
Thus, Machiavelli indicates a process of deliberation towards the opposite extreme, or 
vice, to the example of De Tocqueville in the virtue of phronesis. Machiavelli and Tocqueville 
are examples for the discerning student of less than ideal deliberations and choices about 
political judgment. Tocqueville acts with a focus on ends that causes a defect of sound 
judgment on means in the hic et nunc; on the other end of the scale, Machiavelli exemplifies 
choices towards the opposite extreme of phronesis, displaying an excessive focus on means to 
the detriment of the ends of politics and his own moral good. The ideal, most closely reached 
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by Cicero among Glendon’s examples, is the figure worth studying as the synthesis between 
the aims of philosophy and the aims of the political life. Within Glendon’s framework, 
therefore, it is possible to identify the degrees to which scholars and statespersons synthesise 
“ends” and “means” in their decision-making. Too great an emphasis on ends over means leans 
towards an excess of one kind, and too great an emphasis on means over ends leans towards an 
excess of the other.  
 
Conclusion 
Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower examines the lives and decisions of prominent 
scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and practical 
realities.”201 This chapter has aimed to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics help 
understand Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory and political 
practice, outlined in The Forum and The Tower. 
This chapter has demonstrated that Glendon uses Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that 
the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” are 
“philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to be 
politically effective and retain moral integrity.  Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue, 
as both a mean point between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the 
individual, links the philosophic and the political in the ideal statesperson’s life.202 Philosophy 
and politics intersect in the moral process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals. 
Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue,203 it is possible to discern that, across the examples 
in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians deliberate about how to be politically 
effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms of political judgment. An excessive 
                                                          
201 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii. 
202 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 337. 
203 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 206. 
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commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of political judgment; on the other extreme 
is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of immediate advantages. The present thesis 
has shown how Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise 
man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).  
As a practical inquiry, the question of which is the highest life between philosophy and 
politics indicates that philosophy is essential for the good life because it enables a grasp of 
what is the best thing for human beings. However, it is not proper to philosophy to answer 
practical questions of how to best live without reference to a different kind of wisdom – which 
the present thesis has suggested is practical wisdom, or phronesis.204  
The following chapter aims to examine how phronesis is employed throughout The 
Forum and The Tower. This discussion will construct a “Glendon method” through which to 
analyse the deliberations of the subjects in The Forum and The Tower. It will aim to establish 
a graph of “practical wisdom” that draws from the discussion in this first chapter with 
terminology from The Forum and The Tower and Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”. 
This graph is an adaptation of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, through an amalgamation of 
Copleston, Glendon and Maritain’s work to illustrate how practical wisdom can be understood 
through Glendon’s framework. Thus, the graph will be called the “Glendon graph.” The chapter 
aims to show that the graph can be re-applied to a new context, which shall be Karol Wojtyla.  
                                                          
204 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii. See also Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Lecture on Politics as 
Vocation in Cicero and Burke, 1 November 2011’, accessed November 07, 2017, 
http://www.lumenchristi.org/november-1-mary-ann-glendon-on-cicero-and-burke-on-politics-as-
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Chapter Two 
 
Introduction 
The current research project has aimed to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics informs 
Glendon’s framework. Chapter One explored how Glendon portrays the intersection of 
philosophy and politics. It outlined how concepts from Aristotle’s virtue ethics offers some 
conceptual grounding on which to understand the challenge scholars and statespersons face in 
The Forum and the Tower. The present thesis has identified that philosophy and politics 
intersect in the virtue of phronesis, especially in the life of the statesperson. Glendon’s project 
in The Forum and The Tower explores how scholars and statespersons deliberate how to affect 
their political contexts towards their conceptions of political ends.  
Chapter One identified Plato and De Tocqueville as examples of political actors who, 
according to Glendon, exercised an excessive commitment to their own conceptions of political 
ends without sound judgment of the political circumstances. It also suggested Machiavelli as 
an example of deliberation that eschews moral virtue as essential for sound political judgment. 
The thesis has tried to show how Glendon’s ideal statesperson can be understood within 
Aristotelian phronesis, as one who combines a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in 
managing “great affairs”.205 Within the explanations presented of Aristotelian virtue, this thesis 
suggests that Glendon’s analyses of De Tocqueville and Machiavelli can be understood as 
examples of political judgment towards the extremes of practical wisdom. Cicero can be 
understood as the closest of Glendon’s subjects to the phronimos. Chapter Two aims to apply 
these concepts further in close readings of examples in The Forum and The Tower. This 
examination aims to establish a clear framework that can analyse political judgment in new 
contexts. 
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Chapter Two continues the discussion of political influence in the “forum” from 
Chapter One. From the discussion on how Glendon’s method provides insights into how 
phronesis manifests in the lives and decisions of the subjects in The Forum and The Tower, the 
present thesis argues that an identifiable “Glendon method” can be established. This method 
analyses the intersection of ends and means, philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the 
decisions of the person in question. It aims to answer how it is possible to retain moral integrity 
and be a successful political actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to 
Glendon’s project to establish a graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom.  The graph helps 
explain how the virtue of practical wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political 
judgment that aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of 
phronesis call “political judgment”.206    
This chapter considers contemporary debates on Aristotelian phronesis207  to help 
explain how political actors in The Forum and The Tower engage in a moral process of 
deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. Terminology from 
Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” will be employed to identify excessive forms 
of political judgment, which, Maritain argues, constitute vices.208 Following from this, the 
thesis aims to establish a framework in which practical wisdom is understood as both a mean 
point between what Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” 
                                                          
206 Richard S. Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment’, American Political 
Science Review 91, no. 2 (June, 1997): 409–10. 
207 Eugene Garver, Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics; Richard S Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery 
of Political Judgment’, 409–420; Peter J. Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1993); Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983); Ronald Beiner, ‘Review of Peter J. Steinberger’s The Concept of Political Judgment’, 
Political Theory 22 (November, 1994): 688–93; Glendon, Rights Talk; David E. Tabachnick, 
‘”Phronesis”, Democracy and Technology’, 997–1016; Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
208 Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 37–67. 
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on the other.209 The method pays special attention to key moments of decision-making where 
beliefs about the ends of politics might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political 
setting. These are decisions that involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right 
clashes with apparent advantage.”210 It argues this framework can be applied to a new case 
study, namely on Pope John Paul II. The framework aids an understanding of Pope John Paul 
II, specifically in how political principles inform his decision-making, in the established 
context of Communist Poland. 
 
Section One: The Glendon Method 
 
Context and Political Judgment 
The present thesis proposes that context is a fundamental element in The Forum and 
The Tower, and is essential to construct a “Glendon method”. Glendon’s method illuminates 
instances of political deliberation, where a judgment involves integrity of a political aim, or a 
degree of compromise on those aims for some immediate advantage. Debates on the virtue of 
phronesis help to construct a framework that presents “sound political judgment” as a mean 
between two extremes, or vices, which constitute “bad” political judgment.211  
Glendon adopts a “biographical” format in the essays in The Forum and The Tower. 
This contextualisation of political judgments provides a ground map to appreciate how context 
can shape conceptions of political ends. For example, Glendon states that Cicero’s preference 
for the “primacy of politics” over philosophy as the “more illustrious” kind of life “perfectly 
reflected the ethos of Republican Rome”.212 Context also helps explain the kind of political 
conditions that generated opportunities, or hindrances, to the pursuit of political aims. For 
                                                          
209 Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 62–64. 
210 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38.  
211 The definition of political judgment is taken from David Tabachnick, ‘”Phronesis”, Democracy 
and Technology’, 998. 
212 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii, 25. 
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example, Glendon observes that Plato’s birth into a “wealthy and influential aristocratic 
family” made it natural for Plato to believe himself entitled to a life of prominence in Athenian 
politics.213 Conversely, Glendon observes that Edmund Burke faced significant obstacles as an 
Irishman attempting to win election to the British House of Commons. Glendon describes 
Burke’s context – 18th Century England – as particularly hostile towards Ireland, and especially 
suspicious of Irish Catholics. The Penal Laws, for example, declared that no Catholic could 
hold public office, among several other conditions. Burke’s Irish heritage hindered, in 
Glendon’s view, his efforts the enter British Parliament.214  
Glendon’s method aims to understand the conceptions of political ends as a reference 
point for the value of moral integrity in the political life. Maritain explains that whatever is 
considered the chief end of the state will determine what the statesperson considers the chief 
means or “power” of the state. For example, if the aim of politics is the “common good”, then 
the chief power of the state are its “organs” or institutions of justice. Peace is the measure of 
the state’s “health” – its ability to move towards the common good. Maritain defines peace as 
a constructive “struggling through time towards man’s emancipation from any form of 
enslavement”. If the chief end of the state is power, which Maritain states Machiavelli believed, 
then “military strength” is the state’s primary power, and its capacity to wage “war” is the 
indicator of its health.215 The distinction between ends and powers or means has consequences 
for the statesperson’s conduct. Glendon’s project emphasises that her audience is concerned 
with retaining moral integrity in the pursuit of political success.216 Maritain suggests that what 
the person considers the chief end of politics will also shape their prioritisation of moral 
integrity in political practice. Should the chief end be the common good, then the statesperson 
                                                          
213 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 9–10. 
214 Ibid., 137. Glendon states that as part of this hindrance, Burke was repeatedly investigated by 
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recognises that being a person “good in every respect” is essential for retaining “clear-
sightedness” of the temporal good of human persons in the community. If it is power, it is 
necessary, in Machiavelli’s words, to learn to not be good. Thus, in Maritain’s view, moral 
excellence is closely bound to the aims of politics.  
Glendon’s view is comparable to Maritain’s, as she observes that often the more 
“decent” and noble the political aims of the person are, the more they “agonise” over decisions 
that require compromise of moral principles.217 Glendon recognises, as Maritain does, that 
conceptions of political ends shape the prioritisation of moral virtue in the political life. Thus, 
when the political aims are noble, i.e. the common good, the desire for moral integrity is greater 
than if the aims are less noble, such as those that Machiavelli espoused, of power and stability. 
The implication for the phronimos is that the right conceptions of the aims of politics demand 
a method of political judgment that avoids “falsehood” and any “slip of the will” entirely.218  
For the purposes of the current research project, a clear explanation of the subject’s 
conception of the aims of politics is needed to understand where their political judgments 
involve a retention of moral integrity or a degree of compromise on those aims. However, 
Glendon provides no definitive account of the right ends of politics. The Forum and The  Tower 
limits its analysis to where the aims of politics intersect with, or do not intersect with, political 
judgments. The book does not compare the political aims with Aristotle’s notion of the 
common good, or any other particular conception, of right ends. The method instead aims to 
highlight instances of deliberation between acting towards an aim with integrity, or 
compromising on an aim for some immediate advantage.219 The thesis adopts terminology from 
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Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism” to enable an understanding of how political ends 
inform, or are tactically ignored, in instances of political decision-making.  
 
Section Two: Maritain and the Glendon Graph 
 
The End of Machiavellianism 
The current research project uses Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”220 to 
identify extreme forms of political judgment that constitute vices of phronesis.221 Maritain’s 
analysis has the virtue of drawing clear but complex distinctions, which can contextualize 
Glendon’s method so as to enable the construction of a framework. He examines the political 
philosophy of Machiavelli to explore the interaction between ends and means in his political 
judgments. Maritain’s essay identifies the challenges of pursuing the common good through 
means that Aristotelian virtue describes as excessive or defective. Maritain labels the excessive 
kind of political judgment “hypermoralism”.222 This method of action insists on a purity of 
means that fails to produce any tangible political impact. It is an excessive form of practical 
wisdom, because it fails to understand what the right means are in the hic et nunc and judge 
accordingly.223 Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain “something impracticable 
and merely ideal”, where the practitioner refuses “pharasaically any exterior contact with the 
mud of human life”.224  
At the opposite extreme is Maritain’s term “Machiavellianism”. This term refers to a 
method of political practice that eschews any notion of moral virtue as essential to securing the 
chief end of politics. In practice, the person focusses on gaining “immediate success” (power), 
                                                          
220 Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? 
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221 Ibid., 45–46. 
222 Ibid., 61. 
223 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119. 
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often at the expense of personal convictions (morality).225 Glendon explains that the aspiring 
statesperson can try to rationalise pursing immediate political success. The person considers 
the advantage of trading silence, on a particular belief about right ends, for a position of power. 
The advantage is that from this newfound influence, they might be better placed to pursue those 
ends previously abandoned. The risk in this method, Glendon observes, is that one develops a 
pattern of trading long-term goals for immediate advantages, and thereby fails to achieve the 
very aims one set out to achieve in the first place.226  
Chapter One argued that phronesis is the virtue proper to the statesperson, and 
combines an accurate understanding of the present moment and the right judgment on the 
means to pursue the right ends. Sorabji, among others, argues that the wise statesperson needs 
philosophy to work out what are the right ends.227 Phronesis is a deliberative capacity that does 
not supply the ends itself. Rather, philosophy is tasked with supplying the human goods, while 
phronesis must deliberate how to achieve those ends. Thus, philosophy and phronesis 
complement one another in Aristotle’s wise statesperson.228 
However, some proponents of Aristotelian phronesis argue that it is prudent judgment 
for the statesperson to be “flexible” and avoid “fixed universals” of political theory.229 
Ruderman, in his essay “Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment”,230 argues 
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contemporary scholarship among political scientists seeks to appropriate Aristotle’s concept of 
phronesis into a model of political decision-making that limits the role of philosophy in 
political judgment.231 Barber and Lyotard are among scholars who argue that Aristotle’s 
phronesis can be used to produce a mode of political judgment that avoids “logical extremes” 
on the one hand and a politics of pure “accident and force” on the other.232 These arguments 
aim to “assign wholly different tasks” to philosophy and political practice.233 Ruderman argues 
this design is conceived as an “antidote to reason” – to remove any requirement for the 
statesperson to “invent” morality, or rely on principles to base his or her reasons for acting.234 
This argument suggests a loose correlation between moral virtue and political decision-making 
directed at achieving political aims.  
Maritain proposes that there are degrees to which the statesperson can err on either side 
of the mean, which can constitute what contemporary scholars call “sound political 
judgment”.235 Maritain argues that the morally virtuous statesperson must use his intelligence 
to devise “cunning” ways to achieve the ends in difficult circumstances, without descending 
into “falsehood or imposture”.236 The distinction between – to use Aristotle’s terms – 
“cleverness” and “falsehood,” in the means one deploys, is both difficult and imprecise.237 This  
moral dilemma is the focus of Glendon’s analysis. She highlights the process of deliberation 
                                                          
231 See Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics; Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment; Ronald Beiner 
‘Review of Peter J. Steinberger’s The Concept of Political Judgment’, 688–93; Peter J. Steinberger, 
The Concept of Political Judgment. 
232 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 67; Benjamin Barber, 
The Conquest of Politics, 39.  
233 Richard S. Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment’, 418. 
234 Ibid., 416–417. 
235  David E. Tabachnick, ‘”Phronesis”, Democracy and Technology’, 998–9. 
236 Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? Perspectives from 
the Review of Politics, 41–2. 
237 Eugene Garver, ‘Deception in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: How to Tell the Rhetorician from the Sophist, 
and which One to Bet On’, Rhetoric Society Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1994): 76. 
 61 | P a g e  
 
on means to pursue a particular aim that recognise the need for compromise, but offers no 
precise point at which “prudent accommodation becomes pandering”.238  
Maritain’s perspective is congruent to Copleston’s view of virtue; Copleston states that 
for virtuous acts, the right choice will sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”, 
while in other cases the reverse may be preferable.239 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use 
actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of 
the right ends. This section aims to explain how “Hypermoralism” and “Machiavellianism” are 
extreme forms of political judgment, and explore how the political judgments of subjects in 
The Forum and The Tower demonstrate operating between these extremes. It aims to show how 
Glendon’s framework illustrates political judgments that lean towards excess, or defect, on 
either side of the mean. It will suggest that the terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be used 
to indicate a moderate form of political judgment that errs on the mean side of either of the 
“hypermoralist” and “Machiavellian” extremes.  
Copleston draws from a graph developed by Hartmann to explain “ends” and “means” 
in relation to virtue.240 Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below show how Hartmann’s graph of virtue 
can be adapted to the current research project’s discussion of phronesis. The adapted graph 
attempts to highlight how philosophy and politics, or ends and means, intersect in the virtue of 
practical wisdom. The graph shows how the wise statesperson acts towards the mean, as a 
middle point between extreme forms of political judgment. The graph aims to illustrate that 
Glendon’s analysis of scholars and statespersons shows different methods of political 
judgment, where some examples operate at the extremes of political judgment, while the ideal 
statesperson acts towards the mean.    
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Figure 2.1: Hartmann’s original 
 
Chapter One explained Copleston’s argument that the Aristotelian “doctrine of the 
mean” is not simply “an exaltation of mediocrity” in the moral life.241 Likewise, Urmson  states 
the doctrine of the mean is not a fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances.242 Simple 
calculated compromise between vices is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral 
goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when the right ends are sought.243 The graph shows that 
the extremes of actions are called “excess” and “deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme 
right and extreme left of the horizontal axis, respectively. The middle point is at the centre of 
the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could 
not be assigned to either the category of “mean” or the category of “excellence”, but to their 
“synthesis.”244 This is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent to which one’s actions 
aim toward the right ends determines the height one reaches on the vertical axis. The graph 
below adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue, generally, to the virtue of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom.  
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Figure 2.2: Hartmann Adapted to a “Glendon Graph” of Practical Wisdom 
 
 
The thesis proposes that the Hartmann’s labels of “excess” and “defect” can be adapted 
to Maritain’s terms “Machiavellianism” and “Hypermoralism” as vices related to the virtue of 
practical wisdom. Hartmann’s other terms, “goodness” and “badness,” can also be adapted to 
reflect the aim or “end” – “practical wisdom”. “Cleverness” replaces “badness” as the middle 
point between the vices, absent the right aims necessary for practical wisdom. Chapter One 
outlined that “practical wisdom” is not the same as “cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle, 
Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of deliberation that enables the person to find the 
right means to any particular end, even if that end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not phronesis 
because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever 
means can be used to attain whatever end is desired, however morally perilous.245 On the graph, 
cleverness is a “mean” form of political judgment between “hypermoralism” – the absoluteness 
of ethical claims – on the one hand, and “machiavellianism” – the denial of ethics and moral 
virtue in the political life.246  
The present thesis argues that the graph, when applied to The Forum and The Tower, 
helps illustrate how Glendon’s examples of political actors make judgments between the 
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extremes of practical wisdom. The following section aims to show how the graph provides a 
visual representation of practical wisdom as the virtue proper to understanding how philosophy 
and politics, theory and practice, and thymos and eros intersect in The Forum and The Tower. 
It will argue for a method whereby one can read  the political decisions through Glendon and 
an amalgam of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, with Maritain’s terminology. When the method is 
tested against Plato,  his decisions are towards the “hypermoralist” extreme of practical 
wisdom. That is, Plato’s decisions exhibited  ethical absolutism and lacked immediate success. 
Machiavelli can be placed within the “Machiavellian” half of the graph. It should, though, be 
clarified that Maritain believes Machiavelli is a more moderate political actor than the term  
“Machiavellian” denotes. As will be seen, Glendon considers Cicero and Edmund Burke the 
closest among her examples of the “ideal statesperson”.  
 
Hypermoralism  
Maritain labels an absolute commitment to ethics and ideals in politics as 
“hypermoralism”, which is an Aristotelian vice. Urmson concurs that an excess of commitment 
to ideals is one extreme of practical wisdom.247 To Maritain, hypermoralism is an approach to 
politics that is highly idealistic and largely impracticable. It involves the refusal to engage in 
any form of political activity that is stained with the “mud of human life”.248  
The purity of means consists in not using means morally bad in themselves, it does not 
consist in refusing pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life, and it 
does not consist in waiting for a morally aseptic world before consenting to work in the 
world, nor does it consist in waiting, before saving one’s neighbour, who is drowning, 
to become a saint, so as to escape any risk of false pride in such a generous act.249  
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Maritain contends that “ethics” can become a “distraction” in political judgment, when the 
person in question applies ethical principles as absolute. Such insistence severs the ethical life 
from the political life, which, Maritain argues, ignores the “empirical practical wisdom” of the 
nation’s moral and intellectual “instincts”. The “common inherited experience”, which 
contains accepted values and beliefs in a kind of national consciousness, is generally more 
potent than any “artificial construction of reason”.250  
Beiner is among the scholars of phronesis who share Maritain’s criticism of a method 
of political judgment that is too reliant on theory. Beiner states that there is a “natural and 
unbridgeable gap between theory and practice.”251 Theory, Beiner argues, is rigid, inflexible, 
abstract, and the product of “morally disengaged minds” concerned with “fixed universals” 
absent of any adaptability to political circumstance.252 Ruderman suggests that this kind of 
“rationalist” mindset informs a desire for a “rigorous consistency or intellectual elegance in 
one’s mind”.253 This produces decisions that are “unable to elude the seductiveness of logical 
extremes”.254  
The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis of Plato’s attempts at political 
influence exemplifies an excessive commitment to ideals. Glendon highlights Plato’s two 
attempts at serving as an adviser to Kings of Syracuse. His attempts to advise King Dionysius 
I and later his son, Dionysius II, were his most defining efforts at influencing politics. Glendon 
describes Dionysius I as a man who, among other vices, possessed “zero tolerance for 
criticism”. Plato’s view on giving advice to rulers was that one should “never pander to 
power”.255 The firm application of this principle caused Plato to imply in his discourse on the 
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just man to the King that Dionysius was not an example of a “good man”. In Glendon’s view, 
this was “not the most politic thing” to say. The king reacted badly and ordered Plato’s death 
or sale into slavery.256 Plato’s rigid inflexibility on any kind of compromise on the principles, 
or ends, of his own mind is evident in his Seventh Letter: 
When government is being carried on the right course, it is the part of a wise 
man to advise such people. But when rulers flatly refuse to move in the right 
path and order their counsellors to advise them only about how aims can most 
readily be accomplished, I should consider unmanly one who accepts the duty 
of giving such forms of advice, and one who refuses it to be a true man.257 
This kind of decision-making resonates with Maritain’s explanation of hypermoralism as a 
“pharasaic refusal” to engage in the “mud of human life”. Plato can be understood as a political 
actor who believes that immediate success cannot justify sacrificing moral integrity. Indeed, 
Plato’s counsel is clear that it is an “unmanly” thing to advise a ruler on practical means of 
pursuing an aim, should the “wise man” consider that aim not right. That he lacked success 
through these means suggests this is not practical wisdom. Glendon observes the fault may lie 
“not in the stars, but in [Plato himself]”, and the qualities that make an excellent scholar are 
not the same as those that make a great statesman.258 
 The thesis proposes Plato’s decisions can be mapped onto the adapted “Glendon graph”, 
which aims to show Glendon’s judgment on the extent to which Plato acts towards the mean, 
or the extremes, of practical wisdom. Plato’s advice for when all noble efforts are spent, is to 
“be silent and offer up prayers for oneself and for one’s country”.259 Plato could not bear to see 
his ideas in their ideal form tampered with and amended, for the purpose of taking at least some 
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effect. This inability to compromise rendered him politically ineffective.260 Glendon’s view of 
the limits of theory in practical judgments is expressed in other works and is similar to 
Maritain’s. In Rights Talk, Glendon observes that a part of contemporary American political 
discourse relies on abstract language, especially on human rights. This immobilises judgments 
about what is practical and sensible, producing a form of “rationalist hyperliberalism”. This 
subverts, in Glendon’s view, the skill of judgment to the abstracted sense of rights to a logical 
extreme, particularly in the decisions by judges, bureaucrats and other democratically 
unaccountable officials.261 The thesis suggests that judgments, like Plato’s, that rely on 
principles, or ends, to inform political decisions without understanding what means might best, 
move towards the aim are not practically wise. These decisions constitute a vice within the 
virtue of phronesis. On the graph, this project proposes that Plato can be placed towards the 
“hypermoralist” extreme. Figure 2.3 below shows this mapping. 
Figure 2.3: Plato on the “Glendon Graph” 
 
 
Plato’s political judgments, in Glendon’s view, failed to reconcile his insistence to 
“carry out my ideas about laws and constitutions”; with his idea that the statesperson is “like 
the navigator of a ship”, who learns to “change tack” as the conditions shift between favourable 
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and unfavourable.262 Plato’s decisions show that he could not exercise tact in the form of 
flattery or pandering to rulers; nor moderate his views on the just man to win immediate success 
in the form of favour with Dionysius. This is reflected on the graph. Plato is placed low on the 
vertical axis, to reflect his lack of success and sound judgment in his attempt to advise 
Dionysius; he is closer to the extreme of “hypermoralist” than the centre, or mean. This reflects 
his insistence on retaining his political convictions, or a “purity of means”, in Maritain’s 
words.263 Thus, an idealistic form of political judgment constitutes a vice in relation to the 
virtue of practical wisdom. This is relevant because it highlights the limits of theory, and of 
principles, in practical wisdom. It indicates that theory is the “touchline skill”, as Urmson 
describes, whereas practical wisdom requires additional skills such as good sense, 
understanding and experience (NE 1141b17; 1142a14).264 
Maritain offers his Catholic perspective that moral integrity is an essential component 
in the life of the statesperson, who must also consider the eternal destiny of humanity – eternal 
union with God. Maritain’s essay considers this goal as the only “perfect justice”, and therefore 
concedes that it is part of the nature of temporal politics that perfect justice cannot be attained. 
The “political virtues” aim at the “earthly common good” and such virtues are only “indirectly 
related to the ultimate end of man”.265 Thus, part of the practical science of politics requires 
the statesperson to make judgments that do not conform perfectly to ethical principles. At what 
point, then, does compromise on principles, as an essential part of practical wisdom, become 
morally destructive, as Glendon’s students ask?266 Debates on the nature and extent of 
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flexibility, compromise and the use of “cunning” can be placed within the half of the graph 
between “cleverness” and “Machiavellianism”. 
 
Machiavellianism  
 Maritain recognizes the same problem that Glendon highlights in The Forum and The 
Tower - that acting with moral integrity does not align with immediate political success: 
It is true that politics being something intrinsically moral, the first political condition is 
that it be just. And it is true that at the same time that justice and virtue do not, as a rule, 
lead us to success in this world.267  
Political ethics must maintain a “truly realist quality”, which Maritain argues that, when 
usurped, is the basis of what he calls “Machiavellianism”. This requires learning how to pursue 
political ends within circumstances that are imperfect with regard to the application of ethical 
principles. For example, Maritain acknowledges the statesperson must generally learn “the 
political toleration of certain evils”, such as new statutes of law that permit the “retention of 
long ago ill-gotten gains”. This is because new human ties and “vital relationships” infuse these 
relationships with legal legitimacy that are “in reality ethically grounded”.268 The pursuit of the 
right political ends, encompassed within the “common good”, enables the statesperson to 
resolve the “antimony” between political justice and political expediency.269 Usurping these 
circumstances for the “benefit of immorality”, on the other hand, is the essence of 
Machiavellianism.  
 In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon suggests Machiavelli’s political thought as an 
opposing extreme to Plato.270 In The Prince, Machiavelli counsels new leaders on methods and 
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practices to secure power in sixteenth-century Florence. Machiavelli advises, “it is necessary 
to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able to not be good, and to use this 
and not use it according to necessity.”271 Machiavelli’s idea of political virtue is one of courage 
and political skill; and rather than the Sophia Aristotle proposes, wisdom is simply canniness. 
Moral virtue is a useful tool, but is not an end worth pursuing if it does not assist in the goal of 
securing power. And there are even times where it is better not to be virtuous.272 
Glendon observes that Machiavelli, though steeped in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, 
Cicero, and Augustine, held that the ideals they aimed at to be untenable. These thinkers were 
aware of humanity at its worst, and observed that human efforts would always fall short of 
ideals. But each insisted on retaining ideals as worthwhile political goals.273 To Machiavelli, 
accepting such aims would be disastrous for a statesman. To aim for such ideals, rather than 
taking men as they are, Machiavelli wrote, would render a statesman politically ineffective:  
[There is so great a distance] from how one lives to how one should live that he 
who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than 
his preservation: for a man who wants to make a profession of good in all 
regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good.274 
Politics, says Glendon of Machiavelli, should be based on empirical observation, taking men 
as they are and not as they ought to be.275 Maritain argues that Machiavelli is not proposing a 
ground-breaking science of politics that is highly practical, taking men as they are and not as 
they ought to be.276 He quotes Lerner as “rightly observing” that “power politics existed before 
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Machiavelli was ever heard of, [and will] exist long after his name is only a faint memory.”277 
Machiavelli’s “radical pessimism regarding human nature” elevates bad politics to a normative 
level. 278 Maritain says, 
For not only do we owe to Machiavelli our having become aware and conscious of the 
immorality displayed, in fact, by the mass of political men, but by the same stroke he 
taught us that this very immorality is the very law of politics.279 
However, Maritain distinguishes what he calls “absolute Machiavellianism” from 
Machiavelli himself. Indeed, Maritain writes that Machiavelli would “pale at the sight of 
modern Machiavellianism.”280 Machiavellianism is the rejection of any notion of the moral life 
whatever, and seeks to employ “wickedness” at every opportunity for “immediate success”. In 
contrast, Machiavelli has in mind the goal of political stability, and advises the prince against 
vice and greed, should these threaten the aim of political stability. Machiavelli is thus 
revolutionary in elevating a means of political judgment that abandons moral virtue as desirable 
for the person, or as a component in the health of the state. However, he does not abandon ends 
themselves, as political stability is still important for the state to function well. At the extreme 
of Machiavellianism, the aim is the constant pursuit of power, what Maritain calls “immediate 
success”, which is destructive for the person’s ethical character and the state.281 Thus, 
Machiavelli is not himself an “absolute Machiavellian” as Maritain describes, though he still 
rejects the importance of moral integrity in securing the right ends of the state.  
Glendon’s quote from Villari, a biographer of Machiavelli, concurs with such a 
distinction. Villari acknowledges that Machiavelli pursued an end, a “dream”, of a politically 
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unified Italy as the “holiest of objects”.282 Unlike Machiavellianism, which denies any political 
ends, Machiavelli had in mind the aim of a unified Italy. Machiavelli’s distinct political method 
is exemplified in his belief that this aim would have been “impossible to achieve… without 
recurring to the immoral means practiced by the statesmen of the time.”283 
The present thesis proposes Machiavelli can be placed closer to the Machiavellian 
extreme of the graph than the mean, shown on figure 2.3. Glendon acknowledges that 
Machiavelli’s method of political practice won him important diplomatic missions that were, 
in his view, important to the aim of political stability. He enjoyed political favour with some 
rulers of Florence.  However, Glendon observes towards the end of his life his influence in 
politics diminished.284  
 
Figure 2.3: Machiavelli on the “Glendon Graph” 
 
Machiavelli created, in Maritain’s view, “a profound split, an incurable division 
between politics and morality”. In the Aristotelian image of the practically wise man, 
Machiavelli, though interested in some ends of politics, lacked the eros that Glendon says 
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should have encouraged him to higher ideals.285  Hence, on the vertical axis, Machiavelli is 
placed higher than Plato, but is still closer to “cleverness” than “Practical wisdom”. In support 
of this view, Glendon offers Villari’s comment that it is uncertain whether “the excessive 
immorality of the means employed may not, even while momentarily grasping the desired end, 
sap the very foundation of society, and render in the long run all good and strong government 
an impossibility.”286 On Maritain’s view, this  antimony between idealism (wrongly confused 
with ethics) and realism (wrongly confused with politics), limits the possibility of achieving 
genuine political aims toward the common good,287 and renders the actor who pursues this 
method of judgment, clever at best. 
 Therefore, two nearly diametrically opposed accounts of the “very law of politics” are 
manifest in the examples of Plato and Machiavelli. At one extreme is a “hypermoralist” 
commitment to ideals, and at the other a total abandonment of those ideals, both to the detriment 
of politics and its aim – the common good.288 Glendon suggests that, in light of the experience 
of Plato and Machiavelli, the need for “public servants who can negotiate such moral 
minefields with wisdom and integrity is more urgent than ever.”289 Therefore, as Maritain says, 
a “deadly division [is] created between ethics and politics both by Machiavellians and 
hypermoralists”.290 The present thesis suggests such a division is exemplified in Glendon by 
Plato and Machiavelli, as the hypermoralist and Machiavellian respectively. The mean point 
between these extremes shall thus be the ideal goal for the statesman concerned with retaining 
integrity to aim towards. However, as Maritain argues, and the example of Burke testifies, the 
mean point itself is difficult to pinpoint.  
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Phronesis – the Mean between Hypermoralism and Machiavellianism 
Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful illustration of Maritain’s point that the 
statesperson must use the skills of intellect, called “cunning”, to discern how to advance the 
common good, and when to opt instead for what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”,291 
without “falsehood or imposture”.292 Glendon’s view of Burke suggests that a method of 
political judgment that uses compromise and “cunning” without descending into “cleverness” 
is possible, though it is difficult to identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full 
betrayal of principle. Burke argues that “falsehood and delusion are allowed in no case 
whatever. But, as in the exercise of all the virtues, there is an economy of truth. It is a sort of 
temperance, by which a man speaks truth with measure, that he may speak it the longer.”293 
Burke’s method of political judgment insisted on identifying what means are available in the 
present moment to pursue a particular good, even if it only be a partial fulfilment of that good. 
“It is a settled rule with me to make the most of my actual situation, and not to refuse to do a 
proper thing because there is something else more proper, which I am not able to do.”294  
Edmund Burke’s parliamentary career reveals several instances where his values 
clashed with that of his government. Particularly, this manifested in Burke’s drafting of a report 
on the Penal Laws imposed by the British on Ireland at the time. Though repulsed by them, in 
the report, Burke maintained his government’s view that the laws were both “just and 
necessary”.295 This example was characteristic of Burke’s continual efforts to navigate the 
“tightrope” he had to walk between party policy and personal conviction. In some instances, 
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he could advocate for what he believed in,296 but in many cases he needed to remain silent.297 
This indicates Burke’s willingness to compromise his beliefs at certain times, to retain his 
position as Member for Bristol. Indeed, throughout his career, Burke compromised on personal 
preferences to align his views with his party.298 Is this practical wisdom, or too much 
compromise? Glendon quotes Burke’s friend, Dr Samuel Johnson, who explains: “I do not say 
that he [Burke] is not honest; but we have no reason to believe from his political conduct that 
he is honest.”299 This view highlights the imprecision between “falsehood and delusion” and 
the “economy of truth”.  
Maritain recognises that although it is necessary for the statesman to be just in order to 
“procure and further the political common good”, it is not sufficient always to be just. 
Sometimes, Maritain observes, it is not necessary to be just, and indeed may be occasionally 
more advantageous to be unjust to gain “immediate political success.”300 The debate on 
phronesis between scholars such as Gadamer and Gallagher on the one hand, and Lyotard and 
Timinaux on the other, highlights that the extent political theory and notions of political justice 
ought to direct sound political judgment is unclear.  
Lyotard argues that phronesis is “pure judgment”, and involves no reference to theory 
to inform decisions. As with Copleston’s description of practical deliberation judging what 
means can be pursued in the hic et nunc, Lyotard states that any decision must be considered 
“case by case”, because “each situation is singular” and no external criteria can guide the 
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judgment beyond what appears to be the right means to immediate success “here and now”.301 
Lyotard denies wholly that any theory of justice can inform practical contexts, stating, “that is, 
after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models. It is 
not possible to produce a learned discourse upon what justice is.”302 Instead, Lyotard contends 
that sound judgment requires “sensitivity to differences” and the “ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable”.303 Within this framework, phronesis is only concerned with particulars, 
and not with universal, or objective, concepts.304  
Steinberger views practical wisdom a calculative element in the act of deliberation, 
where the State sets the boundaries of ethics. Political judgment is “essentially neutral”, 
particularly with regard to “specific political arrangements, procedures, or policies… [and 
even] on the purposes of political society.”305 Steinberger sees the statesman’s work as 
malleable to any political reality. Political judgment accepts political realities, and does not 
seek to transform them into an established ideal. It simply acknowledges the system and the 
corresponding values of the community, and as such does not critique the framework in any 
way.306 The task of the statesman here is simply to clarify the best practice within what is 
established as permissible. Barber concurs that phronesis deals with practical circumstances 
that necessitate and even justify a “lesser degree of precision” than rigid theory.307 
Conversely, Gallagher and Tabachnick are among the scholars who argue that political 
judgment devoid of political theory to provide ends is closer to Aristotle’s view of “cleverness”. 
Tabachnick observes that Aristotle states the phronimos is concerned with “universals” as well 
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as the “particulars” (NE 1141b15-16).308 To deny the aims of the common good is, in 
Tabachnick’s view, detrimental to the health of the State, because it is the precise aim of the 
State to secure the good of its members.  Gallagher notes that for Lyotard, phronesis is simply 
the “ability to play the game with inventiveness, to play ‘master strokes’ – justice is nothing 
other than this”.309 Gallagher argues that while sensitivity to “working at the limits of what the 
rules permit” is necessary, to then allow the State’s “generally accepted norms” to dictate the 
common good denies the legitimate use of reason in politics.310 Indeed, the risk of “public 
reason” providing the sole reference point for the “health of the State” leaves rational inquiry 
into the human goods unable to correct perversions of public reason.311 The phronimos, 
would not be able to share in this sensitivity because they would be focused solely on 
the individual, unable to even fathom, let alone provide for, the larger or greater ends 
of his shared community, the “human goods” [of which] Aristotle writes.312 
Therefore, the “inventiveness” of the statesperson cannot function with respect to 
achieving the common good without reason (philosophy) to inform the right ends.313 In contrast 
to Lyotard, Maritain states that an approach to politics that denies the aim of political justice is 
essentially “destructive” for a “nation as well as a civilisation”, because it gnaws away at the 
interior ethical character of the person. The ethical character supports political justice, which 
is the chief moral virtue and the very “soul” of human societies. It is through aiming at political 
justice, and struggling against defects of it, that society is preserved.314 
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In Glendon’s view, however, it is nonetheless necessary to “operate within the limits of 
the possible”. The present thesis suggests that this discussion helps understand, though not 
precisely, that cleverness and compromise differ through the presence of political ends. 
Maritain’s view on the use of cunning without degrading into lying as “exactly the affair of 
intelligence” renders some unjust acts permissible, and in some cases, necessary.315 Thus, 
where can Burke be placed on the graph of practical wisdom? 
Copleston points out that Aristotle believes one should not aim for the same precision 
with ethics, as one would expect from mathematics. In the sciences, it is appropriate to search 
for, and find, precise answers to mathematical questions. In ethics, however, only general and 
approximate accuracy can be expected.316 As mathematical precision cannot be expected, 
Copleston states that identifying what actions constitute excess, mean, and defect do not 
conform to “hard and fast, mathematical rules”. In some cases, the appropriate action would 
involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the reverse in others.317 For 
example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more audacious act, rather than 
a reserved one. This act leans towards excess from the ontological viewpoint, but as the 
situation required a more audacious act, it was also a better choice. Therefore, it is possible that 
actions that lean towards the hypermoralist or Machiavellian sides of the scale can still produce 
the right outcome. Furthermore, these more excessive actions may even be the right means in 
a particular context. However, the accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often 
known only through hindsight. As such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long 
after the person has passed from this life”.318  
                                                          
315 Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 42, 59. 
316 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332–3. 
317 Ibid., 337. 
318 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 223. 
 79 | P a g e  
 
Therefore, a “grey area” replaces Hartmann’s vertical line through the centre of the 
graph. It covers the full height of the vertical axis, between the areas of “cleverness” at the 
base, and “practical wisdom” at the top. The grey area represents the difficulty in assessing 
whether an action constitutes cleverness or cunning in the legitimate use of intelligence. In 
Burke’s case, this thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis renders it possible to place Burke 
within the grey area of the map, reflected in figure 2.4. 
 Figure 2.4: Burke on the “Glendon Graph” 
 
 
Section Three: Reasons for Success or Failure And Limitations 
 
On Success and Failure 
Glendon’s use of biography to establish context is important for phronesis, as it 
provides insights into the political conditions that the political actor must reflect on to 
determine if the conditions either hinder or provide opportunities to advance towards an aim 
with integrity, or through compromise. Unfavourable conditions, like those Burke experienced, 
help justify Glendon’s judgment that he ought to be considered among the few examples of 
statesmen worth emulating. Few opportunities presented themselves to Burke to advance his 
aims, and thus, Glendon states, it is difficult to determine how he could have achieved more as 
a statesman.319 At the same time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the 
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impact of one’s decisions can take effect long after one’s death. For instance, Glendon states 
Burke’s accomplishments, though modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that 
eventually vindicated some of his other aims, such as ending an oppressive system of British 
rule in the East India Trading Company. Glendon concludes that “just because one does not 
see the fruits of one’s efforts in one’s own lifetime, does not mean those efforts were in vain.”320 
In this way, Burke can be placed closer to the “practical wisdom” end of the vertical 
axis, rather than towards the “cleverness” end at the base. Burke’s calculated compromise 
embodies, in Glendon’s view, the reality that political virtue alone is not enough to generate 
successful outcomes. Indeed, she writes that the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable 
conditions and plain luck will always be elusive”. Compromise on political aims to service 
immediate needs is part of the imperfect and imprecise nature of politics. At the same time, 
favourable political conditions can facilitate success in one’s political aims. Thus, part of 
Glendon’s method is to offer context on whether the political conditions were favourable or 
unfavourable for the specific political ends of the person in question. This enables her to offer 
some judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political 
conditions in the “reasons for success or failure”.321 
 
Limitations of the “Glendon Graph” 
Glendon highlights the impact the scholar’s philosophical legacy can have on future 
political contexts. Locke’s contributions to the founding principles of American Democracy; 
Cicero’s synthesis of Greaco-Roman legal thought later nourished Western law and politics; 
Cicero’s works also inspired future prominent figures such as St Augustine; and Plato’s 
philosophical discourses are studied widely today.322 The extent of the “difference” scholars 
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and statespersons have made is an aspect of Glendon’s insight that graph cannot take into 
account. It is limited to how the political judgments of the subjects in The Forum and The 
Tower erred on either the side of integrity or the side of compromise on each side of the mean 
in the virtue of phronesis. It tries to highlight how the person aims at an end, and has to 
deliberate whether they will deploy an action that is compromising on their views in order to 
reach that end, on the side of “cunning”; or if they will opt for a choice on the side of integrity. 
The success, or failure, of the means chosen over the course of their political involvement helps 
to answer Glendon’s concerned student about how different kinds of political judgment 
contribute to success or failure.  
 
Conclusion 
The “Glendon graph” helps understand how conceptions of political ends can inform 
political decisions. The method used to employ it analyses the intersection of ends and means, 
philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the decisions of the person in question. Through 
the application of the graph it is possible to retain moral integrity and be a successful political 
actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to Glendon’s project to establish a 
graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom.  The graph helps explain how the virtue of practical 
wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political judgment that aims at the mean 
between excessive forms 
This chapter has considered briefly how contemporary debates on Aristotelian 
phronesis323  help explain how political actors in The Forum and The Tower engage in a moral 
process of deliberating the extent to which theory, or conceptions of political ends, can inform 
decisions “here and now”. Terminology from Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” 
identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels 
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denoting excessive forms of political judgment.324 The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s 
method is to identify moments of decision-making where beliefs about the ends of politics 
might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political setting. These are decisions that 
involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent 
advantage.”325 Additional considerations of success and failure are situated within observations 
on the political conditions the subject operates within. A key insight of The Forum and The 
Tower is that often the circumstances in which the person tries to be of political influence, can 
have a greater impact on the success, or failure, of their efforts, than their own choices.  
The thesis will now test the construction of the “Glendon graph” and the aspects of 
Glendon’s method that it visualises, in an original application of the method in a new context. 
It will suggest that Karol Wojtyla, known as Pope John Paul II, is a candidate worthwhile to 
situate within this framework. It proposes to offer two studies on John Paul II, in Chapter Three, 
and Chapter Four, respectively. Chapter Three aims to describe the central features of John 
Paul II’s conception of political ends, as the reference point against which to understand how 
his political judgments are informed by his political thought. It situates his political thought 
within his political context, in order to establish, as Glendon’s method indicates, how context 
informs or shapes his political thought. Chapter Four applies the Glendon graph to a study of 
John Paul II’s political engagement with an established context of Communist Poland. It 
analyses how his conceptions of political ends inform his political judgments. Finally, it will 
comment on the extent to which the political conditions enabled John Paul II to act with a 
greater degree of integrity, than compromise, in this context.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Three contains the first of two studies aimed at understanding Karol Wojtyla 
within the framework. It aims to describe his political context, so as to explain how his 
education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of the human 
person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the present thesis aims to 
establish Wojtyla’s views about the ends, or aims, of politics. The study identifies Wojtyla’s 
development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his political 
thought. Within the framework, Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his development 
as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the individual person 
as the goal toward which politics should be oriented.326 In particular, it aims to show how 
Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic structures – socialism and 
capitalism – that he argues produce outcomes that corrode the properly oriented concept of 
human dignity, most particularly through the denial of his understanding of basic human rights. 
The chapter addresses the first study in three sections. Following Glendon’s 
biographical approach, Section One highlights Wojtyla’s intellectual formation in a 
biographical essay. It pays particular attention to how the political and cultural dynamics of 
Poland under Nazism and Communism inform his interest in the philosophy of the human 
person. The thesis argues that Wojtyla’s intellectual development as a philosopher, poet, 
playwright and Ethics professor at the University of Lublin help situate him within the “tower”. 
Glendon observes that “some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for philosophy or 
statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many directions.”327 This 
section suggests Wojtyla’s process of discernment, from wanting at first to join the 
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contemplative religious order of the Carmelites to becoming a priest and train as a philosopher 
demonstrates his choice for a life in the “tower”, rather than the “forum”. According to 
Glendon, circumstances sometimes draw scholars from the “tower” into public life. This 
insight proves applicable to Wojtyla’s case, given that  he was elected to the papacy on October 
16, 1978. Section One presents the context for considering how Wojtyla’s political thought is 
influenced by his experiences living under Nazism and Communism. Furthermore, his 
intellectual training as a philosopher shape his political thought. 
Section Two goes on  to establish that the human person is the central preoccupation of 
Wojtyla’s philosophical development. Following the work of Wilk, Buttiglione, and others, it 
shows how Wojtyla draws from the philosophical schools both of phenomenology and of 
Aristotelian-Thomism, to develop the anthropology that provides the intellectual basis for his 
political thought.328  Wojtyla ultimately aims to provide a  philosophical anthropology whereby  
the person’s irreducibility, as subject, is central. With this, Wojtyla counters any understanding 
of the person through abstract definitions or ideological axioms, which he thinks ultimately 
leads to a denial of personhood at the heart of  human experience. This argument is the basis 
for Wojtyla’s view that human rights need to be derived from the “hic et nunc” – the here and 
now of personal experience.329 It suggests that Wojtyla has his own Polish context in mind. 
Section Two employs Barrett’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights in 
Wojtyla’s political thought, to highlight Wojtyla’s distinction between individual responsibility 
and the role of economic and political structures to secure human rights.330 
Section Three argues that human rights are fostered at the level of the political 
community, or the State, through Wojtyla’s concept of participation. It engages Clark, 
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Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, to highlight that “the state exists in order to 
protect…rights”,331 which requires statespersons to foster conditions where each person can 
fully participate in the dynamic life of the community.332 Wojtyla’s conceptual antithesis, 
alienation, explains his opposition to any form of political system or human behaviour that 
fails to treat human persons as ends in themselves. In his political thought, he is particularly 
critical of notions of socialist as well as capitalist economic structures that claim to be good in 
themselves. The implications of these ideas within the current research project are that Wojtyla 
holds passionate and intellectually formed convictions about the ends of politics that are 
fundamentally incompatible with the tenets of the political systems under which he was 
educated. The analyses of Williams and Murphy show how Wojtyla employed caution and 
subtlety in advancing his political ideas, in his philosophical works and in his limited pre-papal 
public life, during which he was an archbishop and cardinal, while also a professor of Ethics.333 
Arguably, a comparison can be made between Wojtyla’s experience and that which Glendon 
locates in Burke, who adopted a comparable caution in his public life. This will be discussed 
in what follows. 
Chapter Three makes its argument by way of descriptive analysis. It aims to relay 
Wojtyla’s political thought clearly, rather than to critique it. This clear explanation will enable 
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subsequent analysis, in Chapter Four, of where his thinking can directly be either seen, or not 
seen, in his political decision-making.  
Before embarking on these three sections, this chapter explains why Karol 
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II is a fitting candidate to study within the established framework. To 
resolve potential confusion over interchanging John Paul II and Karol Wojtyla, the present 
thesis follows the approach adopted by Guietti and Murphy, in their translation of Rocco 
Buttligione’s Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II. Guietti 
and Murphy distinguish “Karol Wojtyla’s thought and John Paul II’s teachings.” When 
referencing philosophical works, Guietti and Murphy “limit [them]selves to Professor 
Wojtyla.” John Paul II is used exclusively for the Pope’s public teachings, such as social 
encyclicals and public addresses. John Paul II’s and Wojtyla’s works will be distinguished in 
the footnotes.334  
 
Why Pope John Paul II? 
Glendon’s method addresses the scholar who is passionately driven toward the highest 
life, and tries to work out how to be involved in the practice of politics, whilst retaining integrity 
of principles developed in their political thought. Therefore, any study of new figures in new 
contexts must pay particular attention to the political ideas held by the person about how to 
best live, especially as they apply these beliefs, or perspectives, to their political context. Their 
efforts to be involved in the most “pressing political events” of their times constitute the arena 
in which their decisions need to examined.335 Glendon argues these figures share both the 
intellectual and passionate qualities, and that these traits are desirable for the ideal statesperson. 
To establish new contexts to study within her framework, Glendon calls for attention to those 
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able to successfully “bridge the gap between scholarship and statesmanship.”336 She suggests 
that Karol Wojtyla – Pope John Paul II – is one such candidate worthy of study in her 
framework. “One thinks, for example, of extraordinary intellectuals like Vaclav Havel and 
Karol Wojtyla who were at the forefront of the movements that brought a nonviolent end to 
totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe…”337 
Glendon suggests that the “vocational journeys of such persons will one day be 
fascinating and instructive to explore.”338 As Glendon herself has suggested Pope John Paul II 
– Karol Wojtyla – as a candidate whose “vocational journey” is worth studying within her 
framework, the present thesis proposes to take up her suggestion and examine Karol Wojtyla 
as she has studied others. Glendon has helpfully suggested that Wojtyla’s involvement in the 
collapse of totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe as an appropriate political arena to 
examine the intersection of Wojtyla’s scholarship and political action. Therefore, the present 
thesis aims to apply the methodology derived from Glendon, to Karol Wojtyla as a political 
theorist, with special attention to his engagement as a political actor with totalitarian 
governments in Eastern Europe.  
 
Section One: The Biographical Context of John Paul II 
 
The Role of Context in Karol Jozef Wojtyla: A Brief Biography 
Karol Jozef Wojtyla (b. 18 May 1920 d. 1 April 2005) was the first non-Italian Pope 
elected to the papacy in over 455 years.339 His election to the papacy took the Catholic world 
by surprise – Wojtyla was just 58 years old – a relatively young age for a pontiff in the twentieth 
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century.340 Further, unlike several of his predecessors he was untrained in the Italian-style 
Vatican diplomatic corps; nor was he from a noble family.341 Instead, Wojtyla was the first 
Pope from Poland in the Church’s history, and his professional and personal background was 
more unconventional for a pontiff than any Pope before him. Wojtyla was a priest, a 
philosopher and an Ethics professor, who came from a small town named Wadowice, in 
Poland.342  Rowland observes that by 1978, Wojtyla’s curriculum vitae read “something like: 
poet, priest, philosopher, playwright, Pope.”343 The present thesis suggests that applying the 
Glendon framework shows how Wojtyla’s “unconventional” context shapes his political 
thought, especially on how human dignity shapes the rights of individuals in economic, social 
and political life in the Polish State. 
 Suffering marked much of Wojtyla’s upbringing in Poland. He was largely raised by 
his father – a middle-ranking officer in the Polish Army – having lost both his mother and his 
elder brother while he was still young. He attended the local schools and was raised as a devout 
Catholic by his father, as was the experience of many Polish children. When he was just twenty 
years old, his father also passed away. On top of the loss of his family, Wojtyla also experienced 
the death of several close friends, especially Jews, during the Nazi Occupation of Poland in the 
Second World War. Cooper notes anti-Semitism was prevalent in Poland during Wojtyla’s 
youth, but that Wojtyla often extended “heroic support” to Jews, especially throughout the Nazi 
occupation of Poland, emblematic of his growing passion for the dignity of all persons.344 
                                                          
340 George Weigel, Witness to Hope, 1–500. Weigel comments that, when Wojtyla’s name was 
announced from the Vatican to the crowds in the square as the new Pope, the crowds cheered but also 
asked, “who? Is he one of us (an Italian)?”  
341 George H. Williams, ‘John Paul II on Church, State and Society’, Journal of Church and State 24, 
no. 3 (1982): 473. 
342 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II (Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 18–19. 
343 Tracey Rowland, ‘John Paul II and Human Dignity’, in John Paul II: Legacy and Witness, ed. 
Robert Gascoigne (Sydney: St Paul’s Publications, 2007), 54. 
344 Austin Cooper, ‘Poland in the Twentieth Century: A Background to the Contribution of John Paul 
II’, ed. Robert Gascoigne (Sydney: St Paul’s Publications, 2007), 23–4. 
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Wojtyla later commented following his father’s death that, by the age of twenty, “I had already 
lost every person I had ever loved”.345 The personal loss was reflected across Poland, which 
had lost one fifth of its national population between 1939-1945. 
In this context of war, suffering, and death, Wojtyla contemplated the merits of the 
vocation of the Diocesan Priesthood, or a more radical form of spirituality and contemplation 
with the religious order known as the Carmelites. Weigel observes that by 1945, Wojtyla had 
been “wrestling for some time” with the question of whether to enter the Discalced Carmelite 
monastery to pursue a “contemplative life in complete withdrawal from the world.”346 The 
attraction of the contemplative life suggests, in the Glendon framework, the strong presence of 
the noble, holistic form of eros in Wojtyla’s deliberation. Further, Maritain’s observation that 
the ultimate human good in the Christian context is the eternal union with God, suggests this 
kind of contemplative vocation is reflective of a pursuit of the highest, most complete, kind of 
life.347 Wojtyla took the advice of his superior and Prince Archbishop, Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, 
who counselled him to complete his studies and formation of the Diocesan Priesthood. Wojtyla 
was ordained a priest on November 1, 1946 by Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, aged 26.348 
Wojtyla retained his interest in the Carmelites, even after his ordination to the 
priesthood.  Immediately after his ordination, Wojtyla was posted to the Dominican Faculty of 
Theology in Rome, known as the Angelicum, to complete his doctorate in Theology. His choice 
to complete his Doctorate in Theology on Saint John of the Cross – a Carmelite mystic – 
                                                          
345 Jason Evert, Saint John Paul The Great: His Five Loves (Colorado: Totus Tuus Press, 2014), 15. 
346 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 78. The Carmelite spirituality involves a monastic lifestyle of near-
continual prayer and contemplation. The Carmelites are often considered “mystics”, due to the 
amount of prayer and contemplation the spirituality requires. 
347 Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? 
Perspectives from the Review of Politics, 57–60. Maritain does not draw a definitive correlation 
between Aristotle’s concept of theoria as the highest life and the “monastic” life of the in the Catholic 
context, though he does emphasise the importance decision-making that keeps in mind the ultimate 
end of eternal life. 
348 Cardinal Sapieha was Wojtyla’s childhood hero and a major influence on Wojtyla’s decision to 
enter the priesthood, according to Buttiglione. See Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the 
Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 30–32. 
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highlights the retention of his interest in the merits of the order.349 During his studies at the 
Angelicum, Wojtyla was exposed to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, through the tutelage 
of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.350 Buttiglione states Garrigou-Lagrange was a major influence 
on Wojtyla’s early philosophical formation, particularly through introducing Wojtyla to the 
thought of Saints Thomas Aquinas and John of the Cross. This influence is reflected in his 
doctorate, where Wojtyla attempted to confront the relation between dogmatic faith and 
mystical (experiential) faith, expressed in the writings of Aquinas and John of the Cross, 
respectively.351 Most importantly, the engagement with John of the Cross solidified Wojtyla’s 
conviction in the importance of an anthropology that started from the experience of the 
person.352 
The eros of the mind that Glendon believes is essential for grasping the right human 
goods manifests in Wojtyla’s interest in philosophy generally and ethics in particular. In 1954, 
Wojtyla accepted a professorship at the Catholic University of Lublin,353 where he was 
appointed chair of Ethics two years later. Wojtyla also published Love and Responsibility in 
1960, which was his first major philosophical work that explored sexual ethics.354 Williams 
                                                          
349English edition—Karol Wojtyla, The Doctrine of Faith According to St John of the Cross trans. 
Jordan Aumann (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981)  
350 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 44–53. 
Buttiglione explains that Garrgiou-Lagrange was a renowned defender of a “rather rigid and plodding 
Thomistic orthodoxy”. However, Garrigou-Lagrange also displayed an “outstanding modernity” in 
encouraging Wojtyla’s doctorate on applying the spiritual experiences of St John of the Cross to a 
new priestly spiritual formation in a post-war Europe.  
351 George Huntston Williams, The Mind of John Paul II : Origins of His Thought and Action (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1981), 106. Wojtyla’s doctorate concluded that faith in a dogmatic sense and 
faith in an experiential sense can be viewed as two aspects of a unitary process that enable a 
theological transcendence.  
352 Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 53. Ingarden was an early 
disciple of Husserl and later Scheler, whom Buttiglione describes as the father of Polish 
phenomenology. 
353 The University of Lublin was the only non-State university in the Communist Bloc. Gregg explains 
this was significant because it was the sole facility that allowed open discussion and cultivation of the 
works of St Thomas Aquinas in its philosophical school. See Gregg, Challenging the Modern World: 
Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 1999), 72–3. 
354 Rafal K. Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, International 
Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2007): 265. 
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argues that from the beginning of Wojtyla’s clerical career, Wojtyla had been “trained within 
the authoritarian context of the occupying Nazi authorities and of the ideologically Marxist 
People’s Republic.”355 In this context, in 1959, Wojtyla published his second dissertation on 
An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the System 
of Max Scheler,356 under the direction of Roman Ingarden at the Jagellonian University in 
Krakow.357 Ingarden’s influence exposed Wojtyla to phenomenology and the modern 
philosophy of Kant, which were the two schools of thought Wojtyla engaged with to attempt a 
construction of a Christian Ethics on the basis of Max Scheler’s phenomenological system.358 
As Weigel puts it, Wojtyla inquired how Kant and Scheler could answer the moral 
question of doing things that one “ought”, rather than simply what one “prefers”.359 Wojtyla’s 
answer was ultimately that “the ethical system constructed by Max Scheler is “not at all suitable 
as a means of formulating a scientific Christian ethics.”360 Scheler’s phenomenology, in 
Wojtyla’s view, lacked a rigorous metaphysics that could be linked back to an objective 
anthropology for a coherent ethical framework, though Wojtyla did acknowledge Scheler’s 
importance in bringing “back into philosophy everyday things, concrete wholes, the basic 
experiences of life as they come to us.”361  
Wojtyla continued to explore the usefulness of phenomenology in understanding ethics 
in his principal philosophical work, The Acting Person, published in 1969. Buttiglione states 
                                                          
355 George Huntston Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, Journal of 
Church and State 24, no. 3 (1982): 472. 
356 Karol Wojtyla, An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of 
the System of Max Scheler, (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1959). 
357 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 44. For 
Ingarden, phenomenology is not a philosophical system per se, but is a method of philosophical 
inquiry that can engage with a broad range of philosophical systems. See also A T Tymieniecka, 
‘Beyond Ingarden’s Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl’, Analecta Husserliana, vol. 4 
(Dordrecht, 1976), 250.  
358 John M. Grondelski, ‘Prepapal Influences on John Paul II’s Thought’, New Blackfriars 78, no. 911 
(1997), 28–33.  
359 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 128. 
360 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 23. 
361 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 127. 
 93 | P a g e  
 
The Acting Person contains Wojtyla’s fullest formulation of his philosophy.362 Between 1970 
and 1978, Wojtyla delivered several lectures and published papers giving more precise 
clarifications of his thoughts in The Acting Person, particularly his most original thinking that 
blended phenomenology with Thomism. In 1979, The Acting Person was published in America 
in English, which introduced Wojtyla’s work to worldwide audiences.363 From this outline, it 
is arguable that Wojtyla’s intellectual formation places him within the “tower”, as a scholar 
rather than a statesperson.  
However, Glendon also observes that circumstances can introduce political 
opportunities to advance one’s own conception of the human goods. Charles Malik exemplifies 
this point, as Glendon portrays him in The Forum and The Tower. Malik was a philosopher, 
who, like Wojtyla, was also steeped in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Further, Malik was intent 
on spending his career as a teacher and professor. Glendon writes that Malik, through chance, 
found himself at the centre of the team responsible for drafting and shepherding the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) through successive bodies, competing 
interest groups, and approval processes. Through a series of what Malik described as “the 
oddest coincidence[s] of my life at the United Nations”, his election to head several United 
Nations committees, gave him an unusual degree of influence in moving the UNDHR through 
the approval process, and into international law.364   
In a comparable way, in 1963, Wojtyla was appointed Archbishop of Krakow. Already 
surprising was Wojtyla’s ordination as Bishop in 1958, at just 38 years of age. Weigel observes 
that the circumstances surrounding Wojtyla’s appointment were particularly unusual. The 
established Polish Communist Party wielded the authority to veto any appointment the Pope 
                                                          
362 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 40–43 The 
book was not met without criticism, as scholars at a conference at the Catholic University of Lublin, 
questioned  whether it was necessary to apply a personalist lens to Aquinas’ thought.  
363 Ibid., 41–42. See also Weigel, Witness to Hope, 324. 
364 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 212-13. 
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proposed for a new Bishop in Poland. For eighteen months, from June 1962 to December 1963, 
the Vatican and the Polish government had been deadlocked over the appointment of the new 
Archbishop of Krakow. The Communist Party’s “chief ideologist” had vetoed seven names, 
insisting, “I’m waiting for Wojtyła, and I’ll continue to veto names until I get him.”365 
Wojtyla’s name was finally submitted, and the Communist Party agreed to his appointment. 
Weigel comments that the Communist Party regretted this appointment soon after.366 Over the 
next fifteen years, Archbishop Wojtyla became “something of a public personality in 
[Krakow]”, known for being an outspoken “defender of the human person against persecution 
and humiliation.”367 On October 16 1978, Weigel states the implausible again occurred, with 
the College of Cardinals responsible for electing the new Pope breaking with centuries of 
tradition and electing the first Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyla, who took the name Pope John Paul 
II.368  
Polish culture had considerable formative influence on Wojtyla’s interests and 
formation in those areas more associated with the “forum”. Buttiglione states that Wojtyla’s 
participation in “many of the classics of Polish literature” helps draw a “sketch of the 
atmosphere in which the cultural and spiritual vocation of Wojtyla came to maturity.”369 The 
themes of resistance in Polish plays helps explain how the theatre was an important tool of 
resistance against the Nazi Occupation. Wojtyla, like many other Poles, believed that resistance 
                                                          
365 Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul Ii, 184-5. 
366 Ibid., 186. 
367 Ibid., 120–1. Weigel also notes that Wotjyla never publicly used the word “communism” or 
criticised the Communist government directly. The nature of his rhetoric and its impact on Polish 
politics will be examined in Chapter Four.  
368 Ibid., 252–3. Weigel describes that, though not certain, it is likely the sudden death of Pope John 
Paul I, after only 33 days as Pope, created the conditions for the Cardinals prompted the occasion for 
doing the “unthinkable” in electing Wojtyla. He cites Cardinal Ratzinger (who later became Pope 
Benedict XVI), as stating that “the shock of the September [1978] Papacy, so abruptly and 
unexpectedly ended, created the human conditions for the possibility of doing something new.” 
Ratzinger, like several other Cardinals, believed God was saying something to them through the 
suddenness of Pope John Paul I’s death.  
369 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II,  23. 
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through preserving culture was fundamental to ensure a nation’s survival of an oppressor. 
Polish history was a resource Wojtyla frequently drew from for inspiration for the content of 
both his poems and plays.370 He published a number of plays and poems, right up until his 
election to the papacy, including David, The Jeweller’s Shop (turned into a Hollywood 
movie)371 and The Radiation of Fatherhood.372  
Buttiglione states that a “unity of the finite and the infinite” is a “recurrent theme in 
Wojtyla’s own poetry and philosophy.”373 Buttiglione suggests Wojtyla draws his interest in 
this unity from his Polish identity, and that Poland is a reference point for his conclusions about 
individual rights and the role of government in upholding those rights.374 Wojtyla’s cultural 
and philosophical formation are each linked by his passionate and intellectual formation in the 
relationship between the person’s ultimate aim (the infinite) and ethical action (the finite). As 
Poland transitioned from a nation under Nazi control to a nation under Soviet Communist 
control, Wojtyla’s philosophy emphasised the need for linking sound philosophy with concrete 
moments of “action”.375 Wojtyla’s aim to unify the finite and the infinite parallels the likes of 
Cicero and Burke’s aim to integrate the “tower” and the “forum”, or ends and means. For 
Wojtyla, the reality of choice has a double effect of both the immediate effect of the action, 
and the inner formation that act has on individual character. Thus, it is important for actions to 
aim at the right ends to develop a sound character, which, Wojtyla believes, is desirable for the 
individual.376  
                                                          
370 George Huntston Williams, The Mind of John Paul II : Origins of His Thought and Action (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1981), 58. 
371 Rowland, ‘John Paul II and Human Dignity’, in John Paul II: Legacy and Witness, 54. 
372 Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 27. 
373 Ibid. Buttiglione states these themes are “the genius of Catholicism”. The likes of Norwid and 
Schelling helped shape the same aim – placing the obligations and duties of the present moment at the 
service of Christ, who is eternal – in Wojtyla. 
374 Buttligione, Karol Wojtyla, 42–3 
375 Karol Wojtyla, ‘Rapsody Tesiaclecia’, in Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who 
Became Pope John Paul II, 27. 
376 Meghan Clark, ‘Integrating Human Rights: Participation in John Paul II, Catholic Social Thought 
and Amartya Sen’, Political Theology 8, no. 3 (July, 2007): 302–3. 
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 In his approach to the “forum”, Weigel believes that Wojtyla was not especially vocal 
about Polish politics, nor did he publish any works directly engaging the Polish Communist 
government while he was a priest and ethics professor. Indeed, Weigel argues, “by all accounts, 
Father Karol Wojtyła continued to be utterly uninterested in what passed for ‘politics’ in Poland 
in the 1950s.”377 This indicates Wojtyla did not contain the same degree of thymos – what 
Glendon calls the “noble sort of ambition” that drives political action – as he did eros.378 
Nevertheless, his work in the “tower” was concerned with the significance of work in the 
“forum,” and could also be considered a response to that domain. For example, he is concerned 
that ideologies, among other “evil of our times”, deny each person’s fundamental uniqueness. 
In a letter in 1968 to Jesuit friend and theologian Henri De Lubac, Wojtyla confided, 
I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to 
the metaphysical significance of the mystery of the PERSON. It seems to me that the 
debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first 
place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverisation, of the fundamental uniqueness 
of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical than of the 
moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must 
oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of “recapitulation” of the mystery of the 
person.379 
For Wojtyla, the human person-in-relationship as distinct from the “human being” as 
member-of-species, or ideologies that reduce human persons to solely material beings, is a 
defining feature of his major philosophical works, with profound implications for his political 
thought.380 Williams states that John Paul II brings “his experiential, philosophical, and 
                                                          
377 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 120; Weigel, The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II—The 
Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy (New York: Image Books, 2010), 191. 
378 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 24. 
379 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy; S. J. Avery Cardinal Dulles, ‘John Paul II and the 
Mystery of the Human Person, America Magazine 130, no. 2 (February, 2004), 4. 
380 Wilk, ‘The Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 265. 
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theological antecedents”, and the “political situations with which [he] is faced” to the first 
“Slavic” papacy.381 How these experiential, philosophical and theological ideas shape John 
Paul II’s conception of human rights is the focus of the next section. It aims to understand 
Wojtyla’s idea of the “human person” and the implications his philosophical thought has on 
individual rights. The section following will then address how human rights are fostered in 
Wojtyla’s concept of community, and the obligations fundamental rights place on economic 
and political structures, thereby constituting the central aspects of his political thought. 
 
Section Two: Human Persons and Human Rights 
 
The Human Person at the Centre of Wojtyla’s Political Thought  
Wojtyla’s philosophical project aims at providing a philosophical anthropology of the 
person as an irreducible subject.382 He approaches this through bridging the philosophy of 
objective man (ontology) and subjective man (phenomenology). His aim is to present a 
philosophy that solves the problem of how to understand man as a subject, in an objective 
sense.383 Wojtyla identified a need for applying the tools of phenomenology to enrich the 
Thomistic account of the human person. For Wojtyla, the metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas 
left little room to explore the realm of personal experience as a means of recognising objective 
values.384 Hence, Wojtyla’s most original thought attempts to incorporate the personalist lens 
of phenomenology with the ontology of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.  
                                                          
381 Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, 472. 
382 Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 269. Wilk explains Wojtyla’s 
anthropology relies on the classical Boethian definition of the person – individual substantia ratio 
naturalis (individual substance of a rational nature). Wojtyla writes, “In the first and fundamental 
approach the man-person has to be somewhat identified with its basic ontological structure. The 
person is a concrete man, the individual substantia of the classical Boethian definition.” Wilk explains 
that all of Wojtyla’s exploration of the inner dynamisms of the person is grounded in this definition. 
383 Mary Angela Woelkers, ‘Freedom for Responsibility: Responsibility and Human Nature in the 
Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla’, Studia Gilsoniana 5, no. 4 (2016): 635. 
384 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. A T Tymieniecka (London: Reidel, 1979), xi–xiv. See also 
Wojtyla, The Acting Person trans. Andrej Potocki, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). 
The title, Osoba i Czyn, is also translated as Person and Act. For discussions on differences in 
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Wilk identifies Wojtyla’s concern that sole reliance on phenomenology lacks a sound 
ontology, and can lead to subjectivism.385 On the other hand, for Wojtyla, phenomenology 
provides a way of enriching the concept of the human person through exploring the “whole 
subjective, conscious aspect,” which he claimed had been, to some extent, “levelled by 
metaphysical naturalism”.386 Wojtyla’s concern about an intellectual divide between a 
“metaphysical naturalism,” on the one hand, and “subjectivism” on the other, highlights his 
focus on human goods from the “tower”. The dominant aspects of Wojtyla’s philosophical 
thought concern the intellectual understanding of human personhood, which he believes can be 
resolved through objectivising subjective human action. Understanding human personhood 
through both experience and an objective ontology is essential for Wojtyla’s grasp of human 
rights, which shapes his ideas of the ends of politics. Wojtyla writes, 
I am convinced that the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (idealistic) and 
objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics must break down and is in fact 
breaking down on the basis of the experience of the human being. This experience 
automatically frees us from pure consciousness as the subject conceived and assumed 
a priori, and leads us to full concrete existence of the human being, to the reality of the 
conscious subject. With all phenomenological analyses in the realm of that assumed 
subject (pure consciousness) now at our disposal, we can no longer go on treating the 
human being exclusively as an objective being, but we must also somehow treat the 
human being as a subject in the dimension in which the specifically human subjectivity 
of the human being is determined by consciousness. And that dimension would seem 
to be none other than personal subjectivity.387 
                                                          
translations, see Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 
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385 Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 268. 
386 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans. Teresa Sandok (New York: P. 
Lang, 1993), 104. 
387 Wojtyla, Person and Community, 210 
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 For Wojtyla, the philosophical insight operari sequitir esse, which is to say, action 
follows being, necessitates a rich understanding of human action, within a sound account of 
being (ontology). Wojtyla explains that “something has to exist to be able to act”, and 
“something acts according to its being”.388 The human person is, for Wojtyla, capable of action 
that constitutes the person’s identity, within the limits of human nature (as Aquinas theorised). 
Human action at once reveals the person as an independent, free-thinking subject whose acts 
are unique and irreducible; and at the same time the person is a member of an objectively 
ordered species that can experience the same kinds of “inner happenings” as all other human 
persons.389 As Wojtyla puts it, 
For us action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action. For it 
lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man’s 
acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed. 
Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to 
understand the person most fully.390 
All human beings can be distinguished by this potency to both act and be aware of the 
inner transformation through the act. Wojtyla argues that the blend of phenomenology with 
classical ontology helps gain the insight that human beings have a richer identity than simply 
a shared membership in the same species. At the same time, this shared nature enables 
subjective human action to transcend itself as a manifestation of an objective nature. Persons 
pursue actions that fulfil their good, and this human good is the same for every person.391 
                                                          
388 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 83–84 
389 Ibid., 71. The self constitutes itself through action, through the operari proper to the human being 
as a person…the human self is able to constitute itself in this manner only because it already is and 
has been constituted in an essential and fundamental way as a suppositum. The supposituum humanum 
must somehow manifest itself as a human self: metaphysical subjectivity must manifest itself as 
personal subjectivity.  
390 Ibid., 66. 
391 Jameson T. Taylor, A Defense of Moral Praxis: Karol Wojtyla's Acting Person, PhD Diss., 
University of Dallas, 2007.  74. 
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Personal subjectivity recognises persons as “someone”, rather than “something”.392 The status 
of “someone” is unique to each person, and therefore imbues him or her with an inviolable 
dignity. Buttiglione notes that the core of the human rights movement stemmed from the same 
conviction shared by Wojtyla – belief in the “inviolable dignity of each individual human 
person”.393 For Wojtyla, this dignity is the source of human rights.  
Within the framework, Wojtyla’s approach to political ends through philosophy, rather 
than government policy primarily, renders him an “intellectual”.394 To treat a person as a mere 
being leads to a limited grasp of the person, with practical complications. Abstract definitions 
of beings do not grasp the full essence of being a person. Moving away from this vision can 
also reduce human beings to objects.395 For Wojtyla, as for Kant, treating persons as means to 
ends is a great moral wrong. He states: 
Whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that 
person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but also allow for the fact that he 
or she too has or at least should have distinct personal ends. This principle, thus 
formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms.396  
 Wojtyla’s central occupation is thus the human person, which is the basis of his 
conception of the proper practice of politics. Gregg argues that Wojtyla’s consideration of 
                                                          
392 Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 268–9. 
393 Rocco Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla and St. Thomas Aquinas’, paper 
presented at P.A.S.T.A Converence (Housten, Texas, 17–19 October, 2013); Buttiglione observes that 
Wojtyla’s final view is that while phenomenology enriches the traditional approach of Aristotle and 
Thomism, it is “unable to overcome the opposition between nature and person”. Buttiglione 
summarises, Karol Wojtyla rereads the modern discovery of subjectivity on the basis of the 
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394 Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy, ‘Transaltors’ Afterword: Buttiglione on Wojtyla’s 
Philosophy of Freedom and an Update on Fifteen Years of Studies of Wojtyla’s Thought’. Trans. by 
Paolo Guietti and Fracesca Murphy, in Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope 
John Paul II, edited by Rocco Buttiglione (Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 
309. Indeed, Buttiglione describes Wojtyla as a “philosopher Pope”. 
395 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 121. 
396 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 28. 
 101 | P a g e  
 
“politically contentious matters”397 includes the role of unions, market limits, socialism and 
capitalism as economic systems, in a way that is faithful to the authoritative tradition of Church 
teaching and his moral anthropology. Gregg cites Glendon’s interpretation that John Paul II’s 
perspective on the human person, “applicable to economics, politics, law and all other 
disciplines relating to man – is rooted in a view of the human person which aspires to be 
correct.”398 This view is “profoundly anthropological” in its orientation, highlighting the 
person as free-thinking and choosing subject, alone and in community with others. Wojtyla 
reads the entire political landscape through the lens of his moral anthropology.399 As Schall 
observes, Wojtyla’s insistence on working out the proper human ends is consonant with 
Aristotle’s notion of the purpose of politics as working out the human goods. Indeed, Schall 
notes that Wojtyla is particularly concerned with identifying proper political ends in response 
to the “lowering of sights of which Machiavelli and modern liberalism spoke.”400 This point is 
relevant to earlier discussions in Chapter Two, concerning the problems that can be involved 
in a so-called Machiavellian perspective on the nature of politics. In his view of political ends, 
Wojtyla is not Machiavellian. 
 
Human Rights 
From Wojtyla’s phenomenological training, writes Buttiglione, Wojtyla’s solution to 
idealistic accounts of personhood is to derive analysis from the hic et nunc – the here and now 
of history.401 Beginning with the experiences and actions of human persons is the starting point 
                                                          
397 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 230. 
398 Glendon, ;A Challenge to the Human Sciences’, in A New Worldly Order, in Gregg, Challenging 
the Modern World : Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching, 
231 
399 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 141. 
400 James V. Schall, ‘The Teaching of “Centesimus Annus”’,Gregorianum 74, no. 1 (1993): 28. 
401 Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla’, 6. Buttiglione is clear that Wojtyla’s starting 
point of the present moment, grounded in reality, then proceeds to take the listener “step by step” 
towards “the fundamental structures that enliven this history and towards the Son of God who stands 
in the centre of cosmos and, through his incarnation, also of history.” Thus, Wojtyla’s philosophical 
and political thought cannot be wholly separated from “the light of the history of salvation”. 
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to recognise dignity and is the locus of rights. Abstract (idealistic) accounts of human persons 
fail to grasp the needs (and the dignity) of persons in real contexts. Wojtyla argues that all 
considerations of human rights must start from this reality. As Urmson explains, failing to 
understand what the right means are in the hic et nunc, and to judge accordingly, is an excessive 
form of political judgment, and is a vice.402 Thus, Wojtyla is aware of the intellectual problem 
of what Maritain calls “hypermoralism”, which causes political judgment to remain “something 
impracticable and merely ideal”.403 Figure 3.1 below, illustrates how “hypermoralist” forms of 
political judgment are excessive, in relation to the virtue of practical wisdom. 
Figure 3.1: Hypermoralism as a Vice 
 
 
According to Barrett, Wojtyla, as John Paul II, adopts several rights from the United 
Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. The basic rights that must be protected and upheld by 
governments, and include the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom to found a family, to 
gain employment for a just wage, to internal and external migration, the right to participate in 
the free choice of the political system to which one belongs, and the right participate in the 
community.404 Williams argues that John Paul II promotes these rights because of his formation 
                                                          
Acknowledging the theological roots of Wojtyla’s thought, the present thesis aims to emphasise 
Wojtyla’s conception of political ends as a philosopher, rather than as a theologian. 
402 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119. 
403 Maritain, ‘The End Of Machiavellianism’, 62. 
404 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 50. 
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under totalitarian systems. His experience of Polish communism, and the lack of worker rights, 
political freedoms, freedom of religion and economic stability informed his approach to the 
papal politics.405 Weigel adds that John Paul II’s 1979 address to the United Nations 
“unambiguously” committed the Catholic Church to the “cause of human freedom and the 
defence of basic human rights as the primary goal of its engagement with world politics”.406 
This, then, is where John Paul II’s work clearly intersects between tower and forum. John Paul 
II proposed “the Church wishes to serve people also in the temporal dimension of their life and 
existence”,407 giving it an interest in the political common good of each nation-state, and the 
means used to secure it. Hence, basic human rights are where John Paul II’s work as a 
philosopher (in the tower) opts to engage world politics (the forum). 
Barrett categorises John Paul II’s list of rights into “positive” and “negative” rights. 
The positive rights are basic preconditions needed to guarantee participation in the political life 
of the community and “should be received from others.”408 These rights include access to 
employment, a just wage, and search for the truth without fear of censorship. Barrett describes 
them as “positive” because they require the support of economic and political structures, as 
well as the support from the community to secure them.409 Negative rights are those limitations 
on behaviours that must be observed not just by government, but by individuals and groups to 
ensure the social welfare of those lacking access to basic goods.410 This distinction emphasises 
the role and responsibility Wojtyla places on both individual persons and structures of 
community, including economics, government and community culture, to secure human rights. 
The individual is tasked with pursuing the good, and upholding the good of others, within a 
                                                          
405 Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, 472. 
406 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 349. 
407 Pope John Paul II, Return to Poland: The Collected Speeches of John Paul II (London: Collins, 
1979), 22. 
408 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 61. 
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just political and economic structure or system that enables the full participation of the person 
in the life of the community.411  
Barrett suggests Wojtyla has a “qualified acceptance” of the liberal democratic order as 
the system naturally consistent with “man’s social nature.”412 However, this acceptance of 
liberal, democratic rule is “tempered with conditions and critique.”413 Wojtyla believes that the 
system itself can never be the political end sought. Rather, “the human person transcends the 
political community and constitutes therefore the end to which all political action should be 
oriented.”414 This includes an active participation from persons in the political process to avoid 
“narrow ruling groups”: 
Peoples must be able to choose freely the social organisation to which they aspire for 
their own country, and … this organisation should be in conformity with justice, in 
respect of freedom, religious faith, and human rights in general. It is a commonly shared 
conviction that no people should be treated by other peoples as subordinate or as an 
instrument.415  
Barrett states that it is precisely because of Wojtyla’s concept of free human action, 
when aimed at human goods, as an expression of dignity, that he favours a political system 
where political choices are enhanced as good in itself.416  
                                                          
411 Wojtyla emphasises that human dignity is located in real experiences, and not guaranteed through 
abstract concepts. “Humanity is not the abstract idea of the human being, but… [is] the personal self, 
in each instance unique and unrepeatable. Humanity is not an abstraction or a generality, but has in 
each human being the particular “specific gravity” of a personal being… to participate in the 
humanity of another human being means to be vitally related to the other as a particular human being, 
and not just related to what makes the other (in abstracto) a human being. This is ultimately the basis 
for the whole distinctive character of the evangelical concept of neighbour.”  
412 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 49. 
413 Ibid., 63. 
414 Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla’, 5. 
415 Pope John Paul II, ‘Address to the Diplomatic Corps, January 14, 1982’, in Pope John Paul II and 
the Challenges of Papal Diplomacy, ed. Dupuy Andre (Vatican City: The Pontifical Council For 
Justice and Peace, 2004), 41 
416 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 64. 
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Barrett compares Wojtyla to Tocqueville regarding the necessity of education about 
“true ideals” that form the basis for citizens to make informed political choices. Like 
Tocqueville, states Barrett, Wojtyla “stresses the importance of non-state institutions to 
suitably educate and form persons.” These “structures” help supply the public knowledge of 
political ends.417 Tabachnick concurs that “an educational backdrop” is necessary for citizens 
to make “sound judgments.”418 Without institutions to deliver these conditions, however, 
Wojtyla believes it is acceptable that rights be secured by rulers who are appointed through 
acceptable non-democratic means.419 Thus, for Wojtyla, the “basic organising principle [of the 
State] should be the primacy of the good of humanity and of the human person over every other 
consideration.”420 The person is more fundamental for Wojtyla than the system in which the 
person operates. Any political or economic structure is subordinate to the prior rights of the 
human person.421  
This brief account of Wojtyla’s perspective on rights aims to highlight that persons and 
structures, individuals and the community, are responsible for securing human rights. This idea 
has implications in the social, economic and political structures of any society. In the context 
of explanations of John Paul II’s concept of participation as the chief end of politics, the present 
thesis proposes that John Paul II believes human rights need to be fostered within communities 
as well as within structures of both governance and economics. His idea from the “tower” thus 
informs and intersects with his activity in the “forum”. 
                                                          
417 Ibid. 
418  Tabachnick is among those scholars who rely on the argument that citizens can exercise 
Aristotle’s phronesis. Ruderman rejects this notion, arguing that only the statesperson can exercise 
phronesis. Tabachnick suggests there is a “common phronesis”  that citizens exercise to determine 
how to pursue the human goods, and the “uncommon phronesis”, which belongs to the statesperson 
who must work out how to attain the human goods for the whole State. See Tabachnick, ‘”Phronesis”, 
Democracy and Technology’, 1000. 
419 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 64–5. 
420 John Paul II, ‘Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the 
United Nations Organisation’ 2000 in John Paul II and Participation in International Politics, 75. 
421 Schall, ‘Catholicism and the Forms of Democracy: A Reflection on the Nature of the Best 
Regime’, Gregorianum 75, no. 3 (1994): 469–90. 
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Section Three: Participation, Alienation and Political Structures 
 
Participation: The Chief End of Politics 
The current research project argues that Wojtyla’s formation and education under 
totalitarian regimes informs his political thought about the role of economic and political 
systems in securing human rights. Wojtyla’s central argument for the end of politics – that is, 
the common good – is bound up with  his concept of participation. Wojtyla contends that “the 
state exists in order to protect…rights”,422 which requires statespersons to foster conditions 
where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Participation for 
Wojtyla begins with understanding the person as an individual I as distinct from other I’s. This 
I is taken from the school of phenomenology, particularly the work of Max Scheler.423 
Participation, in this sense, expresses the way “we as persons exist and act together with others, 
while not ceasing to be ourselves in action, in our own acts.”424 Clark identifies participation 
and its antithesis, alienation, as Wojtyla’s central concern for humanity.425 Clark also argues 
that it is for this reason participation is the criteria by which to evaluate forms economic, social 
and political structures.426 She cites Wojtyla, 
                                                          
422 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, in Clark, ‘Integrating Human Rights’, 303. 
423 In particular, Wojtyla drew from Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and a Non-Formal Ethics of Value: 
A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. Manfred S. Fings and Roger 
L Funk (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Herbert Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), explains the phenomenological 
school more generally. The subjective existence in a community are those I-Thou relationships within 
the community, where persons reveal themselves to one another. They reveal themselves through 
conscious action, which reveals their self-determining and self-governing nature, which, for Wojtyla, 
is the distinctively human capacity.  They also reveal themselves in their striving for fulfilment, 
through “acts of conscience” that reveals a “transcendence proper to the human person”.  An 
interpersonal community, properly speaking, is one in which the members take care of themselves, 
but also of others. This responsibility reflects conscience and the transcendence of the person, as each 
recognises that both the I and the Thou are constitutive of the “path the self-fulfilment”, and forms an 
“authentically personal” dimension of community. 
424 K Wojtyla, Person and Community, 199. 
425 Clark, ‘Integrating Human Rights’, 303. 
426 Ibid., For Wojtyla, “there exists as mutuality in participation: on the one hand, by participation, a 
self releases the personalistic value of its act, and on the other hand, all participation types of activity 
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The structures of the social existence of human beings in the conditions of modern 
civilization... absolutely must be evaluated in the light of this basic criterion: Do they 
create the conditions—for this is their only real function—for the development of 
participation?427  
Conceptually,  Wojtyla argues that when persons engage in a “community of acting” as 
a group, this dimension is termed by the pronoun “we”.428 The individual simultaneously 
displays a readiness to think in terms of, and act towards, the good of the we as the fulfilment 
of each individual I.429 The “we” does not diminish the interpersonal relationships already 
present in the community; rather, it shifts the direction each member takes towards self-
fulfilment – which now happens in relation to a commonly held end. Wojtyla explains,  
A we is many human beings, many subjects, who in some way exist and act together. 
Acting ‘together’ (i.e., ‘in common’) does not mean engaging in a number of activities 
that somehow go along side by side. Rather it means that these activities, along with 
the existence of those many I’s are related to a single value, which therefore deserves 
to be called the common good.430 
The distinguishing character of community in Wojtyla’s philosophy is the explicit 
identification of individual fulfilment through participation in community with the common 
good.431 The fulfilment one receives through genuine interpersonal relationships is in no way 
                                                          
should be structured in such a way that the self, which is included in that form of action, is given the 
opportunity to realize (concretize) its own self.” 
427 Wojtyla, Person and Community, 206. 
428 Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State and Society’, 472. 
429 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community, 251–2. 
430 Karol Wojtyla, ‘The Person: Subject and Community’, in Person and Community Selected Essays, 
247. 
431 Jeffreys, ‘John Paul II and Participation in World Politics’, 75. Jeffreys explains the most localised 
form of community is expressed in the I-Thou relationship. The I-Thou relationship reflects the 
“interhuman, interpersonal dimension of the community”. When recognising the person as another I, 
there is a “reflexivity of this relationship”, where I acknowledge a “relation that proceeds from me, 
but also returns to me.” Jeffreys observes that this experience uncovers more than a fact of two 
members of the same species; it uncovers a normative element, that is “reducible to treating and 
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diminished, but is rather enhanced and enriched by participating in the shared common end of 
the community.432 Therefore, the task of politics is to devise the means for every member of 
the community to experience participation. 
Gregg explains that Wojtyla believes the person must have a sense of “acting for 
himself” as the community works towards achieving its “objective goal”. As a worker, for 
example, the employee must have a sense of ownership over his labours that dignifies his 
ability to produce a good or service through his actions.433 Participation is a “constitutive factor 
of community”.434 In The Acting Person, Wojtyla’s concept of community also distinguishes 
the goal of community from the fulfilment of the individual members. Each community has 
particular aims that are achieved through actions that aim at, and achieve, the ends.435 Wojtyla 
colours his example of the worker with the example of workers digging a trench. The labourers 
come together in a “community of acting” towards a shared goal: digging the trench.436 But at 
the same time, Wojtyla argues that it is vital that the labourer (or any person) “belonging to a 
community of acting… is in a position in his communal acting to perform real actions and fulfil 
himself.”437 This ability to be fulfilled through the relationships in the community of acting is 
what Wojtyla calls “participation”.438  
In his political thought, Wojtyla argues that any system that fails to understand the 
personalistic and relational foundation of participation is “dangerous for the truth of the image 
in question” and “impossible”.439 While Wojtyla locates the problem within personal 
                                                          
experiencing the other as oneself”. Thus, there is a basis in the I-Thou relationship to uphold the rule 
of treating others as one would treat oneself. 
432 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 277.  
433 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 137. 
434 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 332.  
435 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 137. Gregg suggests that here, Wojtyla might be drawing 
these distinctions from the German Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). 
436 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 335–336. 
437 Ibid., 336. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community, 239. Wojtyla notes that social groups can become a source 
of alienation in proportion to the disappearance of community, that is, in proportion to the 
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responsibility, he recognises that economic and political structures can contribute to what he 
calls “alienation”, which is the antithesis of participation and leads to the perversion of the 
common good.  
 
Alienation: The Defect of Economic and Political Systems 
For Wojtyla, “alienation basically means the negative of participation, for it renders 
participation difficult or even impossible.”440 Practices that subordinate the dynamic, fulfilling 
nature of relationships in the communities of being and the communities of acting, to collective 
interests (called totalism) or individual interests (called individualism) create alienation.441 For 
Wojtyla, individualism occurs where the person accepts needing other persons as a kind of 
means to an end to continue to advance toward their own goals. The individual has no interest 
in the fundamental good of other beings, and engages with them only to the extent they can 
benefit their goals.442 Such a practice denies Wojtyla’s claim that human persons can only be 
fulfilled in mutually self-giving relationships.443 At the opposite extreme is totalism. This defect 
prevails when collective interests subvert individual rights. Mejos comments that in totalistic 
societies, there is a tendency that persons may be coerced to contribute to the achievement of 
the common good. He writes,  
It is not surprising that a state or even a small community running on the lines of 
totalism will end up committing violations of fundamental rights of human beings as 
persons. Persons are not allowed to pursue their own individual growth under the 
assumption that it will not bring any contribution to the social group.444 
                                                          
disappearance of the relations, bonds, and social unity perceived and experienced by the individual 
subjects. 
440 Wojtyla, ‘Participation or Alienation?’ in Person and Community, 206 
441 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 274. 
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Schall observes that Wojtyla has market and State systems in mind when describing the 
defect of totalism:  
People lose sight of the fact that life in society has neither the market nor the State as 
its final purpose, since life itself has a unique value, which the State and the market 
must serve. Man remains above all a being who seeks the truth and strives to live in that 
truth, deepening his understanding of it through a dialogue, which involves past and 
future generations.445 
Both totalism and individualism, despite their differences, has the same root cause. 
Each method promotes a conception of the human good that ignores the essential need of 
participation in the social dimension of the community, give the goal of the common good: 
participation as essential for self-fulfilment. The means of participation can be diverse, but can 
only be pursued through the limits of treating others as other “I’s”.446  
 
Analysing Political and Economic Structures: Socialism and Capitalism 
Gregg observes that when he was writing his social encyclicals during the Cold War, 
John Paul II unpacked the “structures of sin” in the power structures of the “East” and “West” 
blocs. Baum writes that Sollicitudo Rei Socialis refers to 
The existence of two opposing blocs, known commonly as the East and the 
West. The reason for this description is not purely political, but is also, as the 
expression goes, geo-political. Each of the two blocs tends to assimilate or 
gather around it other countries or groups of countries, to different degrees of 
adherence or participation.447 
                                                          
445 John Paul II, ‘Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus’, in Schall, ‘Catholicism and the Forms of 
Democracy: A Reflection on the Nature of the Best Regime’, Gregorianum 75, no. 3 (1994): 469. 
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Social Concern (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1989). 
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Gregg argues that the “blocs” John Paul II refers to are the United States and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.448 Each bloc 
“identifies itself with a system of organising society and exercising power which presents itself 
as an alternative to the other.” Gregg notes John Paul II identifies the root of the opposition is 
ideological in nature. The West promotes a “liberal capitalism” while in the East there exists a 
“system of Marxist collectivism.”449 This opposition grew into a “military opposition and gave 
rise to two blocs of armed forces, each suspicious and fearful of the other’s domination.”450 
Schall observes that in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II affirms the view that 
true human development “cannot consist in the simple accumulation of wealth”, but rather 
“must be measured and oriented according to the reality and vocation of man seen in his 
totality”.451 Linking this to the later encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II writes that “the 
political economy is a means to the end of full personal development of the individual, 
institutional and social levels.”452  The purpose of these encyclicals is not to provide a strict 
Catholic economic model. Rather, John Paul II offers a moral compass to guide any economic 
model, present or future, and to serve as the basis for critique of any model. He does not set 
out a list of prescriptions for economic activity and structure, but articulates a detailed 
understanding of the human person, which is to provide the “normative basis for the critique 
of a political economy.”453 This system is guided by moral precepts that “the State and all of 
society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the 
                                                          
448 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 188 
449 Ibid. 
450 Gregory Baum et al., The Logic of Solidarity. 
451 John Paul II, ‘Encyclical Letter’, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 29 
452 Sethi, Reflections on Centesimus Annus, 903. 
453 S. Prakash Sethi and Paul Steidlmeier, ‘Religion’s Moral Compass and a Just Economic Order: 
Reflections on Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical “Centesimus Annus”’, Journal of Business Ethics 12, 
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essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each 
individual.454  
Gregg writes that John Paul II’s declaration in introducing Centesimus Annus sums up 
the central thesis of his political thought, 
A great commitment on the political, economic, social and cultural level is necessary 
to build a society that is more just and worthy of the person. But this is not enough! A 
decisive commitment must be made in the very heart of man, in the intimacy of his 
conscience, where he makes his personal decisions. Only on this level can the human 
person affect a true, deep and positive change in himself, and that is the undeniable 
premise of contributing to change and the improvement of all society.455 
John Paul II sees the market, political order, and social structures through the lens of 
man as the image of God, with a spiritual nature that orients him towards reflection and wonder. 
He has a personal identity that cannot be expressed in economic terms alone. He has a personal 
character; his needs satisfied through more than the state order. His intermediary groups, such 
as family, social, religious and other community groups, are fundamental to full human 
development.  
Wojtyla writes that, within the “Eastern Bloc”, the good of the group is the most 
important, while “the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of 
the mechanism.”456 A central tenet of Centesimus Annus suggests, according to Schall, that 
socialism’s error is predicated on “this moral-anthropological truth about man”: 
The fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature. Socialism considers 
the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism, so 
that the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of the 
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455 John Paul II, “Confronting the Challenges”, 3 in Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 233. 
456 ‘Centesimus Annus’, in Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 57. 
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socio-economic mechanism. Socialism likewise maintains that the good of the 
individual can be realised without reference to his free choice, to the unique and 
exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus 
reduced to a series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the 
autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions 
build the social order.457  
At the same time, John Paul II rejects the self-regulating free market in favour of a 
system where certain inherent values cannot be violated. John Paul advocates necessary State 
and societal intervention in the Market, as “there are collective and qualitative needs which 
cannot be satisfied by market mechanisms… these mechanisms carry the risk of an ‘idolatry’ 
of the market, an idolatry which ignores the existence of goods which by their nature are not 
and cannot be mere commodities.458 Effectively then, Wojtyla’s perspective of the defects of 
economic and political systems in securing the common good draws from his analysis of the 
prevailing geopolitical structure of the Cold War, which, in turn, is shaped by his personal 
experience of totalitarianism. That is, Wojtyla’s idea that the common good is secured through 
enhancing individual participation in the economic, political and cultural aspects of national 
life is shaped by his education under totalitarian regimes. Buttiglione proposes it is possible to 
speak of Wojtyla’s “political praxis”.459 As Glendon emphasises in The Forum and The Tower, 
the political context can shape the person’s conceptions of what political ends are and how they 
are best pursued. In Wojtyla’s case, Buttiglione argues that Wojtyla’s Catholic formation as a 
Priest informs his understanding of how to pursue political ends. He writes, 
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Anniversary of Rerum Novarum, (Homebush: St Paul Publications, 1991), 13.  
458 Schall, ‘The Teaching of “Centesimus Annus”’, Gregorianum 74, no. 1 (1993): 31–33. 
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It is a matter of course that John Paul II did not make politics in the common sense of 
this word if by the word politics you understand a struggle to conquer and defend 
power. The man who tells the truth does not enter into the political game. The witness 
given to truth produces however political effects which can sometimes be even 
revolutionary.460 
  Guietti and Murphy also add that Wojtyla’s education under Polish communism and 
Nazism directly informs these views. They describe Buttiglione’s account of Wojtyla’s 
philosophy as “a fiery defence of freedom in an age of political tyrannies. Wojtyla’s awareness 
of freedom and of the real possibility of losing it derives from his direct experience [of being 
educated under Nazism and Communism].”461 For example, according to Jeffreys, Wojtyla 
writes of participation as a “property of the person”.462 It is expressed through the human 
capacity to “endow existence and action with a personalistic dimension” when a person acts 
together with other persons.463 This affirmation of work as personal property directly contrasts 
the socialist notion of state ownership and redistribution of labour. In social matters, Wojtyla 
tends to “take the side of unions”, in support of the freedom and dignity of “blue collar 
workers”.464 His experience as a labourer in the Slovay Chemical Plant and a limestone quarry 
as a student helped Wojtyla appreciate the dignity of labour. The manual labour produces 
“solidarity” among the workers, who require a right to unionise as a legal recognition of that 
bond, in the service of his belief in a just wage.465 
Weigel is of the view that throughout the 1980’s, John Paul II never explicitly identified 
the nations being treated as subordinate to others, but was unmistakably interpreted as referring 
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to Poland’s denial of these freedoms under the Polish government.466 Guietti and Murphy go 
so far as to argue that Wojtyla’s philosophical works are a veiled critique of the communist 
totalitarian system in which he was educated. They state that “even the carefully obtuse 
Communist censorship would never have suspected that [Wojtyla’s political thought in The 
Acting Person] was a really dangerous piece of writing.”467  
Guietti and Murphy posit whether Wojtyla’s insistence on human freedom and 
individual rights is “so radical that, in retrospect, one might ask if Wojtyla overreacted to his 
experience of political slavery.”468 Another assessment can also be considered, however, which 
is that this notion of Wojtyla’s subtle critique of the communist political system helps explain 
his seemingly “obsessive” defence of human freedom. Some comparison is possible between 
Wojtyla’s subtlety and Burke’s notion that “one learns to speak the truth with measure, that he 
may speak it the longer”.469 Wojtyla takes the pursuit of “true ideals” as a worthwhile pursuit 
of politics. However, under a politically tyrannical regime, little room was offered to Wojtyla 
as a philosopher to publish openly about his view on the limits of the communist system. 
Indeed, Williams writes that “one can find hardly any explicit references to Marxism and 
Communism in Wojtyla’s writings.”470 Instead of critiquing Marxism, Communism, or 
materialism, Wojtyla’s lectures as an Ethics professor focussed on the more abstract 
“utilitarianism”. Instead of “totalitarianism”, Wojtyla used the more ambiguous “totalism”.471  
                                                          
466 Weigel, The End and The Beginning, 114–15. 
467 Guietti and Murphy, 311. 
468 Ibid., 313. 
469 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 137. 
470 George H Williams, “Karol Wojtyla and Marxism”, in Pedro Ramet (ed.) Catholicism in 
Communist Societies, Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, (Durham, NC: Duke 
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471 George H Williams, ‘Karol Wojtyla and Marxism’, in Catholicism in Communist Societies, 
Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1990), 366–7. 
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Guietti and Murphy cite Strauss’ view that oppressive regimes can create a mode of 
writing that critiques the dominant power structure with subtlety:  
For the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who 
hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique which 
we have in mind when speaking of writing between the lines.472 
Unlike Plato, who, as Glendon recounts, failed to say the “politic thing” when engaging 
with powerful rulers, Wojtyla’s pre-papal writings suggests that Wojtyla exercises caution in 
expressing political ideas that could incite an aggressive response from the prevailing political 
power. This approach can be compared to Glendon’s analysis of Burke, who continually 
exercised caution in his writings and statements on the plight of the Irish people, who 
experienced oppression under English laws and social norms.473 Thus, Wojtyla’s work as a 
scholar within the “tower” exhibits some of the cautionary wisdom that Glendon suggests is 
important for those who aim at political influence, or find themselves through circumstance in 
positions of influence.  
On the other hand, as Pope, John Paul II’s encyclicals contain clearer enunciations of 
his views on political systems, which suggests he holds a new platform of agency through 
which to advance his political ideas. John Paul II’s efforts to advance his political aims in his 
home country of Poland is the subject of analysis in Chapter Four. Thus, how Pope John Paul 
II approaches political practice through the papacy is of particular interest to the current 
research project. In particular, it will examine how his approach influenced Poland under the 
Communist system.  
 
                                                          
472 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 24 
in Murphy, ‘Translators’Afterword’, 311. 
473 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 137–9. 
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Conclusion  
Chapter Three has aimed to describe Karol Wojtyla’s political context to understand 
how his education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of 
the human person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the study identified 
Wojtyla’s development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his 
political thought. It has shown that Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his 
development as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the 
individual person as the goal to which politics should be oriented.474 In particular, it has given 
evidence to suggest that Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic 
structures – especially socialism and capitalism – that produce outcomes that corrode his 
conception of human dignity, most particularly in the denial of what he considers basic human 
rights.  
It has suggested that the method shows Wojtyla’s consideration of whether or not he 
should join the Carmelites, and his decision to become a priest and train as a philosopher 
demonstrate his choice for a life in the “tower”, more so than the “forum”. Within his vocation 
as a philosopher and ethics professor, the thesis has attempted to relay Wojtyla’s understanding 
of the human person as the central preoccupation of his philosophical development. Through 
Wilk, Buttiglione and others, the chapter has shown how Wojtyla draws from both the 
philosophical schools of phenomenology and Aristotelian-Thomism to construct his 
anthropology, which provides the intellectual basis for his political thought.475  It has argued 
that Wojtyla’s conception of human rights draws from this anthropology, and has implications 
for his view on individual responsibility and the role of economic and political structures in 
securing human rights.  
                                                          
474 Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla’, 5. 
475 Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 269. 
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Clark, Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, were employed to highlight that 
“the state exists in order to protect…rights”,476 which requires statespersons to foster conditions 
where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Within Wojtyla’s 
concepts of participation and alienation, the thesis suggests that Wojtyla’s own experiences of 
totalitarian regimes under Nazism and Communism directly inform his critique of the limits of 
political and economic structures in securing human rights. His education amidst these political 
experiences produced a method of political thought that, in the view of Williams, among others, 
exercised caution to not openly criticise the Polish communist system. In his limited pre-papal 
public life as a philosopher and ethics professor, Wojtyla can be understood as an intellectual 
with deep convictions about the dignity of the human person. This dignity grants the person 
inviolable rights that, in Wojtyla’s view, must be fostered through ordinary social life, and 
fostered through the support of economic and political systems naturally consistent with these 
aims.  
With his election to the papacy, Chapter Four argues that Pope John Paul II experiences 
an increased political agency that enables him to pursue his political aims with a more robust 
and direct rhetoric than he employed as a philosopher in Poland. Chapter Four presents a case 
study on John Paul II’s engagement with Polish communism to identify how, and to what 
extent, the means he pursues to secure human rights for the Polish people are consistent with 
the political thought established in Chapter Three. The current research project aims to 
understand whether John Paul II operates with integrity, or whether he compromises on his 
political aims, within the present thesis’ explanation of phronesis. It will attempt to place him 
on the “Glendon graph”, which will help illustrate the extent to which John Paul II can be 
considered a phronimos, or can be placed more towards the extremes of “hypermoralism” or 
“Machiavellianism” in his method of political judgment.  
                                                          
476 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, in Clark, ‘Integrating Human Rights,’ 303. 
 119 | P a g e  
 
  
 120 | P a g e  
 
Chapter Four 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter Three argued that political aims are, for John Paul II, actualised through 
securing individual rights, recognising workers’ dignity, participation in the process of 
selecting government, economic freedoms, and the freedom for religious and cultural 
expression.477 These can be understood as John Paul II’s view of political ends. Chapter Four 
contends that Pope John Paul II pursued these political aims in the Polish communist context 
through means consistent with his political ends. Effectively, this means that he did not 
compromise his values from the tower when pursuing his ends in the forum. Chapter Four 
discusses this in three sections. The first identifies, through scholarly perspectives, instances 
where John Paul II’s engagement with Poland relies on his principle of participation. It argues 
that the “hybrid” agency of Pope John Paul II gave him unique agency in communist Poland. 
His role as head of the Catholic Church and of the Holy See gave him both international legal 
and political status and a moral obligation to defend the convictions of the Church.478 This 
section employs the arguments of Troy, Hall and other international relations theorists, on the 
nature of papal political influence.479 The inclusion of these scholarly perspectives does not 
alter the method of this thesis. Instead, the addition of Troy’s terminology describing the Pope’s 
political agency as “hybrid” helps understand the nature of John Paul II’s political influence. 
                                                          
477 See Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 38. 
478 Chester Gillis, ‘Introduction: Understanding the Political in the Papacy’, in The Political Papacy: 
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Affairs 15, no. 4 (2017); Alan Chong and Jodok Troy, ‘A Universal Sacred Mission and the Universal 
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Glendon’s observation that agency can be facilitated through circumstance applies to John Paul 
II’s context. This highlights the transition in agency that Wojtyla makes from his pre-papal 
identity as a priest, poet, philosopher and professor of ethics, to his status as “chief diplomat” 
and “moral authority” on behalf of all adherents to the Catholic faith.480 Arguably, within this 
mode of agency, the addition of John Paul II’s Polish identity and experience of living under 
communism contributed to an unprecedented level of papal influence in Poland, where the 
national population was over 90% Catholic.481  
Section Two considers John Paul II’s political judgment in Poland as both a diplomatic 
actor and a “moral authority”.  It explores how John Paul II deploys the tools available to him 
to determine the extent to which his decisions reflect an integrity of his convictions, or involve 
a tactful compromise on principles for the sake of immediate advantages. The thesis argues 
that his shift in papal foreign policy towards Eastern Europe – known as the ostpolitik – and 
his papal rhetoric during his public addresses, indicate that there is no conflict between the 
means that John Paul II used to influence Polish politics, and the political ends that he wanted 
to achieve. Though his decisions were consistent with his political aims, it can also be seen that 
that John Paul II exercised caution and used moderated language designed to inspire the Polish 
people without causing negative reactions from the Polish government.  
The Glendon graph helps to interpret these examples, ultimately showing how John 
Paul II’s integrity leans him towards the “hypermoralist” side of the mean. However, his 
moderated language and strategic approach renders him closer to the middle point of the map, 
rather than the extreme. 
                                                          
480 Jo Renee Formicola, ‘The Political Legacy of Pope John Paul II’, Journal of Church and State 47, 
no. 2 (2005): 11. 
481 James E. Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, Journal of Law and 
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Section Three follows the insight of Glendon’s framework that political circumstances 
can facilitate, or hinder, the individual’s political success. She writes that the “optimal 
confluence” for political success involves “gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck.”482 
Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions 
were favourable or unfavourable for John Paul II’s political aims. This enables her to offer 
some judgment on the relationship between his decisions and the political conditions in the 
“reasons for success or failure”.483 Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right ends, 
it is arguable that the political circumstances were highly favourable for John Paul II to pursue 
his aims with integrity, and be successful. These circumstances must also be considered to 
assess the extent of John Paul II’s success in enhancing political participation through the 
communist collapse in Poland. 
In light of this view, the section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be 
considered “practically wise”, in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, The Vatican and The 
Red Flag,484 and Gaddis’ The Cold War: A New History  are among the works that offer 
analyses that argue John Paul II’s political engagement with Poland had a considerable impact 
on the events that led to the free elections and subsequent collapse of communism in 1989.  
John Paul II, then, can be considered central to the foundation of the Solidarity movement in 
Poland, which in turn was a major factor in the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989. The 
third section also considers perspectives in McDermott and Stibbe’s The 1989 Revolutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe,485 which emphasises that a combination of political, economic, 
and international factors contributed to the final demise of the Polish government, among other 
                                                          
482 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xi. 
483 Ibid., x. 
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of Eastern Europe (London: G. Chapman, 1999). 
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governments, within the Soviet Union. When placed within the Glendon framework, these 
factors constitute what Glendon calls the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions 
and plain luck”. The framework offers some insights, or “lessons” on how John Paul II 
approaches decision-making, within the context of political, social and economic pressure on 
the Polish government. These factors were essential preconditions for John Paul II to 
successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish communist context.  
The present thesis does not consider arguments of whether this led to the collapse of 
the entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between 
1989-1991,486 extrapolating a kind of domino effect whereby Poland caused the collapse of the 
entire Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is overly 
simplistic analysis.487 Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish 
context only, not engaging with the contested literature on the links between the revolution of 
1989 in Poland and the rest of the USSR. 
The thesis concludes that Glendon’s insight into the role of favourable conditions 
influencing political success can be applied to Pope John Paul II’s role in the collapse of the 
communist system in Poland. The Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority 
added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist 
system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force 
necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more 
significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where 
a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically.  
                                                          
486 See Kraszewski,‘Catalyst for Revolution’; McDermott and Stibbe, ‘The 1989 Revolutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, 3.  
487 Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, ‘The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the 
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Section One: The Political Agency of the Papacy 
 
The Pope as a “Hybrid” Political Actor 
The framework aims to understand the nature of political influence Pope John Paul II 
possessed in the Holy See’s engagement with the Polish communist government between the 
Pope’s election in October, 1978 and the partial free elections in Poland on June 4, 1989. As 
Glendon contends, in some cases chance and circumstance can elevate a person to new 
positions of political influence, sometimes even undesirably.488 Chapter Three briefly 
explained that John Paul II’s elevation to the Polish episcopate (the order of Bishops) and then 
later his election to the papacy on 16 October, 1978, reflects the kind of circumstances Glendon 
considers “chance”, which differs from actively seeking a position of influence.489 This section 
aims to explain how Wojtyla’s election to the papacy enhances his political influence, from his 
pre-papal political agency as a philosopher and priest, and Archbishop of Krakow. In particular, 
it highlights how the papacy is the kind of political platform that enables John Paul II to make 
public pronouncements with more integrity than the subtlety he employed as a priest under 
communist oversight.   
Troy, Marshall, Hall, and other international relations scholars, argue that religious 
organisations, and the Catholic Church especially, are engaged actors in political and social 
policy. Marshall explains that religious institutions extend their political and religious positions 
beyond their constituencies, and seek to be engaged in public policy discussions, regardless of 
the percentage of the population that institution claims as adherents.490 Diplomacy is the 
primary mode through which religious organisations engage with governments and 
                                                          
488 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 212–13. Chapter Three explained Charles Malik as one 
example of a scholar turned diplomat who did not desire his new political influence. 
489 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 252.  
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stakeholders in public policy discussions.491 Unlike other organised religions, however, Holy 
See diplomacy is “highly institutionalised, rests on formal diplomatic representations around 
the globe equal to embassies and acknowledged by international law.”492 
 Troy explains that the Holy See exercises diplomacy in a unique fashion, distinct from 
its secular counterparts. Holy See diplomats, writes Troy, do not represent their principal’s (the 
Pope’s) immediate possessions, such as territory. Rather, they have a “hybrid” character, at 
once exercising an ecclesiastical role as a priest of the Catholic Church, and the representative 
of the Pope, and at the same time engaging in ordinary diplomatic practice as the international 
legal status of the Holy See enables them.493 Conway states that the Holy See’s two-fold 
priorities of individual salvation and temporal well-being keep it relevant to the public square. 
“Through [The Holy See’s] supernatural mission of salvation and the mundane reality of world 
politics, [the papacy] remains a singular and surprisingly vital factor in the international 
scene.”494 Troy proposes that the “hybrid character” of papal diplomacy is generated from 
political and religious “entanglements”. Papal diplomacy, therefore, is a unique combination 
of universal religious principles with conventional diplomatic practice.495  
 Gillis argues that papal influence extends into public policy and the decisions of other 
States. Popes have the capacity to be of consequence, and must recognize the Papacy has 
political implications.496 Gillis states, in The Political Papacy: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and 
Their Influence:  
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Once elected, all pontiffs recognize that they have the responsibility to make 
pronouncements with political implications since silence might mean a lost 
opportunity. At the same time, they must do so thoughtfully and carefully, often 
balancing the church’s diplomatic needs and the gospel’s demand to be prophetic. What 
a pope says is important because, as the leader of more than one billion Catholics, he 
commands the most significant international religious voice in the world. What he says 
is reported in the press all over the world. And what he says goes beyond pious 
platitudes. By his pronouncements, he attempts to influence public policy, other 
religions, governments, believers, and nonbelievers alike.497 
The Holy See, then, adds moral value to international dialogue through its interest in religious 
communities, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, that reside within nation-states.498 The rights of 
religious groups, their freedom to worship, to gather as a community of believers and act 
according to the convictions of their faith are just some of the interests on which the Holy See 
engages governments. Further, the Holy See is a unique actor because it is more than an 
advocate for itself and its own interests. It also has a special interest in fundamental rights of 
all persons.499 Squaring its interests in the domain of universal values enables the Holy See to 
transcend the partisan nature of politics and interest-driven nature of diplomacy.500 
Significantly, this elevates its “moral authority” as the chief defender of universal human rights.  
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The Pope himself is considered the “chief diplomat and moral authority”.501 The “moral 
authority” of the Pope is also termed “soft power” by international relations scholars.502 Moral 
authority is considered a resource of power for individuals, organisations and States.503 Hall 
argues that “moral authority” can be used as a “power resource” when it becomes 
institutionalised as a “convention”. Hall writes that moral authority is institutionalised when it 
becomes “socially embedded in a system of actors whose social identities and interests impel 
them to recognize it as a power resource.”504 He continues that moral authority can be used as 
a tradable asset, like money or “the credible threat of military force,” to the extent each party 
values its worth. Moral authority has value among political actors as a medium of arbitrating 
disputes between spiritual and temporal authorities. It is a form of “currency” that can be traded 
when the political actors involved calculate that “hard power” options, such as military force, 
carry undesirable risk.505   
Through his election to the papacy of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II 
exercises the “hybrid agency” of the Vatican City state as “chief diplomat” and “moral 
authority”.506 The Papal authority means he functions “as a political figure as well as spiritual 
leader”.507 Troy states that although the Holy See itself has a broad diplomatic apparatus, public 
and academic focus remains focussed on the Pope, which serves to publicise the Pope’s agency, 
                                                          
501 Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, International Organisation 51, no. 4 (1997): 591–
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International Affairs 9, no. 1 (2008): 65–73; Joseph Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalsim’, World 
Politics 40, no. 2 (1988): 235–241; Jospeh Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
503 Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, 591–622. 
504 Hall, 594.  
505 Ibid., 596–7. 
506 The Vatican City State was founded following the signing of the Lateran Pacts between the Holy 
See and Italy on February 11th 1929. These were ratified on June 7th 1929. Its nature as a sovereign 
State distinct from the Holy See is universally recognized under international law. For more 
information see: http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en.html  
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and enhance it. As former US Ambassador to the Vatican Francis Rooney puts it, “from nuts 
and bolts bureaucratic decisions to great theological disputes… the pope is the person in whom 
final authority is vested. There is no separation of powers in the Vatican. Every chain of 
command leads ultimately to him.”508 Rooney continues that the Holy See participates in 
international relations as the governing body of the Vatican City State. As such, 
The Holy See, which enjoys international juridical status, is… presented as a sovereign 
and independent moral authority, and as such takes part in international relations. 
Within nations its action as a moral authority, aims at furthering an ethic of relations 
between the different protagonists of the international community.”509 
Before his papal election, Wojtyla’s political influence was limited to his office as 
Archbishop of Krakow, through which he negotiated with the Communist government for 
specific pastoral initiatives.510 The present thesis suggests that, as Pope John Paul II, he 
combines the “hybrid” channels of diplomacy and moral witness, with his distinctive Polish 
national identity to elevate his political influence in Poland to an unprecedented level. As 
mentioned, Will observes that, by the mid-1980s, around 90% of the Polish population was 
Roman Catholic. Agnew’s insight that States recognise the usefulness of maintaining 
“conventional formal relations” with the Church because of the “sheer number of humans” 
involved is relevant to Poland in this context.511 Thus, by the mid-1980s, Will was in a position 
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to observe that: “the institutional church in Poland is far stronger today than it was prior to 
World War II.”512 
In Poland, cooperation between Church and State is arguably more significant than any 
other Eastern bloc nation.513 Byrnes adds that the Catholic Church exercises considerable 
influence in Polish politics because of the Church’s history of constantly defending Poland 
from foreign oppressors. He writes there is a “long-standing, intimate relationship between 
Catholicism and Polish national identity”.  Within Poland’s particular historical context, the 
“uncontested cultural centrality of Polish Catholicism became a major political factor. The 
Polish Church is a political institution because history has identified it as an authentically 
Polish alternative to an alien governing power.”514 The Church is thus recognised as Poland’s 
“principal moral authority”, which provides it with a “new source of strength.”515 The elevation 
of Wojtyla as the “first Polish Pope” thus infuses the traditional “hybrid” authority of the 
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papacy with the Polish Church’s identity as the “alternate legitimate public authority” to 
government rule.516  
The following section aims to analyse how John Paul II uses his “hybrid” channels to 
advance his political ideas in Poland. It argues that John Paul II conducts a method of political 
strategy that is consonant with his own conceptions of political ends. This analysis relies on 
the “Glendon graph” to illustrate that John Paul II retains integrity in his political judgment, 
and suggests this can be mapped onto the Glendon graph.  
 
Section Two: The Political Judgment of John Paul II 
 
Integrity or Compromise?  
Chapter One offered Copleston’s view that for virtuous acts, the right choice will 
sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”, while in other cases the reverse may be 
preferable.517 Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or 
defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. In some instances, 
more excessive actions may even be the right means in a particular context. However, the 
accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often known only through hindsight. As 
such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long after the person has passed from 
this life”, so that the full impact of one’s decisions can be properly appreciated.518   
Chapter Two suggested that Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful 
illustration of Maritain’s point that the statesperson must use the skills of their intellect, called 
“cunning”, to discern how to advance the common good, and when to opt instead for what 
                                                          
516 Byrnes, ‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’, 103. 
517 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy,  337. 
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Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”,519 without “falsehood or imposture”.520 Glendon’s 
view of Burke suggests that a method of political judgment that uses compromise and 
“cunning” without descending into “cleverness” is possible, though it can be difficult to 
identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full betrayal of principle. At the same 
time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the impact of one’s decisions can 
take effect long after one’s death. As Glendon has argued, Burke’s accomplishments, though 
modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that eventually vindicated some of his other 
aims.521 Thus, to assess John Paul II’s decisions within the framework, it is necessary to 
understand whether his political judgments involved actions that lean towards either side of the 
mean of practical wisdom. It must also consider, through the lens of historical analysis, whether 
his political aims were ultimately successful. 
The present thesis suggests that Glendon’s terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be 
used to denote actions that lean towards either side of the mean, but are not the excessive 
“hypermoralist” or “Machiavellian” extremes.522  
Figure 4.2: Between the Mean and Extremes: Integrity & Compromise 
 
                                                          
519 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii. 
520 Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 42. 
521 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 6–7, 149, 225. 
522 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 7, 23–4. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that political judgments that contain commitment to political aims as 
part of the right means fall between the middle point, and the hypermoralist extreme of the 
graph. Such judgments can be considered as acting with “integrity”. Political judgments that 
consider a lesser commitment to political aims as the right means in the here and now, fall 
between the middle point and the Machiavellian extreme of the graph. Such judgments can be 
considered a “compromise” on essential aims for the sake of some other “immediate 
advantage”, or “immediate success”. 
Gaddis, Bernstein, and Byrnes, among others, offer detailed analyses on the role John 
Paul II played in the events that led to the first partial free elections in Poland on June 4, 
1989.523 Appendix A provides a timeline that links the development of John Paul II with the 
events in Poland that lead to the election on June 4, 1989. This section aims to examine John 
Paul II’s decisions and public engagements within the Polish communist context. It focusses 
on how his political thought from the “tower” informs those decisions in the “forum.” It 
highlights that John Paul II employs his “hybrid” agency of diplomacy and moral authority 
through means consistent to what he considers the ends of politics in the Polish context. It 
assesses the extent to which John Paul II’s judgments lean towards the side of “integrity” or 
the side of “compromise” on the Glendon graph. It will argue that John Paul II makes decisions 
that consistently retain the integrity of his political aims. However, it supplies evidence in 
support of Byrnes’ argument that Pope John Paul II played a significant role in the changing 
political landscape in Poland. Furthermore, it makes the case that Polish society shapes “John 
                                                          
523 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); Byrnes, 
‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’, 103–16. Luxmoore and Babiuch, The 
Vatican and the Red Flag; Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution’, 27–46; Carl Bernstein and Marco 
Politi, His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 1996); 
George Weigel, The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Weigel, Witness to Hope; Tad Sculz, Pope John Paul II: 
The Biography (New York: Scribner, 1995). 
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Paul II’s approach to political questions”524 through the “caution” and “moderated” rhetoric he 
exercised.525 The present thesis suggests he is attentive to the circumstances “here and now”, 
which places him closer to the mean, rather than the extreme of “hypermoralism”.  
 
“Chief Diplomat”: The Ostpolitik and Diplomacy  
The strategies John Paul II deployed as part of his foreign policy towards Eastern 
Europe demonstrate his method of decision-making prioritises long-term political aims over 
short-term advantages.526 The Pope, in consultation with the largely Italian Vatican Secretariat 
of State, devises strategies within its foreign policy to conduct its pastoral initiatives 
effectively, as well as occasionally to mediate negotiations for  preventing, or ending, conflict 
between States.527 The Ostpolitik – or “Eastern Politics” – was an inclusive term, employed in  
a variety of Vatican policies since 1960, with the purpose of ameliorating the situation of 
Catholics in Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Its aim was to provide the Church with 
sufficient freedom to carry out its pastoral activities in Eastern European Communist nations.528 
The new strategy required a shift in approach for better relations with Communist states.529 A 
realist framework informed the Vatican’s approach to the current system of power. This was 
in large part shaped by Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican’s Secretary of State throughout 
the Ostpolitik. The Vatican read the landscape of European power created under the Yalta 
                                                          
524 Byrnes, ‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’,103. 
525 Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft’, 26. 
526 Ibid., 29–30. 
527 Rooney, The Global Vatican, 141. See also Weigel, Witness to Hope, 272–3. Weigel explains that 
the Vatican Secretariat of State has functioned as mediator in negotiating conflict resolutions between 
nations.  For example, through Pope John Paul II’s intervention, the Holy See was brought in as 
mediator between Argentina and Chile in January, 1979, who each threatened the other with war over 
a dispute on the Beagle Channel boundary. 
528 Hehir, ‘Papal Foreign Policy’, 26. 
529 Ibid., 29. Hehir observes that papal foreign policy under Pope Pius XII directly condemened 
communism as an ideology that is totally incoherent with the social teaching of the Catholic Church. 
He states that Pope John XXIII, his successor, recognised that the public condemnation of 
communism limited the Church’s ability to negotiate with Communist nations. 
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system, as largely stable and fixed.530 There was a balance between Eastern and Western 
European powers, and the Soviet side of the balance of power would remain as such for the 
determinate future.531 As Gaddis writes, the Vatican followed the East/West bloc, as they 
“agreed to accept, for the foreseeable future, the world as it was.”532 These beliefs informed 
the Vatican Secretariat’s view that silencing its condemnation of communist government 
policies that it believed violated human rights could give it “breathing space” for its pastoral 
initiatives in communist countries.533  
In practice, Vatican diplomacy acknowledged the legitimate authority of the 
Communist government in power. Open condemnation of communism as an illegitimate form 
of government ceased. The ideological and philosophical differences between the Christian 
tradition and the Communist state were no longer emphasized.534 Instead, the Church pursued 
an avenue of negotiating for specific, pastoral needs in those countries. Such aims included the 
appointment of bishops that the Church considered trustworthy and the Government deemed 
acceptable, applicants to the seminary, and other pastoral matters. These goals were considered 
more achievable than attempting to pressure communist governments to change their policies 
on religious freedom.535 Through downplaying anti-communist rhetoric, the Church hoped to 
                                                          
530 Weigel, The Final Revolution, 86. 
531 Hehir, ‘Papal Foreign Policy’, 29. 
532 Gaddis, The Cold War, 120. Gaddis writes that the “strategy [détente] had looked like a hopeful 
development. It did not free the world from crises, but the new spirit of cooperation did seem to limit 
their frequency and severity: Soviet-American relations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were 
much less volatile than during the first two decades of the Cold War, when confrontations erupted 
almost annually. This was a major accomplishment…” 
533 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 94, 229. 
534 Hehir, 27 ‘Papal Foreign Policy’. The previous attitudes to communism enunciated by Pope Pius 
XII contained open condemnation of the Communist system of government, which was only modified 
to a more cautious approach with the introduction of the Osptolitik under Pope John XXIII in 1967. 
535 Ibid., 30. 
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gain back some control over its pastoral and ecclesial authority in countries across Eastern 
Europe.536  
By 1978, the Ostpolitik was a settled method of engagement between the Holy See and 
the Eastern European states. By 1980, there were sixty million Catholics in the Soviet bloc 
Communist countries.537 Catholics were the majority in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
held a significant minority in Yugoslavia. Kengor describes the method of compromise to gain 
“breathing space” as a Cold War version of détente.538 The strategy had achieved modest 
success, which varied between countries.539 Kramer suggests that this approach made The 
Vatican a neutral moral voice, critical of “both east and west, with the respect of both 
worlds.”540 This neutral approach made it an appealing ally to the Soviet Union nations, and 
enhanced the Holy See’s status as a legitimate moral authority. Weigel states that in Poland, 
local communities described the situation as “bad, but stable bad.”541   
Within the thesis’ understanding of practical wisdom, this approach suggests that the 
Holy See considered what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation” of communist government 
policies necessary to gain immediate advantages. Weigel describes the approach as 
preferencing short-term gains over long-term goals.542 Popes John XXIII and Paul VI 
                                                          
536 Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’. 283. Kramer explains that the shift in Vatican diplomacy to 
a position of nonalignment also provided an opportunity for the Vatican to disentangle itself from the 
label of open supporter of Western politics. The legitimacy of the Vatican as a neutral moral authority 
rested on its ability to observe both the qualities and the faults of both major economic and political 
systems. This position was most precisely articulated under the papacy of Paul VI (1963-1978). Hehir 
describes Paul VI’s diplomatic programme as operating in a neutral territory between Eastern and 
Western ideologies, “By the 1970s, Paul VI was taking positions that were critical of the policies of 
both superpowers. Without announcing major departures from previous polices, he moved the 
Catholic Church in a series of small steps to a position of having contacts with both major powers, 
formal relationships with neither, and a record of critical commentary of both.”  
537 Ibid., 283, 86. 
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(predecessors to John Paul II) calculated that accommodating the communist regimes as 
legitimate representations of their respective people’s interests would deliver better short-term 
results than pursuing a method of open condemnation of communism as an ideological and 
political system.543 Figure 4.3 shows that Vatican foreign policy by 1978 can be placed on the 
“Glendon graph”. The “compromise” approach of the ostpolitik can be considered one that 
leans closer to the centre on the “Machiavellian” half of the graph, rather than on the side of 
“integrity”. 
Figure 4.3: Vatican Ostpolitik by 1978 
 
That the osptolitik achieved “modest success” means it is placed closer to the base than 
the top of the vertical axis, and visibly within the “compromise” area of the horizontal axis, 
which indicates the policy delivered only moderate advantages in exchange for a greater degree 
of compromise. The ostpolitik received criticism on its decision to rescind permissions for 
clandestine ordinations in the Czech and Ukrainian Churches.  The compromise on what was 
considered by some news sources as a key part of the underground Church’s resistance was 
labelled an abandonment of the Church’s responsibilities. The New York Times published that 
the Vatican was “[making] a sacrificial lamb out of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in its search 
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for improved relations with the Soviet Union.”544 Critics of the ostpolitik also argued that the 
lack of Vatican opposition to oppressive measures in Communist countries in return for its 
diplomatic support actually served to enhance the Communist regimes internal and external 
legitimacy.545 However, Ortaymer notes it is unclear what other policies could have been more 
successful during the 1960s and early 1970s.546 
In John Paul II’s analysis, this was not a sustainable policy in the long term. Byrnes 
proposes that John Paul II,  
…used the enormous resources of his office to focus world attention on his homeland. 
He targeted his considerable personal energy on radically reformulating Polish politics 
and government, as well as using the Polish model to effect systemic change in the 
social and political life of the European continent.547 
John Paul II’s strategic goal drew from his first-hand experience of living under the 
communist system in Poland, which gave him unique insight into its limitations.548 His 
perspective was also developed through his own intellectual formation of the concept of the 
person. As the previous chapter has shown, John Paul II developed an anthropology that 
emphasises the dignity of the person in everyday circumstances as the starting point to 
defending each person’s fundamental rights that the Polish government actively restricted.549 
This formation, Weigel argues, gave John Paul II the conviction that the primary issue with the 
pragmatic aims of the ostpolitik was its failure to properly secure the rights of persons that the 
State was obligated to protect. For John Paul II, the communist system was predicated on a 
                                                          
544 New York Times, 17 March 1971 cited in Weigel, Witness to Hope, 195. 
545 Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’, 307. 
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false conception of the person, which crippled its ability to ensure the rights of the Polish people 
in a fundamental way.550 As such, Weigel suggests John Paul II’s policy towards communism 
in Poland as, “one had to win, one had to lose.”551  
Byrnes argues that John Paul II shifted the emphasis of Papal diplomacy towards a 
firmer commitment to human rights in the public sphere, as part of his goal to “reformulate 
Polish politics.” Rather than continue the line of political toleration under the ostpolitik, John 
Paul II challenged the Polish government to improve its policies on the grounds of human 
rights, as the means to “reaching diplomatic agreements.”552 Weigel notes John Paul II made 
continual references to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1975 Helsinki 
Act in his diplomatic addresses.553 The Helsinki Act’s provisions required the Polish 
government (among other signatories) to permit the exercise of religious and association 
freedoms, in the form of permissions to form organisations, among other requirements. The 
Solidarity Trade Union cited these provisions in defence of its organising activities, to which 
John Paul II gave public support.554  
John Paul II’s decision to adopt a human rights stance towards Poland and Eastern 
Europe broadly, produced a form of political judgment consonant with his political thought. In 
1983, on his second pilgrimage to Poland, John Paul II confronted Polish leader Jaruzelski, 
declaring Poland to resemble “one giant concentration camp under martial law.”555 As a 
diplomat, John Paul II arguably used human rights language as a less confronting challenge to 
the Polish government than directly critiquing communism as a political system. Bernstein 
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555 Rooney, The Global Vatican, 144. Rooney also describes John Paul II’s face as downcast during 
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quotes Polish President Jaruzelski’s recollection of a private meeting between himself and the 
Pope:  
[The Pope always spoke] in terms of human rights or civil rights. And when we 
discussed rights we naturally mean[t] democracy. If there is democracy, then you have 
elections; if you have elections, then you have power. But he never put it that way. It 
showed his great culture and diplomacy, because in substance he used words and 
phrases you couldn’t argue with. Because if he had said, ‘you have to share power with 
Solidarity’, we would have argued about it, naturally. But when one simply mentions 
human rights, it’s such a general term, such a general notion, that you can have a 
constructive discussion, which eventually brought us [the regime] closer to that goal 
without losing face.556 
Jaruzelski notes that John Paul II’s use of human rights language was an effective 
means of facilitating constructive dialogue between the Polish government and the Holy See.  
Chapter Three explained that for John Paul II, rights are basic preconditions needed to 
guarantee participation in the political life of the community and “should be received from 
others.”557 These rights include access to employment, a just wage, and search for the truth 
without fear of censorship. Barrett states that for John Paul II, rights require the support of 
economic and political structures, as well as the support from the community to secure them.558 
As such, John Paul II’s use of rights language in his diplomacy illustrates his commitment to 
human rights as an essential political good. 
John Paul II arguably shifted Vatican foreign policy to a closer alignment with US 
foreign policy objectives. Bernstein proposes John Paul II and Ronald Reagan actively sought 
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each other’s mutual support to destabilise the Eastern bloc communist governments, and 
especially Poland, where the Church was strongest in number. Bernstein argues that Reagan’s 
closest advisors considered the Catholic Church the “crucible of anti-communist 
conviction.”559 As such, Reagan sought “both openly and covertly to forge the closest of ties 
with the Pope and the Vatican”.560 Bernstein contends that part of the “holy alliance” between 
John Paul II and Ronald Reagan involved channelling resources for Solidarity and intelligence-
sharing through the Vatican.561 
Such decisions reflect a decisive shift in the ostpolitik’s diplomatic strategy and tactics. 
As Rooney puts it, Pope John Paul II had a “way of moving past the usual diplomatic parlance 
to say exactly what he meant.”562 However, despite his belief that the ostpolitik was an 
unsustainable policy, John Paul II retained the policy and placed Cardinal Casaroli, who 
strongly supported the policy, in charge of bilateral negotiations with communist states. Weigel 
argues this decision demonstrates prudential judgment. Rather than abandon the ostpolitik 
entirely, John Paul II permitted the Vatican diplomatic service to continue the norms of 
accommodationist diplomacy while pursuing his own method of diplomatic engagement.563 
Appleby summarises the shift in John Paul II’s strategy towards Poland in these terms,  
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[Pope John Paul II] demonstrates both continuity and change in papal policy. His 
teaching on human rights, economic justice, and international order develops ideas from 
the eras of Pius XII through Paul VI. But his historical experience, his philosophical 
convictions, and his personal style of pastoral leadership and diplomacy have all set 
John Paul II's pontificate apart from his predecessors…This pope engages world leaders 
with a more explicitly geopolitical analysis than his predecessors; he speaks more 
openly about power and how it should be directed and contained.564 
The extent to which this shift in policy contributed to the collapse of the communist 
government in Poland is the subject of further analysis in the next section. However, the 
conclusion of this part can fittingly observe that John Paul II employs his political ideas of the 
rights of persons consistently in his diplomatic engagement with communist Poland. As Troy 
and others have proposed, the Pope exercised a “hybrid” agency that enables him to speak as a 
moral authority through diplomatic channels as well as to the global press and his adherents.565 
John Paul II’s agency is enhanced through his rigorous public defence of human rights. This 
seemingly contradicts the wisdom learned from Plato’s experience, that consistent public 
affirmation of political aims, worked out in “the tower” has little traction with totalitarian 
authorities.  
“Moral Authority”: Rhetoric on Pilgrimage 
Throughout his papal pilgrimages to Poland in 1979, 1983, and 1987, John Paul II 
deployed a rhetoric that consistently reinforced the idea that Poland’s national history and 
identity was inseparable from its religious history and identity. Melady contends that papal 
rhetoric is a distinctive style of “sacralising the secular.”566 In The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul 
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II: The Pastoral Visit As a New Vocabulary of the Sacred, Melady argues that the “task facing 
the Church at the time of Pope John Paul II’s elevation to the papacy was to restore a sense of 
the sacred.” John Paul II believed, according to Melady, that emphasis on the Church’s 
distinctive lens of viewing reality was an essential tool to shift away from previous Vatican 
policy of accommodating secular perspectives of the situation in Poland. In practice, John Paul 
II repeatedly “employed images of Polish history” that evoked a form of religious patriotism. 
The images of upward “struggle and conflict” serve to entrench the image of “unseen but 
omnipresent” spiritual forces that would help Poland overcome the communist system.567 The 
Pope’s rhetoric created a “forward moving and assured future” that “is also a ‘victory’ that 
must be won by those who believe that grace is more ‘powerful’ than sin.” Melady states that 
the Pope’s rhetoric drew “battle lines” between “life and death, grace and sin,” that could only 
be overcome by confronting communism through a more direct rhetoric than previous Popes 
had employed.568 
Throughout his 1979 visit, John Paul II reminded the Polish State authorities that “an 
agreement” of cooperation between the Church and State in Poland “corresponds to historical 
reasons of the nation, whose sons and daughters, in the vast majority, are the sons and daughters 
of the Catholic Church.”569 In a negotiation with Polish First Secretary Gierek for this 
agreement between the Church and State, John Paul II deployed rhetoric that called for national 
unity, through the aims of justice and peace, and through the securing of basic human rights 
for the Polish people. According to Bernstein, Gierek emphasised international détente as the 
primary path to peace. John Paul II, however, “laid down a list of conditions” that were 
“designed” to influence the Communist government to make “unprecedented concessions” to 
                                                          
567 Carl Wayne Hensley, ‘Rhetorical Vision and the Persuasion of a Historical Movement: The 
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coexist peacefully with the Church.570 In evidence of the success of this more direct approach, 
Sculz states that by the early 1980’s, “The church and [Polish President] Jaruzelski engaged in 
a permanent dialogue on every aspect of national life.”571 
 As Chapter Three argues, John Paul II’s political thought is chiefly concerned with the 
ability of people to secure their basic rights, through participating in the determination of their 
own political, cultural and economic future.572 In the Polish context, John Paul II is clear that 
the situation in his home country required the government to recognise in practical terms the 
basic rights of the Polish people to authentic participation in Poland’s social and political order. 
He stated that “the drawing together of peoples…can only be achieved on the principle of 
respect for the objective rights of the nation, such as: the right to existence, to freedom, to be a 
social and political subject, and also to the formation of its own culture and civilisation.”573 To 
secure these basic conditions, John Paul II states, “our times demand that we should not lock 
ourselves into the rigid boundaries of systems, but seek all that is necessary for the good of 
man, who must find everywhere the awareness and certainty of his authentic citizenship.”574 
These claims demonstrate a decisive shift from previous accommodationist Vatican approaches 
to Eastern Europe to a more confrontational approach. John Paul II’s language emphasises the 
central tenets of his political thought – that the Polish people have a right to determine their 
own culture, and the political system in which they participate.  
Indeed, scholars of rhetoric Melady and Jamieson suggest that John Paul II was 
thoroughly deliberate in the location of his speeches, using “dramatic symbols” and linking his 
own Polish identity to the assessment that a radical reclaiming of faith was relevant and 
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necessary in the immediate historical moment. Melady concludes John Paul II’s rhetoric 
rendered him a “credible and compelling” advocate for the Polish people.575 These decisions 
appear decisive in leading Soviet leader Gorbachev to fly to the Vatican in 1988 to meet the 
Pope to discuss Poland’s future. Weigel notes that at this meeting, Gorbachev described John 
Paul II as “the highest moral authority in the world, and a Slav.”576 
 However, it is also conceivable that John Paul II drew from his experiences in using 
caution and subtlety in his statements as a priest and Bishop in Krakow, Poland. Bernstein 
observes John Paul II’s rhetoric remained in the abstract realm of rights, rather than citing 
specific events. These included the basic rights of workers to a “just salary”, “to security”, and 
to “a day of rest” in an address to one million people in the steelworks town of Katowice. John 
Paul II connected the area of work to the question of trade unions, stating that all workers had 
“the right of free association” and to form unions as “a mouthpiece for the struggle for social 
justice”.577 The State, John Paul II proposed, “does not give us this right, it only has the 
obligation to protect and guard it” through “whatever system of relations and powers.”578 
Throughout the 1979 visit, Weigel observes John Paul II did not mention “politics” or 
“economics” once, in any of his thirty-two sermons to an estimated ten million people.579 
Instead, he repeatedly welcomed any reference the Polish authorities made to peace and a 
united Poland.580 Gaddis writes that “Wojtyła had been working quietly for years—as priest, 
archbishop, and cardinal—to preserve, strengthen, and expand the ties between the individual 
morality of Poles and the universal morality of the Roman Catholic Church. Now, as pope, he 
witnessed his success.” This highlights that John Paul II retained the experiences from his 
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cautionary approach as priest, ethics professor and Bishop in Krakow and applied them as 
Pope.581  
 John Paul II’s political judgment through the ostpolitik and his papal visits to Poland 
suggests he is aware of and practices a form of prudent accommodation. As Murphy states, 
“while martyrdom remains always a free man’s last witness to truth, there is plenty of room for 
prudence between conformism and martyrdom.” Murphy continues that “Wojtyla did not seem 
an enthusiast for death”, and, as “a general principle, the crown of martyrdom should not be 
desired as long as it can be avoided.”582 Therefore, John Paul II makes political judgments with 
integrity, but not at the “hypermoralist” extreme. On the Glendon graph, John Paul II’s strategic 
approach to “reformulate Polish politics” through the use of “dramatic symbols”, human rights 
language and closer collaboration with US administration policies, suggests he can be placed 
on the opposite side of the map to the ostpolitik of his predecessors. 
 
Figure 4.4: John Paul II on the “Glendon Graph” 
 
 Figure 4.4 indicates that John Paul II’s political judgment involved a greater degree of 
integrity, than of compromise in pursuit of his political aims. Barbato writes that Popes exercise 
the Church’s agency “most powerfully” when they engage “on principle” and out of “the clear 
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conviction of its confessions”, but is also “wisely discrete on its particularities, policy and 
procedure.”583  Gaddis captures how John Paul II’s political thought directly informs his 
decisions when he describes that John Paul II, along with US President Reagan and UK Prime 
Minister Thatcher, had “destinations in mind and mind maps for reaching them.”584 Byrnes 
echoes this view, declaring that “the pope was committed to the establishment of true, absolute 
Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms.”585 These perspectives indicate that John 
Paul II’s political thought in the “tower” informs a strategically devised method of rights 
rhetoric and diplomacy designed to pressure the Polish government in the “forum”. 
The present thesis has followed Copleston’s argument that in some cases virtue requires 
the person to act in a way that leans more towards an excess of the mean proper to that action.586 
In the virtue of practical wisdom, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards 
excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends.  John Paul 
II arguably uses means that lean on the “hypermoralist” side of the mean, though he is not a 
“hypermoralist” by Maritain’s definition. This thesis proposes John Paul II’s method of 
political judgment as diplomat and moral authority – the “forum” – draws directly from his 
political thought – the “tower”. Thought and practice intersect consistently in the Pope’s 
political decision-making. Thus, the framework shows that John Paul II’s method of political 
judgment involves “integrity” in the context of Polish communism. However, as Buttliglione 
and Murphy argue, John Paul II is sensitive to the needs of the present moment and deploys 
his moral and diplomatic agency with a degree of understanding of what means best serve his 
political aims.587 Therefore, John Paul II’s actions place him closer to the mean on the 
horizontal axis, rather than the hypermoralist extreme on the Glendon graph.  
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 The extent to which John Paul II’s aims were successful and thus whether the means 
were used in the right way, at the right time, has not yet been shown. The following section 
aims to understand the extent of John Paul II’s impact on the political events that led to Poland’s 
partial free elections on June 4, 1989. The framework engages arguments that suggest John 
Paul II exercised unprecedented influence for a Pope on Polish politics throughout the 1980s. 
However, the framework also highlights that the political conditions were most favourable for 
John Paul II’s actions to be considered the right means at the time. Thus, it will argue that the 
framework shows that political conditions enabled John Paul II’s agency, in a way that 
validates Glendon’s view that political circumstances are essential components of political 
outcomes.  
 
Section Three: Success or Failure – Is John Paul II the “Practically Wise Man”? 
  
This section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be considered “practically 
wise” in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, The Vatican and The Red Flag,588 Gaddis’ The 
Cold War: A New History are among the works that argue John Paul II’s political engagement 
with Poland had a considerable impact on the events that led to the free elections and 
subsequent collapse of communism in 1989.  In particular, John Paul II is credited with being 
the “catalyst” that caused the Solidarity Trade Union to form in 1980.589  This argument 
considers the emergence of Solidarity as both a movement and the Trade Union as a key 
contributor to the pressure that caused the communist government to hold free elections on 
June 4, 1989.590  
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However, the present thesis also considers Glendon’s view that favourable conditions 
can facilitate political agency, while unfavourable conditions can hinder effectiveness.591 
Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions 
were favourable or unfavourable for the person’s political aims. This enables her to offer some 
judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political conditions 
in the “reasons for success or failure”.592 Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right 
ends, the political circumstances must also be considered to assess John Paul II’s success in the 
pursuit of enhancing political participation through the communist collapse in Poland. 
John Paul II and the Solidarity Movement 
 During the 1979 papal visit to Poland, John Paul II had “conjured up images of a nation 
defiantly reasserting its identity against the external forces of power and coercion.” Luxmoore 
and Babiuch contend the impact of the message began to take on an organised, political form 
by mid-1980. Solidarity had needed a “spark” to ignite – and John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage 
functioned as that catalyst.593 In August 1980, at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, the same site 
where around forty-five worker protesters were shot in 1970, Lech Walesa led a strike that was 
replicated across several factories in Poland. Luxmoore notes that these strikes were distinctly 
nonviolent, more organised and more sustained than those in 1970, and 1976. Gaddis states 
that Walesa followed John Paul II’s example of “rattling the Polish authorities” when he 
announced the formation of Solidarność (Solidarity), the first ever independent trade union 
under communism in Poland.594 “The word ‘Solidarity’ appeared on the banners of the 17,000 
Gdansk strikers. The Pope’s picture was everywhere. His words were being repeated”.595 The 
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strikers’ organised and peaceful approach forced the communist government into legalising the 
Solidarity Trade Union. Gaddis observes that “the pen with which [Walesa] co-signed the 
charter for Solidarność bore the image of John Paul II. And from Rome the pontiff let it be 
known, quietly but unmistakably, that he approved.”596 
Walesa describes Poland prior to John Paul II’s election to the papacy as “in a state of 
apathy”. The perspective of the Polish people was one of fear of Soviet intervention, and a 
sense that the Communist system could not be undermined, and that social organised resistance 
with an alternative, and attractive, narrative could not be established.597 However, when Pope 
John Paul II was elected to the papacy, and visited Poland less than a year later, Walesa states 
the Polish people could “not help but notice the size of the crowds in attendance.” It is estimated 
that nearly ten million Poles saw John Paul II in person on his nine day pilgrimage, and 
“virtually the entire country” was engaged through radio and television broadcast.598 This gave, 
in Walesa’s view, the Polish people a sense that “there are a lot more of us than there are of 
them” – meaning the State.599 Walesa concluded that John Paul II’s 1979 visit to Poland had a 
direct impact on the foundation of Solidarity.600  
Without the Holy Father [in Poland, 1979], we would not have been able to take note 
of our numbers, and to organise, and the Communists would have been able to break 
us apart. So [Solidarity] was caused by coming together for prayer, yes, but it also 
helped us to count our strength in numbers.601 
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Walesa argues that John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage had a unifying and awakening effect 
on the Polish people. The crowds that attended each of the places he visited gave visible 
credibility to the idea that mass social opposition to the regime was possible, through the 
unifying force of social solidarity. At the same time, Walesa also cautions not overextending 
the role of John Paul II in the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc. Walesa believes that 
John Paul II was limited by his religious mission to help Solidarity’s organised activities 
throughout the 1980s. However, he concludes that if one “wanted to assess in percentage who 
contributed [to the collapse of communism], we would have to give 50 percent of credit for 
bringing communism down to the Pope, [and] 30 percent to Solidarity and Lech Walesa, that 
means myself.”602 
In December 1981, the Polish government banned the Solidarity Trade Union, and 
arrested several of its leaders, including Walesa. Appleby states the arrest of intellectuals and 
religious leaders, in conjunction with Poland’s economic stagnation, caused a series of worker 
and student protests throughout the 1980s. These conditions enabled John Paul II to encourage 
continued organised opposition with the support of the Polish Church under a common theme 
of solidarity.603 Byrnes links the consistency of John Paul II’s messaging in his 1979 and his 
1983 pilgrimages to Poland. When “John Paul II entered Warsaw in triumphant glory in 1979, 
and when he defiantly and repeatedly uttered the loaded word ‘solidarity’ before Polish 
audiences suffering under martial law in 1983—these were the crucial, purposefully symbolic 
acts of a very resourceful subversive.”604 Kraszewski concurs with this view, stating that “from 
a situation in Poland of social, moral and economic malaise, in which people felt that nothing 
good could happen, [John Paul II] came, and the emotional, psychological consequences were 
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inevitable.”605 Thus, Appleby declares it “indisputable” that John Paul II was “central” to the 
causing the Solidarity revolution and the communist collapse in Poland.606  
Thus, John Paul II is considered an influential actor in the collapse of communism, 
owing to his role in igniting the Solidarity Trade Union, and his support of the movement 
throughout the 1980s. The Pope’s public messaging gave the Polish people the “raw materials” 
through which to forge “tools of liberation” that were essentially “moral and cultural in nature”. 
In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s engagement with Poland helped the Polish people “find tools 
of resistance that totalitarianism cannot match”.607 However, the framework also highlights 
that the political conditions were unusually favourable for Pope John Paul II, which arguably 
enhanced his political impact. 
The “Confluence of Gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck” 
The present thesis recognises that the causes leading to the collapse of the communist 
government, signalled with the elections on 4 June 1989, are complex. Scholars disagree on 
the ultimate or even dominant causes of the communist system’s collapse across the nations 
under the Warsaw Pact.608 Several questions as to why “1989” occurred that remain contested, 
are captured by McDermott and Stibbe, who ask: 
Why did the seemingly impregnable fortresses of communism disintegrate so rapidly 
in the autumn of that year?; why was this historic transformation achieved so 
peacefully?... were internal or external developments the main motor of change?; what 
role did ‘the people’ play in the overthrow of communism, or, conversely, did the 
machinations of leading individuals account for the extraordinary events?; how far do 
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political, ideological or economic factors explain the demise?; was the collapse inherent 
in the utopianism of communism’s modernising spirit and its unshakable belief in 
hyper-centralist economic and political structures?609 
McDermott and Stibbe’s The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe,610 
provides a selection of perspectives on the causes and processes of the collapse of communist 
governments across Eastern Europe. These viewpoints emphasise a combination of political, 
economic, and international factors contributed to the final demise of governments within the 
Soviet Union. When placed within the framework, these factors constitute what Glendon calls 
the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. These factors were 
essential preconditions for John Paul II to successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish 
communist context.  
Buckley argues that Gorbachev’s introduction of the perestroika (restructuring) and 
glasnost (openness) policies in the Soviet Union were fundamental in causing the eventual 
collapse of the communist government in Poland - and in the USSR broadly. The centre of 
these policies was a shift away from the Soviet Union’s overt influence and exertion of pressure 
on its neighbouring allies.611 Within this policy shift was the complete abandonment of the 
“Brezhnev Doctrine”,612 which prescribed the use of Soviet force to repress any dissidence in 
Warsaw Pact countries – and had been deployed to great effect in Czechoslovakia in 1968.613 
Buckley observes that the new “Gorbachev Doctrine” was significant in countries like Poland, 
Hungary and Bulgaria’s transitions to more tolerant, open and pluralist regimes. In particular, 
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it sent a clear signal to Polish President Jaruzelski that martial law and the banning of the 
Solidarity Trade Union were no longer considered good policies.614  
Gorbachev’s most significant reform, according to Dahrendorf, was that the “Soviet 
army will no longer intervene when its allies go their own way”, and, as an extension, “the 
Soviet Party will not insist on the monopoly of the communist party”.615 The effect of this 
policy relieved the risk anti-communist forces in Poland faced when mobilising their 
opposition.616 In Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Dahrendorf declares that without 
Gorbachev and his “remarkable approach, the events of 1989 would not have happened in the 
particular way in which they occurred”.617 
In the Polish context, Buckley argues that Gorbachev found Polish President Jaruzelski 
to be the leader most open to reform, and most adaptable to change.618 Malia states that 
Jaruzelski’s attempts at reform communism were instigated as a result of an openness to 
Gorbachev’s perestroika. Nonetheless, when these failed and demonstrations began again in 
Poland, the Red Army were not sent in – giving credibility to the policy of supporting internal 
reform without intervention. This had the effect of enabling the Polish government to negotiate 
with internal opposition on its own terms.619 The present thesis concurs that this contributed to 
the non-violent means through which Polish communism transitioned to a pluralist, open 
market democracy.620 However, Kampleman suggests that the US nuclear weapons 
advancement also featured in Soviet calculations on the cost of intervention in Poland. By the 
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mid-1980s, it is plausible that the Soviet Union abandoned the interventionist policy because 
it was already about to lose the Cold War.621 
In addition to Gorbachev’s new foreign policy, the Soviet Union was under pressure to 
accept internal reform in Eastern Bloc countries due to its overstretched resources in the Cold 
War. War in Afghanistan, East–West agreement on missiles and dealing with strains with 
China were higher priorities than internal Eastern bloc issues.622 Further, diplomatic pressure 
applied through the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is offered as a major factor. O’Hallaron details 
how the Helsinki process created a space where human rights and security issues intersected 
between the US and the Soviet Union.623 The Helsinki Act was signed primarily by the US and 
the USSR (but not by the Vatican), to codify the status quo of the existing Yalta imperial system 
(created in 1945 at the end of the Second World War). The Act contained what became known 
as the “Basket Three” conditions. These contained a set of human rights provisions and 
compliance review procedures that in effect legalised the formation of organisations to 
scrutinise the Soviet Union’s practices and record of human rights violations. Multiple 
conferences were held in Europe between 1977-1989, which were used to provide support to 
human rights activists in Eastern bloc countries, and amplified pressure on the Soviet Union’s 
failures to keep to the commitments on human rights.624 
Gaddis, among other historians, also emphasises that Polish economic conditions 
placed the government under considerable pressure, which, in turn, also sustained the 
motivation for social opposition.625 Will offers a comparable assessment to Gaddis, and 
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provides some statistical data to highlight the deteriorating state of the Polish economy during 
the 1980s. Will states that Poland’s economy had stagnated by the mid-1980s, where the 
national monthly average pay dropped to 107,000 zlotys, which was equivalent to less than 
$US20, 57.9% of households did not have any savings, 60% of working age persons were 
physically impaired in some way, and just 10% of Polish men lived till retirement age.626 US 
military and economic pressure also contributed to Poland’s stagnant economy. The US 
Government cut its loans to the Polish government, which Poland had been using to finance its 
expenditure. The lack of US funds created economic pressure that led to mass strikes across 
Poland, which further destabilised the Polish regime’s authority.627  
Therefore, by the late 1980s, the communist leadership experienced significant 
economic, social, and political pressure from a network of forces both internal and external. 
These factors, in the present thesis’ view, constitute ideal conditions for John Paul II to engage 
Poland through the means, and at the time he deployed them. Junes, Will, and others observe 
that the timing of John Paul II’s election as the first Polish pope in history, at a time where 90% 
of the country adheres to the Catholic faith, in the context of these pressures, provides him with 
an unprecedented influence.628 The network of pressures arguably made it possible for John 
Paul II to pursue his aims with integrity, and for those means to have a tangible political impact. 
The present thesis considers John Paul II made sound political decisions, based on his 
experience as a Pole. It follows Byrnes’ view that “the pope was committed to the establishment 
of true, absolute Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms” as his distinctive political 
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aim.629 However, that these aims were successful must be considered within the network of 
forces already pressuring the Polish government.  
John Paul II’s Lessons for the Aspirant Statesperson 
The present thesis has argued that the favourable political conditions facilitated John 
Paul II’s political success. Within this context, what lessons do John Paul II’s decisions offer 
to the aspirant statesperson? Byrnes argues that by the late 1980s, the Polish Government was 
aware it needed the Church’s support to enter negotiations with Solidarity and other resistance 
groups, to deliver an acceptable package of economic and political reforms in exchange for 
ceasing public protests. Byrnes writes that, 
The Church under communism was transformed into an indispensable substitute for the 
civil society that Michnik and other dissidents so desired but that the Soviet system so 
explicitly disallowed. Therefore, when Polish political autonomy exploded in Poland 
in the form of the Solidarity trade union, it did so in a distinctively Catholic idiom. 
From the Black Madonna pin in Lech Walesa’s lapel and the striking miners lining up 
to receive Holy Communion to the revolutionary rallies held in Father Jerzy 
Popieluszko’s Warsaw parish, the articulation of free-thinking opposition to the Polish 
communist government was deeply imbedded in the only viable noncommunist 
institution to which Poles could turn, the Polish Church.630 
The Communist government proposed that the Church act as interlocutor on behalf of 
the Polish people to negotiate the reforms. At this point, the regime was offering some degree 
of power in the dialogue to the Church in Poland. John Paul II, however, chose to decline the 
government’s proposition. Weigel states that John Paul II cited Solidarity as the “proper 
representative of Polish society”, and that any negotiations must be conducted with the Trade 
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Union. In John Paul II’s view, the Church could not substitute itself as mediator, as this 
involved tacitly accepting the regime’s ban of Solidarity.631 This decision highlights John Paul 
II’s preference to retain the integrity of his principled view of the Church’s role rather than take 
the perceived immediate advantage.632 Throughout his engagement in Poland as Pope, John 
Paul II can thus be understood as a political actor who pursues political aims in the “forum” 
with consistent reference to his political principles. In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s decisions 
towards communist Poland provide a “lesson” for “the twenty-first-century statesman” that 
“moral pressure can be an important lever in world politics, but effective human rights 
advocacy and democracy-promotion require dexterity – diplomatic dexterity, and dexterity in 
waging the battle of ideas.”633 Within the framework, the thesis concurs with Weigel’s view 
that John Paul II’s decisions in this context exemplify “thinking long-term” as he does not 
“sacrifice core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”634 
The decision to reject playing “the role of opposition party” for the communist regime 
increased pressure on Jaruzelski to recognise and engage with the Polish people’s authentic 
representative, largely based in Solidarity. As a result, by early 1989 the regime negotiated 
directly with Solidarity at the Round Table discussions. The result of the discussions was, most 
significantly, the agreement to hold partial free elections on June 4 1989. Only some of the 
lower house seats could be contested, but all 100 seats in Poland’s Senate were contestable.635 
Solidarity won 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, with the 100th won by an independent 
businessman.636 Will states that the network of pressures produced a re-distribution of popular 
support in Poland, which ultimately forced the government to hold Round Table negotiations. 
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Solidarity ultimately “became a decisive factor on the political scene. No legal act will be 
enforced without Solidarity approval in… the Senate.”637 
Does John Paul II’s role within the present thesis’ account render him practically wise? 
Willey, a biographer of the pope, concludes that, 
“The rise of the Solidarity movement and indeed Poland’s subsequent transition from 
Communist dictatorship under Soviet tutelage to the first non-Communist government 
in Eastern Europe, can be traced directly back to the sense of patriotism, purpose and 
optimism generated by the Pope’s bold visit to Poland a decade before.638  
Within the context of economic, social and political pressure on the communist 
government, John Paul II’s consistent use of his “hybrid” political influence was essential to 
the formation and sustaining of the Solidarity movement. Solidarity’s electoral victory in 1989 
arguably vindicates the view that John Paul II’s support of the movement and Trade Union was 
an important contributing factor to the result. Thus, John Paul II can be said to have pursued 
the right means, at the right time.  
However, as Buckley, O’Halloran, and others have shown, the political conditions were 
unusually favourable for John Paul II. Scholars such as Weigel acknowledge John Paul II could 
not have had the same kind of effect without certain external factors that eventually forced the 
regime into negotiations with Solidarity in 1989.639  On the Glendon graph, the present thesis 
suggests it is both difficult and imprecise to consider the extent to which John Paul II can be 
considered “practically wise” in this context.  On the one hand, scholars such as Appleby, 
Kraszewski, and Bernstein, among others, argue that John Paul II exercised exceptional 
political judgment that was central to the communist collapse. Indeed, Kraszewski’s declares 
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that, of all the contributing forces to the collapse of the Communist government in Poland, “no 
factor… was more important that John Paul II.”640 Kraszewski claims that “the pope’s 1979 
pilgrimage proved more powerful than any nuclear weapons, politics, or economic 
restructuring package could ever be.”641 On the other hand, Buckley and Malia are among those 
who emphasise political and economic pressure as most determinant. Figure 4.5 maps John 
Paul II between these points. 
Figure 4.5: Perspectives on John Paul II as “Practically Wise” 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows that John Paul II falls squarely within the half of the map that leans 
towards an integrity of means, rather than a method of compromise. As has been argued, 
decisions that lean towards the excess of the mean can still produce the right outcome, and be 
the right means – though to a limited extent. There are three red marks, the highest mark on the 
vertical axis represents Kraszewski and others view that John Paul II’s decisions were 
strategically devised and correctly executed. The lowest mark on the vertical axis represents 
Buckley and others view that emphasises the political and economic conditions external to John 
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Paul II as more determinant. The centred mark is the middle point between these two 
perspectives, which, is where the present thesis suggests John Paul II can be placed.  
 The present thesis hesitates to offer a definitive conclusion on the extent of John Paul 
II’s strategic decision-making in the collapse of communism in Poland. Analyses that are more 
thorough, cited in the present thesis, offer more detailed and considered perspectives. An 
assessment of his impact is a secondary component of the present thesis; its primary concern 
is understanding the nature of John Paul II’s political decision-making with respect to his 
political thought. This is the fundamental area of analysis the method has set to understand – 
as Glendon terms them, the tension between the “forum and the tower.” The present thesis 
suggests, therefore, that John Paul II can be placed between the higher and lower points already 
given here.  
 In a final analysis, then, the Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority 
added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist 
system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force 
necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more 
significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where 
a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically. Thus, was 
John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism a feature of political luck and good timing? 
The factors observed here lend support to the idea that John Paul II fits within Glendon’s 
assessment that statespersons who aim for the right ends, at the right time, using the right 
means, can be aided by felicitous political conditions.  
Conclusion  
John Paul II can be understood as a political actor through the framework developed in 
this thesis. The developed and adopted method has highlighted that John Paul II used political 
means in the “forum” in a way that retained the integrity of his political aims from the “tower”. 
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As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II engaged Poland under Communism through “moral-
diplomacy”.642 As part of his new political agency as Pope, he shifted the Vatican’s policies 
under the ostpolitik towards his own political aims. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt 
references to human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to 
Poland, especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist 
government. His moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that, 
arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of 
conscience”.643 The impact this had on the formation of Solidarity is tangible. This was backed 
up by continual public affirmation of the rights of the Polish people to live in solidarity, that 
there could be “no freedom without solidarity”.644 
However, the present thesis highlights that the network of political, social and economic 
pressures arguably facilitated John Paul II’s ability to pursue his aims with integrity, and for 
those means to have a tangible political impact. These pressures constitute what Glendon calls 
the “optimal confluence” of “gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. John Paul II’s role 
in the collapse of communism in Poland reflects that unique confluence of circumstances, and 
John Paul II’s efforts. Therefore, that these aims were successful must be considered within the 
network of forces already pressuring the Polish government. The Glendon graph illustrates that 
John Paul II acts with integrity as a political actor in this context, and preferences long-term 
aims over immediate advantages. It is difficult to measure the extent of his effectiveness 
through this framework. However, it is arguable that John Paul II achieved his political aims, 
and that favourable political conditions facilitated that success. 
  
                                                          
642 Barbato and Joustra, ‘Introduction: Popes on the Rise’, 1. 
643 Weigel, The Final Revolution, 191. 
644 Weigel, The End and The Beginning, 184 
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Conclusion  
 
“At sea it is good sailing to run before the gale, even if the ship cannot make harbour; 
but if she can make harbour by changing tack, only a fool would risk shipwreck by holding 
the original course rather than change it and still reach his destination.”645 
 
This thesis has examined how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his 
decisions to influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It has argued 
that his philosophical formation in the shadow of totalitarianism helped shape his view that 
participation in political, economic and social activities are basic human rights. As the first 
Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, he combined the conventional diplomatic 
and moral authority of the papacy with his own experiences of totalitarian regimes to influence 
events leading to the collapse of the Polish Communist government in 1989. The present 
research has shown that John Paul II’s political philosophy and Polish context directly informed 
his political strategy to encourage the Polish government to increase its citizens’ political, 
social and economic freedoms, while advocating nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it has 
demonstrated that John Paul II, as a philosopher in the tower, made political decisions as a 
statesperson in the forum that were consistent with his philosophical influences and 
convictions.   
The thesis drew from Mary Ann Glendon’s The Forum and The Tower to examine the 
lives and decisions of prominent scholars and statespersons who grappled with tensions 
between political ideals and practical realities. For Glendon, the tower conveyed philosophy, 
specifically political theory, whereas the forum represented political decision-making and 
action.646 It argued that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics helped understand Glendon’s 
                                                          
645 Cicero, cited in Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38. 
646 Ibid., 44-5. 
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thought about the relationship between political theory and political practice, outlined in The 
Forum and The Tower. For example, it observed that Glendon used Aristotle’s claim in the 
Politics that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” 
are “philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to 
be politically effective and retain moral integrity.  Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue, 
it showed that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians 
deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and mean forms of 
political judgment. Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically 
wise man”, to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom.  
Aristotelian phronesis provided a reference point for how political actors in The Forum 
and The Tower engage in a moral process of political deliberation. The process considers the 
short-term advantages of compromising on political views, versus the merits of retaining moral 
integrity by not sacrificing “core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”647 Maritain’s 
essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and 
“Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels denoting excessive forms of political judgment. 
Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain something impracticable and merely ideal, 
where the practitioner refuses pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life. 
Machiavellianism, which is at the other extreme, denies the value of moral integrity in political 
practice. The practically wise statesperson must begin by acting between these two extremes. 
Indeed, it is both difficult for the statesperson to act precisely at the middle point between these 
extremes; by its very nature, political action is imprecise. It proposed that, for this reason, 
ethical action can only provide general and approximate accuracy. As such, in some cases, the 
appropriate action would involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the 
reverse in others. For example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more 
                                                          
647 Weigel, "Lessons in Statecraft", 29. 
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audacious act, rather than a reserved one. The challenge for the statesperson is to identify 
whether circumstances in the present moment are favourable for acting on the side of strongly 
held moral principles, or whether an act that involves a tacit compromise on principles, better 
serves their aims.  
The Glendon method has enabled consideration of the extent to which the political 
decisions of subjects analysed in The Forum and The Tower demonstrate the virtue of practical 
wisdom. Investigation via this method highlights how political actors engaged in a moral 
process of deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. These 
are decisions that involved deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with 
apparent advantage.”648 Applied to John Paul II, the method highlighted his political thought 
is built on his intense interest in the fundamental dignity and rights of the human person. This 
formed the basis of his political thought, which argued that all persons have a fundamental 
right to participate in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community.  
John Paul II used political means in the forum in a way that retained his political aims 
from the tower. As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II’s ostpolitik revealed a strategic shift 
in the Vatican’s policies towards Poland. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt references to 
human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to Poland, 
especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist government. As has 
been proposed, his moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that, 
arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of 
conscience”. The thesis has also proposed that the network of political, social and economic 
pressures at the time made it possible for John Paul II to pursue his aims without compromising 
his integrity in terms of means, and for those means to have tangible political impact. These 
pressures constitute what Glendon calls the optimal confluence of “gifts, favourable conditions 
                                                          
648 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38  
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and plain luck”. Thus, John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism in Poland is aided by 
the unique confluence of circumstances that met his efforts.  
The thesis has found that the adapted Glendon framework and the corresponding graph 
of practical wisdom can be reapplied heuristically into to new contexts. It has tested the 
framework in an original study on Pope John Paul II, focussed to one historical context of his 
decision-making as Pope. Future studies might well pick up this work, seeking to provide 
insights into other prominent political actors who grappled with the same tension between their 
principles and the demands of practical politics. In other words, one could follow this thesis’ 
example, and take up another candidate that Glendon suggests is worth studying, such as 
Thomas More.649 The framework would in this case enable a study of how More used silence 
on his beliefs to retain his Chancellorship under King Henry VIII, but ultimately refused to 
compromise on his views to the point of his own execution. Alternatively, more recent 
statespersons, such as former US President Barack Obama, show how contemporary 
perspectives of political judgment emphasise compromise. Obama’s reflections in The 
Audacity of Hope650 provide his view that prudent decision-making must err on the side of 
compromise, to be politically effective in modern democracies. The framework thus enables 
an understanding of how different political actors prioritise retention of moral integrity when 
faced with challenging political realities.  
  
                                                          
649 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 44-45. 
650 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New York: 
Three Rivers Press, 2007). 
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APPENDIX A: Timeline  
 
Timeline of Karol Wojtyla and Polish Communism 1920-1989651 
MAY 18, 1920 Karol Józef Wojtyła is born in Wadowice and baptized on 
June 20. 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1939- 
JANUARY 1945 
World War II begins as Germany invades Poland. The 
German Occupation abandons Kraków in 1945 and the Soviet 
Union’s Red Army takes control of Poland. 
NOVEMBER 1, 1946   Karol Wojtyła is ordained a priest by Cardinal Sapieha. 
MAY, 1955  Establishment of Warsaw Pact joining Poland to the USSR 
MARCH 8, 1964 & JUNE 28, 
1967  
Karol Wojtyła installed as Archbishop of Kraków, and made a 
Cardinal three years later by Pope Paul VI. 
AUGUST, 1968  ‘Prague Spring’ anti-communist reforms in Czechoslovakia 
aborted by Soviet-led military invasion 
DECEMBER, 1970  Mass strikes begin in the Gdansk shipyard, Poland. 46 Polish 
workers shot and killed by Polish soldiers. 
OCTOBER 16, 1978 Wojtyla is elected as the first Polish Pope and takes the name 
John Paul II. 
JUNE 2-10, 1979 Pope John Paul II visits Poland for his Nine Day Pilgrimage. 
Seen by an estimated 10 million people in person. 
JULY 2, 1980 Mass strikes in Poland in protest of economic stagnation, low 
wage growth, worker conditions and price increases of thirty 
percent to one hundred percent on beef, pork, and high-grade 
poultry. 
AUGUST 31, 1980  Strikes cease with formal legalising of ‘Solidarity’, the first 
“independent self-governing trade union”. Solidarity gains 10 
million members within 10 months. 
 
                                                          
651 Dates and information taken from Weigel, Witness to Hope, and McDermott and Stibbe, ‘The 
Revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe’, xiv-xvi. 
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